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I refer to an agent’s effort to address their involvement in social structural harm as ‘taking up responsibility’ for a number of reasons. Unlike direct interpersonal moral responsibilities, addressing participation in social structural harms almost certainly involves some effort on the part of the individual. An agent will usually need to change their behaviour, they will need to research where the products they purchase have come from and the circumstances under which they have been made. They will need to become involved in efforts to reform social structures in order to make them non-harmful. If in a position to do so, they may be required to compensate for past involvement in harm. Whatever action they take, they will need to take some action in order to address their participation. Taking up responsibility for social structural harm requires an agent to alter their daily interactions and participation in social structure. Since involvement in harm has become normalised into contemporary society, agents will have to work hard in order to change this. I shall therefore attempt to draw out some of the most pressing problems agents need to overcome in order to take up their moral responsibly for social structural harms.

Taking up responsibility for participation in social structural harm is made more difficult than addressing other moral responsibilities because the harm is widely accepted as normal by most people. If an agent goes around stealing, lying, and injuring others directly, people are going to notice this behaviour and call into question the agent’s moral fibre. If, on the other hand, the agent is an extremely morally conscientious individual in their direct interactions with others, but continues to participate in harmful social structural exchanges such as buying sweatshop-made produce, it is unlikely anyone will think their behaviour morally questionable at all. Continuing participation in harm is therefore quite easy, it is already an accepted part of daily life and no-one is likely to criticise an agent for their involvement.

163 Responsibility for social structural harm is different from other forms of moral responsibility. It is collective, because social structures are necessarily collective, and so responsibility for the harms they cause is collective. As these harms are different from direct interpersonal harms, the way in which they must be addressed is also different. Only seeking to address the specific harm that an agent’s particular participation has caused is not possible because individual contributions are not isolatable in this way. Simply withdrawing will also not be sufficient in this instance. Withdrawing fully may not be an option, but even where it is, doing so will not redress the harm already caused. It may also place the agent in a position that makes taking up responsibility for harm already caused more difficult, as social structures have the capacity to provide agents with a greater range of opportunities to act than they could access acting in isolation. The first step in taking up responsibility for social structural harm , therefore, is to develop a more accurate understanding of the nature and implications of participating in harmful social structural activities.

Although the amount of effort expanded individualism requires from each agent is small when we consider the amount of harm social structures produce, it still has big implications for the way in which agents should lead their lives. Some may therefore question whether continued involvement in social structures is desirable. Given the amount of change agents are required to undertake, it could be asked whether it would not just be easier for agents to do their best to simply withdraw from social structural participation. This approach, if it were possible, would only stop an agent participating in further harm. It would not address harms in which the agent has already participated. This approach also fails to take into account the importance of social structures in our lives. Even if it were possible for an agent to withdraw, the implications for that agent’s ability to fulfil their goals and for them to continue to have the kinds of social interaction to which they will have become accustomed would be huge.

Establishing that an agent has participated in a large-scale harm and as a consequence bears some responsibility for that harm does not provide an agent with much information regarding how they are best to discharge that responsibility. When it comes to harms which are collectively brought about, it is important to remember that individual agents do not bear sole responsibility for redressing collective harms, but they do share in the responsibility with other participants. Individual agents cannot address social structural harms alone because the harms are produced on a large scale and involve a great many agents, acting alone would give an agent very little scope to tackle the problems involved. This raises the question of what actions an agent should take in order to address their responsibility for social structural harm.

164 Considering the harm caused by the global clothing industry, one suggestion might be that we simply boycott sweatshop produced items, thus ending our involvement in this particular social structure. This is a problematic approach for several reasons. Firstly, it would be very difficult for most of us to do this. Apart from the limited supply of fair-trade clothing, these items can be much more expensive than their chain-store equivalent, as fair-trade clothing companies currently lean towards more boutique high-end fashion. Secondly, the sudden withdrawal of custom would make huge numbers of sweatshop employees destitute without making any provisions for their support. Thirdly, sweatshop workers do not want to lose their jobs, what they want are jobs with fair pay and conditions. At the same time, we will continue to need and want clothes, so boycotting clothing manufacturers en masse does not serve either party particularly well.

In order to ensure that those employed in sweatshops get fair treatment, consumers need to support and campaign for industry changes, through petitioning companies and supporting ethical initiatives. They also need to be prepared to make some changes to their interactions, through changes in their shopping habits, for example. The number of clothes and the amount we are prepared to pay for these items may, for instance, need to change. Some companies have started to move towards more ethical approaches to their supply chains, Marks and Spencer is a notable example of this.333 _{Purchasing from companies that are actually engaging in institutional}

reform helps support this change and also encourages other companies to follow suit. Simply boycotting social structures, then, is not the answer. Attempting to leave a social structure, apart from often being totally impractical, is an inappropriate response as it renders the agent less able to address the harms in which they have already been involved. Boycotting mass produced clothing would almost certainly be more harmful for workers than continued participation, and charities working with sweatshop employees argue that to simply stop buying clothes put workers at risk.334

Attempting to leave a harmful social structure is an understandable response when faced with the realisation that participation perpetuates so much harm. But the desire to remove oneself from the situation demonstrates a continued narrow individualist view of the problem of social structural harm. Leaving would stop the individual agent’s involvement, but it would not address the wider problem. In order to understand what morality requires of individual participants in order to address these harms, agents need to shift their focus from their individual participation

333 _{Marks and Spencer’s ‘Plan A’ aims to transform their business into a fairer, more sustainable enterprise, with goals} including paying worker a living wage and reducing the environmental damage caused in their manufacturing procedures.

165 to the wider patterns of participation in which they are involved. As Goodin suggests, the best way to do this ‘is to set up institutions to attend systematically to morally important demands that we individually can attend to only partially and imperfectly.’335 _{Agents need to discern the best}

collective approach to reforming social structures, working out the most effective collective strategy for change and then establishing the way in which individuals can act to bring this about.

Shifting focus from the direct effects of a specific agent’s actions to considerations of how many actions will combine may seem difficult for an individual agent to achieve, but it is again important for participants to realise that they are not solely responsible for these interactions. Agents in different parts of a social structure will have more information regarding the way in which that structure operates than others. Considering the case of harms caused by the global fashion industry, agents working directly with sweatshop employees through charities or other NGOs have direct access to information regarding these harms and the ways in which workers are affected. Clothing companies and their suppliers and distributors are also better positioned within a structure to know what kind of actions need to be taken in order to make the structure of the industry non-harmful. These agents are able to make this information readily available to most participating agents, particularly with the increasingly widespread access to the internet. It is then the responsibility of agents to refer to this information before purchasing items. Consumers can also join campaigns and participate in other advocacy activities as recommended by those more closely involved in order to help change the interactions within the social structure. This does require agents to put some thought into how they participate with others in their daily lives, but the level of effort required is small when compared with the very great difference such actions would have on the suffering of others.

One thing that should have hopefully become clear through this discussion is that in order to effectively address social structural harm agents need to work together with other participants. Just as these harms cannot be brought about by agents working in isolation, they cannot be redressed by the uncoordinated, unorganised effort of individuals. The ability of agents to improve social structural processes is increased through cooperation. A donation of £20, if given directly from one individual to another, can of course bring them some benefit. Combining that £20 with other donations to provide vital coordinated support services and institutional reform is, however, more likely to contribute to an agent’s long-term wellbeing. Taking up responsibility for social structural harm requires agents to think carefully about their participation in social

166 structures and to work constructively with others in order to reform these structures to make them beneficial for everyone.