III. METODOLOGÍA
3.5 Procedimientos
The base scenario reflects environments of insurgency dynamics in Nepal. It describes how insurgency evolves, its intensity and its cost compared with reference data. The behavior generated by a generic model under base scenario is the product of the number of actor involve;
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capacity poses; people’s perception about activities; and development of the element of the state capacity. Base scenario based on the assumptions that lack of understanding the entire dynamism of insurgency development and mitigation has contributed to the cost of the conflict. This part attemptstodiscussonvariouspossibleconditionsatwhichintensityand cost of insurgency rest on. 6.5.1. Adjustment Time and Insurgency Dynamics
This study aims to observe the behavior of the insurgency dynamics and its response over time. Time delay is an important consideration of any system dynamics modeling. Number of time elements assumed in this study. Changes in adjustment time produce different behavior in the system. Some variables are sensitive to the time delay and some are not. Extreme condition test in section 5.3.5 explains the impact of the time element on growth of the insurgency such as time to join the insurgency, an average career of insurgent, time to weary, time to create pressure, time to dissatisfy, and so on. Some of the time elements balance the effect of other time elements. For example, longer time to weary deepens the intensity of conflict, but longer time to dissatisfy balance this effect in the system. Similarly, shorter time to create pressure increases intensity of conflict while shorter war weariness compensates its result.
6.5.2. Parameter and Insurgency Dynamics
Some of the parameters are highly sensitive to the model behavior. Section 5.3.5 describes the sensitivity of parameter. Insurgent parameter, satisfaction parameter, economic effect parameter, maximum suppressive acts are some of the sensitive parameters in the model. The difference of the value of these parameters will lead to much difference in the model behavior. The sensitivity analysis in section 5.3.6 describes parameter sensitivity. However, there are compensating natures of these parameters. For example, high value of the satisfaction parameter will compensate low value of insurgent parameter and vice versa.
6.5.3. Scenarios and Insurgency Dynamics
Section 6.2 describes different possible conflict scenarios and explains how and to what extent the behaviors differ with the base scenario. This section explains in which condition these scenarios play remarkable contribution to deepening or weakens insurgency.
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Scenario one assumes that the state capacity ensures resource availability to the security force;
compensate adverse effects of insurgency to the economy and stop insurgent recruitment. Section 6.2.2 describes the impact of state capacity by taking different value of it. This scenario clearly shows that a strong state capacity reduces intensity of conflict significantly, because the security force may control insurgency without compromising level of public satisfaction. The cost of conflict will also be low because state capacity compensates an adverse effect of conflict to the economy. However, weak state capacity supports insurgent recruitment and ability to commit incidents. On the other hand, security force could not launch sufficient counterinsurgency operation due to lack of resources. Weak state capacity could not able to compensate bad result of the insurgency, therefore, increase an indirect cost of conflict. Moderate state capacity does not play higher impact on the system; other elements do play an import role in insurgency dynamism.
Scenario two assumes changes in the population size affect the insurgency dynamics. However,
compared to other scenarios, the intensity of conflict taking population stock constant or dynamic do not generate much difference in the system behavior.
Scenario three assumes actors’ activities do not affect the level of public satisfaction. Section
6.2.4 describes that if insurgent activities assume to be free with public satisfaction, the intensity of conflict increases; if security force activities do not create bad effect on public satisfaction, the intensity of conflict decreases. It is because dissatisfaction with the government is the engine of growth of the insurgency in this model. It is why the actors should try not to dissatisfy people while launching their strategies of the defeating enemy. As discussed in Chapter Three, they should be serious that direct or indirect actions against the opponent should not have an adverse impact on the people if they are pursuing long term strategy to achieve their goal. What is seen in Nepal that, especially, the Maoist, pursue a strategy of exciting and compelling security force to commit coercive actions so as to gain public sympathy.
Scenario four describes if insurgent and security force has sufficient resource capacity to
involve in the conflict, the intensity of conflict increase to some degree. However, insufficient resource capacity and excess resource capacity of both parties reduce intensity of conflict. Section 6.2.5 explains three time greater resource capacity of both actors increase insurgent
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number at initial state but later it began to decrease sharply. This scenario explains that the inadequate resource reduces conflict intensity remarkably, but excess resource does not contribute to increasing the level of conflict. The scenario explains why both parties pursue strategy of destroying opponent resource as discussed in section 3.3.2 rather than to improve their resource capacity.
Scenario five assumes the incident suppression loop switch off and none of offensive action by
the security force. In this situation, the result shows that the intensity of conflict slows down. It is because, less coercive action by security force do not hamper public support on the on hand and do not favor insurgent recruitment on the other. However, the question arises that is there any possibility of being captured by the Maoist? It is not possible because defensive strategy keeps public support intact with the government that stops insurgent recruitment. They rely on a limited number. In such situation, their number constantly reduces due to regular retirement and attrition when they commit offensive actions. The hypothesis that less use of power may have a chance of being captured is wrong. House searching, tedious checking in the highway and other offensive actions by security force becomes unpopular in Nepal that dissatisfies people turned into support to the Maoist. So it can argue that less coercive actions could be beneficial in the long run.
Scenario six describes the intensity of conflict is low if the insurgent creation loop is switched
off. Section 6.2.7 shows the insurgent number and cost of conflict reduced significantly if this formulation assumed to be true. According to this scenario, the security force should pursue a strategy of moderating insurgent recruitment. Security force should be aware of not to interfere civil life to prevent recruitment while committing suppressive actions. That requires their strong intelligence mechanism so that they can attack on a legitimate target, which is quite weak as discussed in chapter three.
Scenario seven describes how war weariness affects insurgency dynamics and cost of conflict.
Assumptions for this scenario are no war weariness and shorter and longer time delay to perceive war weariness. Section 6.2.8 describes that longer the time taken to recognize war weariness, the higher the intensity of conflict. The idea of war weariness is an important component of insurgency dynamics in the model. As discussed in chapter three, war weariness creates pressure
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for dialogue and pulls back security force for a peaceful resolution. If there is no war weariness, the government use excessive force that dissatisfy people and strengthen insurgent recruitment, therefore, deepen the conflict even more. What everyone sees, as discussed above, in Nepal that the intensity of the violent incident grow sharply at initial stage, because war weariness has longer time delay to perceive.
Scenario eight describes how after the insurgency cost contributes to increasing total cost of the
insurgency in the long run. Insurgency has short-term as well as long-term impact in term of cost associated with it. It is the cost that directs variation to the intensive of conflict, and it comes with the lifetime approximated from the life of soldiers who came back and still alive. Section 6.2.9 describes its impact can be seen many years even after the end of the insurgency.
6.6 Summary
All the insurgency scenarios seem to be costly in term of life, liberty, peace and economy. Whatever the scale of the insurgency, the country must bear such costs. The benefits may be if managed wisely; awareness, issues come into surface that are suppressed before and most importantly realization of truth. The Maoist came to mainstream politics and share power in government after peaceful resolution in 2006. However, the causes of conflict argued as discrimination, poverty, underdevelopment, unemployment and so on remain the same. The country still facing the problem of conflict and continue struggling to settle it with a peaceful manner. The election of second constitutional assembly held in late 2013 bring some hope of improvement in Nepal. From all scenario simulated, the intensity and cost of conflict could be minimized only if both parties in the conflict be responsible for the people; minimize aggression and coercive actions. Use of less military solution could be the best way for Nepal. What have seen in the simulation that the party who committed in minimum coercive activities benefited much and the cost to the economy also tolerable.
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