Procedimientos para la Operación y Mantenimiento de la Aplicación WAMS

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was based on a poor war plan. It can be said to have been a campaign plan for a few battles rather than a war plan as such. Its incompleteness became clear in the aftermath of the war.

“It was a horrible war plan,” said Patrick Clawson of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “because everybody was saying that you need to fight the war in such a way that you stand up a new authority afterward – and the war plan didn’t have a depth of thinking about that.” (Chomsky and Achcar, 2007). (Refer Figure 3: Map of Iraq: War on Terrorism):

Figure 3: Map of Iraq: War on Terrorism.

(Source: http://www.waronterrornews.com/images/iraq-map.gif)

In the Iraq war the Americans provided the majority of forces on the ground, in the air and at sea. Although the British contribution was welcomed by the US, it was that of a junior partner. Nevertheless, the overthrow of the regime in Iraq was achieved in record time by the US and their allies.80

The hunt for Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the casus belli, was quickly forgotten when the coalition realised there were no WMD to be found. The Iraqis fielded a sizeable army but their resistance had not been powerful enough. The Americans came, saw, conquered and then realised that they had no aftermath plan (Schlager, 2005).

However, there were no public cheers for democracy, no indication that this was the people’s choice. The war was launched because Saddam Hussein, President of Iraq,

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The Law of War in the War on Terrorism, http://web.ebscohost.com Retrieved 03/08/2007

refused to co-operate with the United Nations inspectors in their search for his forbidden weapons of mass destruction.81

Iraq fielded an army of nearly 400 000 soldiers, equipped with tanks, armed vehicles and artillery against an army not even close in numbers, but still the Iraqi army was defeated. The latter army did not fight at the frontier, it did not fight at geographical obstacles, it hardly defended the cities, and did not even defend the capital, Baghdad, where many of the world media predicted that Saddam would stage his Stalingrad (McDermot, 2006:174-175).

After the capture and fall of Baghdad, no trace of the government could be found. The US high command distributed packs of cards, each bearing the photographic image of a wanted man. Fortunately, this yielded results (Bergen, 2006) and the Deputy Prime Minister was arrested (Tariq Aziz), as well as a number of important role players in Saddam’s regime.

The invasion and occupation of Iraq comprised an index of errors of commission and omission (McDermot, 2006:174-175). Elections were held despite the Sunni boycott and constitutions were drafted in record time, even though there were flaws. Both Saddam’s sons Qusay and Uday were killed during a gun battle in the northern city of Mosul.

Finally, the mystery of the whereabouts of the dictator himself became known. An intelligence team working through Saddam’s family tree, identified his whereabouts. A party of American infantry soldiers, revisiting a farm already searched, discovered the entrance to an underground hiding place. When the trapdoor was lifted a heavily bearded Saddam was found (Galbraith, 2006:89-90). He held up his hands and announced that he was the President of Iraq and ready to negotiate. No incriminating evidence connecting Hussein and his regime with the 9/11 plotters or with Al-Qaeda, the organisation, was found.

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Iraq is one of the most invaded and violated territories in the world, so the people who live in that country have long possessed survival and accommodating skills. For this reason America and its allies should have made an effort to study the Iraqis and the terrain thoroughly before invasion (Keegan, 2007:1-8).

Ali al-Wardi, an Iraqi sociologist, claims that due to frequent invasions which devastated Iraq, the Iraqis would rapidly regress from civilisation and revert to the culture and values of tribal nomads. Because the people of Iraq are divided amongst themselves with regard to sectarian, ethnic and tribal issues, it appears that there is no way to resolve this other than by adopting a democratic system. There was ultimately no surprise about the collapse of Hussein and his people, since he had waged war against Iraq many times before. He had exhorted the population to stay loyal to him, and his execution caused cheers and joyful celebrations (Allawi, 2007:1-16; Galbraith, 2006:1- 13).

In March 2003 the US government announced that diplomacy had failed in Iraq, and that it would proceed together with a coalition of allied countries, called the 'Coalition of the Willing', to rid Iraq of its alleged weapons of mass destruction.82 On 16 September 2004 Kofi Annan, the then Secretary General of the UN, indicated that the invasion of Iraq was not in conformity with the UN Charter, and therefore illegal (Annan, BC News).

As the war proceeded no weapons of mass destruction could be found in Iraq, neither could any link be found between Saddam and Al-Qaeda. These two reasons were originally given as the casus belli for the war on terrorism (Pena, 2006:25-35).

Maj. Gen. John Batiste, who commanded the 1st Infantry division in Iraq for a year, said that the initial US approach helped create the problems that followed. He said that the US had violated two principles fundamental to success. In other words, he argued that the US approach to the war failed to heed two of the most basic rules of military operations: Firstly, have everybody working toward the same goal, with one person in

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charge. Secondly, have enough people and machines to complete the job. Col. Teddy Spain, Chief of US military police forces in Baghdad, agreed with Batiste's assessment (Ricks, 2007:115-148).

Much has been written about the decisions of George W. Bush and Tony Blair concerning Iraq. Ultimately both Bush and Blair stated that the judgment of their decision-making will rest with posterity and the Almighty (Hakki, 2002).

The following question needs to be addressed: What would have happened if the coalition had not taken action against Saddam Hussein? He would still have been in power, using torture as a governing policy and a tool to abuse human dignity and human rights (Schlager, 2005).

The question is whether the world would rather have had a Saddam free to abuse human rights, to terrorise his own people – free to trade and pass on his regime to his sons with the same outlook and beliefs? It is well-known that Hussein had negotiations with jihadists to join him to fight the West and that he never abandoned the dream of acquiring nuclear weaponry (Bergen, 2006:28)

It was important for the West to defeat terrorism, which implies that terrorists must be denied safe places to train or gather. For this reason the invasion in Iraq is understandable. However, the greatest benefit of the invasion of Iraq was the advancement of democratic values in the Arab world. As a result of the defeat of Iraq, the first free and fair elections ever took place in an Arab country. The signs of people taking up the struggle across the Middle East against jihadists, is even more significant. In Iran students and bus drivers have been among the people determined to take up the fight against Islamist establishments. In Lebanon open public protest has forced Syria to withdraw its forces and give the nation breathing space again.

After years of oppression, the people in the Middle East deserve the opportunity to enjoy the same rights and freedoms as the Westerners (Garrett, 2005:85-93).