• No se han encontrado resultados

3. Desarrollo de la Propuesta

3.5 Arquitectura del geoservicio

3.5.3 Proceso

Unlike CP rights, such as the right to life, ESC rights are to be progressively realized within the States’ maximum available resources, as embedded in Article 2 § 1 ICESCR.40Article 2 § 1 ICESCR sets out the principal obligations of States with

37 I.E. Koch, ‘Dichotomies, Trichotomies or Waves of Duties?’, Human Rights Law Review

2005, 5(1), pp. 81-103, p. 92.

38 Ibid., p. 91.

39 See, for a general reference to the tripartite typology e.g., UN CESCR, CO: Greece, UN

Doc. E/C.12/GRC/CO/2, 27 October 2015, § 8; See, M. Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Antwerp: Intersentia, 2003, p. 210; Ibidem supra note 37.

40 Article 2 ICCPR (GA Res. 2200A (XXI), 1966) stresses that each State party ‘undertakes

to take the necessary steps (…), to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized’. Τhe respective provision encompasses an immediate obligation to respect and ensure all rights recognised in the ICCPR; Article 2 § 1 ICESCR (GA Res. 2200A (XXI), 1966).

regard to the rights subsequently included in ICESCR and is of fundamental importance for the Covenant, as it defines its scope within the human rights practice.41Nevertheless, this provision is surrounded with great ambiguity with

respect to its implementation. Most illuminating, in scholarly writings, is the argument that Article 2 § 1 ICESCR is ‘a fairly unsatisfactory article, with its convoluted phraseology in which clauses and sub-clauses are combined together in an almost intractable manner, making it virtually impossible to determine the precise nature of the obligations’.42

Hence, given this ambiguity, at the UN level, attempts have been made to clarify the meaning of the aforementioned provision and its implementation issues by the treaty monitoring body of the ICESCR, namely the CESCR (see section 4.2.1). As regards the right to health, the CESCR in its authoritative source, GC No. 14, by using the clause of progressive realization recognizes the fact that the right to health cannot be achieved immediately or in a short period of time, but rather its realization is a continuing process subject to a State’s available resources.43

However, this policy freedom given to States could lead to misunderstandings in that States could claim that they are not obliged to ensure any given level of protection of this right and excuse their failure to take steps based on the assertion of lack of economic growth and of insufficient national resources.44To avoid this

misinterpretation on the part of the States, the CESCR has set a number of limitations on this wide margin of discretion in virtue of the progressive nature of the right to health. Particularly, the Committee has explained that the concept of progressive realization ‘should not be interpreted as depriving States parties’ obligation of all meaningful content’, namely the minimum subsistence of the right to health, also known as its core content, as will be elaborated below.45On

the contrary, States are obliged to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible 41 Br. Griffey, ‘The “Reasonableness” Test: Assessing Violations of State Obligations under

the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’, Human Rights Law Review2011, 11(2), pp. 275-327, p. 280.

42 M.C.R. Craven, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A

Perspective on its Development, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995, p. 151.

43 Ibidem supra note 6, GC No. 14, § 31; See, UN CESCR, General Comment No. 3:The

Nature of State Parties’ Obligations, UN Doc E/1991/23, 14 December 1990, § 9.

44 J. Asher, The Right to Health: A Resource Manual for NGOs, London, UK: Commonwealth

Medical Trust 2004, p. 23.

45 Ibidem supra note 6, GC No. 14, § 31; See, other authoritative sources, e.g., The Maastricht

Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, NQHR1997, 15(2), pp. 244-252. Pursuant to Guideline 8 the State cannot use the ‘progressive realization’ provisions as a pretext for non-compliance.

by taking deliberate, concrete and targeted steps and by guaranteeing the principle of non-discrimination.46In other words, while taking into account resource

availability and progressive nature of the right, States must show the extent of the level of protection for the right to health in their countries respectively, which is an immediate obligation of the States parties, through careful planning and by priority setting.47

The Committee has further explained that it is not permissible for States based on the requirement to use the maximum of available resources in the implementation of the right to health, to take retrogressive measures, namely to lean back with respect to the protection of the right, that will undermine the realization of the right to health.48Note by way of example that the second Special Rapporteur on

the Right to Health (Anand Grover) has underlined that the limitations on the health care benefits due to the economic crisis are in contrast to State obligation to refrain from taking retrogressive measures that impact on health.49This implies

that States are required to use effectively their available (limited) resources in terms of responding to the needs of their populations within their jurisdictions (see section 4.2). In case of adoption of any deliberately retrogressive measures on the part of a State, such as a reduction in its expenditures, the Committee in its GC No. 14 has argued that the State has the burden of proving that such measures have been introduced after the most careful consideration of all alternatives and that they are duly justified by reference to the totality of the rights provided for in ICESCR in the context of the full use of the State’s maximum available resources.50

Nonetheless, the Committee’s approach is quite ambiguous as regards to the evaluation of the State’s aforementioned course of action in relation to the right

46 Ibid., GC No. 14 (supra note 6), §§ 30-31; See, other authoritative sources, e.g., Limburg

Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN ESCOR, 4thComm, 43rdsess, Annex, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17, § 21

(a reference to the State obligation to move expeditiously towards the realization of ESC rights is made).

47 Ibid., GC No. 14, § 30; See, other authoritative sources, e.g. Limburg principles (supra note

46), § 23 and 28; Ibidem supra note 20, E. Riedel 2009, pp. 21-39, p. 30.

48 Ibidem supra note 6, GC No. 14, § 32; Ibidem supra note 39, M. Sepúlveda, p. 323. 49 UN, The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical

and Mental Health: Report of the Special Rapporteur, Anand Grover, UN HRC, 23rd Sess.,

Agenda Item 3,UN Doc. A/HRC/23/41, 15 May 2013, § 38.

50 Ibidem supra note 6, GC No. 14, § 32; Ibidem supra note 43, GC No. 3, § 9; The CESCR

has suggested a number of criteria by which to evaluate the adoption of retrogressive measures under the justification of resource constraints on the part of a State, such as a reduction in expenses, see section 4.2.1 (b).

to health, given that the Committee has not specified any practical oriented guidelines as to the precise course to be taken by States within their jurisdictions.51

Besides the obligation of the States to progressively realize ESC rights, including the right to health, the CESCR has suggested that States parties have a ‘core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights enunciated in the Covenant ...’, which form part of the core content of these rights.52As regards the definition of such obligations in

relation to the right to health, GC No. 14 based on the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD 1994) and the Primary Health Care Strategy of the Alma Ata Declaration (WHO 1978) is the first document that attempts to define indirectly the minimum essential level of the right to health, namely the core of this right, framed in terms of core obligations for States.53These core obligations could be used as a means of pressure on States

in order to comply with their treaty obligations. For example, such obligations could probably play a role with the definition of minimum health services that have to be available during a severe economic crisis to marginalized population groups without financial means, such as undocumented migrants, and be prioritized in the allocation of scarce resources (see Part II, chapter 7).54The GC No. 14

indicates that the core state obligations encompass both the minimum essential levels of health care (i.e., immunization against major infectious diseases, provision of essential drugs, maternal and child health care) and of the underlying determinants of health (i.e., minimum essential food, housing, sanitation, access to information regarding main health problems); altogether partly cover the content of primary health care (i.e. certain essential elements), as defined in the Declaration of Alma-Ata, notably as part of a comprehensive national health system.55Of note,

51 See also, for a similar statement supra note 42, M.C.R. Craven 1995, pp. 132 and 134. 52 Ibidem supra note 6, GC No. 14, §§ 43- 44 read in conjunction with GC No. 3 (supra note

43), § 10.

53 UN, The Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical

and Mental Health: Report of the Special Rapporteur, Paul Hunt, UN GA, 62ndSess., Agenda

Item 72(b), UN Doc A/62/214, 8 August 2007, § 28.

54 See for a general argument, B. Toebes, ‘The Right to Health and Other Health-Related

Rights’ in: B. Toebes, M. Hartlev, A. Hendriks & J. Rothmar Herrmann (eds), Health and Human Rights in Europe, Cambridge/Antwerp/Portland: Intersentia 2012, pp. 83-110, p. 100.

55 Ibidem supra note 52; Declaration of Alma-Ata (1978) adopted by the International

Conference on Primary Healthcare, Alma-Ata, USSR, September 6-12, §§ VI-VIII; Of note, similar to the meaning of the core content of the right to health, WHO has simply stressed that ‘there is a [health] baseline below which no individuals in any country should find

in 2013 the CRC Committee in its GC No. 15 adopted a similar attitude towards the definition of the core content of the right to health of the child framed in terms of core state obligations.56

The right to health without the aforementioned core obligations would be deprived of its raison d’être57and would lose its significance, and for that reason

these core obligations are not subject to progressive realization even in times of resource constraints.58In other words, even in the presence of limited resources

these core obligations constitute the minimum level of entitlements of the general content of the right to health that States must respect and guarantee irrespective of the availability of resources.59As such, the CESCR in GC No. 14 argues that

the obligations concerning the core content of the right to health are non-derogable (i.e. not to be restricted in any way, for instance due to scarce resources).60

Nevertheless, this CESCR approach (i.e., the disassociation of the core content of the right to health from a State’s available resources) is contrary to an earlier approach adopted in its GC No. 3, where the Committee establishes a connection between the available resources and the discharge of core obligations.61Thereto,

themselves’ (WHO, Global Strategy for Health for All by the Year 2000, Geneva: WHO, 1981, Ch.ΙΙ, p.31, § 1 - Adopted in WHO Resolution WHA 34.36); Note that the concept of primary health care is embraced in CESCR’s guidelines addressed to the States for the preparation of their reports under the ICESCR, in general, and specifically under Article 12 ICESCR (UN CESCR, Guidelines on Treaty-Specific Documents to be submitted by the States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. E/C.12/2008/2, 24 March 2009, Annex, § 55).

56 Ibidem supra note 13, GC No. 15, § 73; The CRC in Article 24 § 2 (b) and (c) puts emphasis

on the development of primary health care.

57 Ibidem supra note 43, GC No. 3, § 9. Accordingly, it is stressed that the raison d’être of the

Covenant ‘is to establish clear obligations for States parties in respect of the full realization of the rights in question’.

58 Ibidem supra note 43, GC No. 3, § 10. It reads as follows: ‘…the Committee is of the view

that a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant…’; Ibidem supra note 1, B.C.A. Toebes 1999, p. 244.

59 Ibid., read in conjunction with GC No. 14 (supra note 6), § 30; Ibidem supra note 1, B.C.A.

Toebes 1999, p. 295.

60 Ibidem supra note 6, GC No. 14, § 47.

61 Ibidem supra note 43, GC No. 3, § 10. It reads as follows: ‘it must be noted that any

assessment as to whether a State has discharged its minimum core obligationmust also take account of resource constraintsapplying within the country concerned’. [emphasis added]

this contradiction is indicative of the confusion that exists around the nature of state (core) obligations in relation to the right to health. Last but not least, as regards the adoption of retrogressive measures on the part of a State as mentioned before, the CESCR has suggested that in case these measures are incompatible with the core obligations under the right to health, namely the core content of the right to health is affected, this should be seen as a (potential) violation of the right to health (see Part II, section 6.4).62

From the perspective of the above analysis, the following observations are made which altogether make clear that there is an absence of worldwide consensus on the progressive nature and core content of the right to health. Due to the open- ended character of progressive realization of the right to health, the CESCR has attempted to clarify -albeit at a relatively general level at times- its core content in terms of identifying a number of core obligations arising from this right to be met under all circumstances. As such, one may argue that progressive realization of the right to health, namely of its remaining section, starts from the point where the core of the right has been achieved. Nevertheless, significant work remains to be done on this area and the Committee’s attempt has been the issue of extensive discussion among legal scholars.63Toebes, for instance, has underlined the general

character of several core obligations, such as ‘access to health facilities, goods, and services on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for vulnerable or marginalised groups’, which gives little precise direction to States as regards to their application.64In addition, concern has been expressed at that ‘the definition

of core content poses the danger that the remainder of a right is subsequently considered unimportant and therefore may well be denied’.65Such an approach

is based on Article 2 § 1 ICESCR pursuant to which States are required to progressively realize the rights enshrined in ICESCR and to the maximum of their available resources. This implies that the realization of the core of a right is not, by itself, sufficient; States have another task that of striving to realize the full spectrum of that right and not denying it as soon as that minimum standard

62 Ibidem supra note 6, GC No. 14, § 48.

63 See, e.g., B. Toebes 2001 (supra note 5); K.G. Young, ‘The Minimum Core of Economic

and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content’ The Yale Journal of International Law 2008, Volume 33, pp. 113-175, p. 154; J. Tobin, The Right to Health in International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012, pp. 239-243.

64 B. Toebes, ‘The Right to Health and the Privatization of National Health Systems: A Case

Study of the Netherlands’ Health and Human Rights2006, Volume 9 (1), pp. 103-127, p. 117; Ibidem supra note 6, GC No. 14, § 43(a).

of health (i.e., its core) has been achieved.66Moreover, the very expansive definition

of non-derogable minimum core obligations irrespective of available resources advanced by the CESCR is contested in literature in that their application in practice by States is well-connected to the requirement of available resources without further considering the diverse economic realities and capacity among States to this end.67

On the other hand, other academic commentators have argued that the content of a right should not be considered as definite as this evolves over the years.68In

connection to the above argument, another concern that has been expressed is as to how to determine a specific core content of a right when there is a variance in resources and in the level of development among the countries, as well as in health needs.69This might be the reason, for instance, why some courts have not applied

this concept in their decisions.70Overall, caution must be exercised with respect

to the precise definition and implementation of this controversial concept. Such a concept deserves further scrutiny by taking into account national circumstances and different health needs of individuals and groups, without though being strictly dependent on such situational circumstances, as this could refuse the universal character of human rights.71In this regard, of particular assistance could be the

development and use of indicators (see below section 3.6). Yet, whatever the extent of controversy exists in relation to the progressive nature and core content of the right to health, the primary importance of the core concept should not be overlooked as regards the prioritization and satisfaction on the part of the State of the basic

66 Ibid.; F. Coomans, Identifying the Key Elements of the Right to Education: A Focus on its

Core Content, London: Child Rights International Network 2007, p. 2 (www.crin.org).

67 See, e.g., Ibidem supra note 63, J. Tobin 2012, p. 98.

68 Ibidem supra note 1, B.C.A. Toebes 1999, p. 288 (citing relevant studies).

69 Ibidem supra note 5, B. Toebes 2001, p. 184 (citing relevant studies); P. Hunt & G. Backman,

‘Health Systems and the Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health’, Health and Human Rights2008, 10(1), pp. 81-92, p. 85 (also found in: UN Doc. A/HRC/7/11, § 52). It is noted by way of example that in some countries the health challenge is undernutrition, whereas in other countries it is obesity.

70 See, e.g., the decision of the South African Constitutional Court in Minister of Health and

Others v. Treatment Action Campaign and Others, Case No: CCT 8/02, 5 July 2002. The Court rejected the definition of a minimum core standard for the right to health by stating that ‘All that is possible, and all that can be expected of the state, is that it act reasonably to provide access to the socio-economic rights identified in sections 26 and 27 on a progressive basis.’ (§ 35)

71 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human

Rights in Vienna on 25 June 1993, Part I, § 5; An analogous approach was adopted as regards to the core content of the right to education, see supra note 66, F. Coomans.

and pressing health needs of vulnerable population groups, including Roma children and undocumented migrants (see section 4.2).

Documento similar