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3. Capitulo II Ventajas y desventajas del cultivo de caña de azúcar orgánica de las fincas del proyecto Ebenezer

3.5. Proceso de cultivo en los terrenos de la hacienda Berlin

The whole process is dominated by the capitalist who is driven by ego­ istical greed. Production is therefore geared to maximise profits and not for the human benefit of the worker. Consideration of the worker’s welfare is secondary to the amassing of wealth - the primary motive of

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production. The man of means occupies his dominant position not because he himself has expended his physical energies to produce. Rather, it is the result of his relegation of the worker to material production which involves the expenditure of physical energy, while he himself elevates himself to the position of authority and expends only

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mental energy. It is this division of labour that serves to perpetuate 113

alienation, Marx sums up this kind of alienation thus:

Therefore he does not confirm himself in his work, he denies himself, feels miserable instead of happy, deploys no free physical and intellectual energy, but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. Thus the worker only feels at home outside his work and in his work he feels a stranger. He is at home when he is not working and v/hen he works he is not at home. His labour is therefore not voluntary but compulsory, forced labour. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need but only a means to satisfy needs outside itself, 114

The worker1s activity is turned into passivity, his power of creativity has become his wealmess. It is no wonder then "that when there is no

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physical or other compulsion, labour is avoided like the plague". This, says Marx, is the epitome of the worker's alienation from the productive process.

Thirdly, the worker is alienated from his species-being , Man's species-life is turned into a means toward his individual life.

man has "species-needs" - needs related to m an’s expression of the being he is. The physical, animal functions of eating, drinking and pro­

creating, etc., which man shares in common with other animals are met by man in such a way that he shows himself to be a creative self- conscious being, which other animals are not. He can freely express

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his creativity as he satisfies these physical needs. But satisfaction of mere egoistic, animal needs are not his primary concern. In produc­ tion, man is primarily concerned with the expression of his "essence" which

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is freedom. Man, Marx declares, has a capacity for culture and for

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the cultivation and appreciation of the aesthetic. In Hegel’s terminology, man is concerned with the "spiritual", in addition to and

120 above his concern with the "physical".

Unfortunately, in his present state, man has become primarily concerned with the satisfaction of physical needs. The "spiritual" has become subordinated to those selfish ends. Acknowledging that "eating, drinking, procreating, etc, are indeed truly human functions," Marx immediately points out that even so "in the abstraction that

separates them from the other round of human activity and makes them

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into final and exclusive ends they become animal." Marx concludes that, in its alienated state, labour "alienates species-life and individual life, and ... in its abstraction it makes the latter into the aim of the former which is also conceived of in its abstract and

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alien form," M a n ’s vital activity and productive life work are seen by man only as the means to the satisfaction of physical needs so that physical existence may go on. In contrast, unalienated produc­ tive life is species life. It is life that produces life, instead of impersonal things which are devoid of human essence.

species-being and man as alienated worker, Marx draws further upon the difference between man and animal. He asserts that, unlike the animal for whom there is no distinction between itself and its vital activity, "man makes his vital activity itself into an object of his will and consciousness. He has a conscious vital activity. He is not

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immediately identical to any of his characterizations," Only man is capable of perceiving himself as the being he is; the animal cannot do this. It is this consciousness that distinguishes him from "animal vital activity," and makes him a species-being. It is only man who

sees his own life as an object to himself. Therefore unalienated man is able to act according to his species, and in so doing affirms his "species-nature". Thus his activity is free activity. On the other hand, "alienated labour reverses this relationship so that just because he is a conscious being, man makes his vital activity and essence a

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mere means to his existence," Whereas unalienated man can and does see his species as well as other species as objects without thereby being estranged from either of them, alienated man's objectification of himself leads to his perception of such objectification as separate from and alien to him. Likewise, the worker views his "essence", i.e. his species-being, as alien and hostile to himself. He also has a similar experience of his fellow-workers. Marx argues that man no longer relates to "himself as to the present, living species," that

125 is, "to himself as to a universal and therefore free being."

Instead, he relates to himself as to a particular, enslaved being. Furthermore, man is not only capable of perceiving his needs, of assessing his resources to satisfy those needs, but he is also capable

126 of deciding how those needs may be met. He is capable of "technique". He can and does build "mediations" between himself and nature. He

interacts with nature, the organic objective world, which he fashions and shapes, and which, in turn, fashions and shapes him as well. This

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is a process of mutual interaction. Nature is therefore perceived by man, who is both a physical and a species-being, in two complementary ways, It is the source of the resources for his survival, and it is a

part of him. This is how Marx describes this creative tie between man and nature:

Physically man lives solely from these products of nature, whether they appear as food, heating, clothing, habitation, etc. The universality of man appears in practice precisely in the universality that makes the whole of nature into his organic body in that it is both (i) his immediate means of subsistence and also (ii) the material object and tool of his vital activity. Nature is the inorganic body of man, that is, in as far as it is not itself a human body. 129 It would appear from Marx’s argument here that unalienated man will live in creative harmony with nature. Even now, albeit in an alienated way, he organizes the productive process, whereby he "fashions things

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according to the laws of beauty," Moreover, he fashions things not only according to the standards and needs of the species to which he belongs, but also according to the measure of every species. He

"knows everywhere how to apply its every species inherent standard to 131

the object." Advanced technology and "human" ways of using such technology are integral tothis complex process.

The sad commentary on the condition of man in capitalist society, Marx makes clear, is that advanced and advancing technology have seen

the continued degradation of man. Alienation has torn man from his creation, and from nature, and vice versa. In the image of the world he has created, alienated man does not see that he has duplicated him­ self, both intellectually and actively in reality. He is t o m from the object of production, including his "mediations", and from his

species-life, "the real objectivity of his species." Moreover, alienated labour has turned "the advantage he ... (had]) over animals into a disadvantage, in that his inorganic body, nature ... (has been}

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t o m from him." This process continues ineluctably.

Finally, Marx speaks of the alienation of man from man. "Every self-alienation", Marx declares, "of man from himself and nature appears in the relationship in which he places himself and nature to

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other men distinct from himself." ^ It is only through the real interpersonal relationships between men that alienation can appear in the practical, real world. Organization of the productive process entails organizing social roles and distribution of workers, IToting the active tole man plays in the ensuing relationships, Marx asserts;

Through alienated labour then man creates not only his relationship to the object and act of production as to alien and hostile men; he creates too the relationship in which other men stand to his production and his product and the relationship in which he stands to these other men. 135

In his alienated state, man continues to produce further alienation. His perception of reality is distorted, and his actions are selfish and hostile. This is certainly a strong case for man being the architect of his own destiny, albeit an alienated one. It was also the worker who made possible the position occupied by the capitalist, a position diametrically opposed to, and dominant over that of the

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worker. There is no doubt in Marx’s mind that the man of means is himself alienated; and, even as he proceeds to exploit the worker to his advantage, he furthers both his own and the worker’s alienar-

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tion, Marx sums up the foregoing description thus:

Just as he turns his production into his own loss of reality and punishment and his own product into a loss, a product that does not belong to him, so he creates the domination of the man who does not produce over the production and the

product. As he alienates his activity from himself, so he hands over to an alien person an activity that does not belong to him. 1J8

This fourth usage of alienation incorporates M arx’s concept of 159

man as a social being. Man, we are told, knows that he is the being he is, a species-being, in contrast to mere animal. He also knows that he is distinct from other species-beings. In his pursuit of the satisfaction of needs of the species-being, both physical and spiritual, he acts within a community.^0 He affirms himself within a community and not apart from it. In unalienated society, unalienated man experiences concord and harmony with his fellows. There is mutual

exchange of creative activities without the concomitant dehumanization of the workers which characterizes alienated, capitalist society. This fact is brought into clear focus when Marx says,

Exchange, both of human activity within production itself and also of human products with each other, is equivalent to species-activity and species-enjoyment whose real, conscious and true being is social activity and social enjoyment. Since human nature is the true communal nature of man, men create and produce their communal nature by their natural action.,,, 141

Here we have a glimpse of Ma r x ’s vision of the communal harmony that

would characterize the future communist society. This sanguine apocalypse is in polar contrast to his description of the disharmonious, non­

affirmative inteimpersonal relationships which exist among workers, and especially between the capitalist class and the proletarian masses. It is in relation to this antagonism between the two classes that he makes the following summary:

The first remark to make is that everything that appears in the case of the Hia^worker to be a state of extemalization, of alienation appears in the case of the non-worker to be a state of extemalization, of alienation.

Secondly, the real, practical behaviour of the worker in production and towards his product (as a state of mind) appears in the case of the non-worker opposed to him as

theoretical behaviour. Thirdly, the non-worker does every­ thing against the worker that the worker does against him­ self but he does not do against himself what he does against the worker, 142

It does appear here that true praxis is reserved for the worker, and that the state of the non-worker is more static than dynamic, hence the ontological description of his condition,

E.

Religion, Atheism and Raise Consciousness,

The unwary reader of Marx may be easily misled into concluding that there is no significant place for ’ theory1 in Marx’s concept of reality. This misunderstanding is often the result of the dichotomy that seems to exist in his thinking concerning praxis and theoria . Marx, it will be recalled, accuses Hegel of conceiving of reality in

terns of theoretical consciousness, the mere activity of the mind. Drawing on Feuerbach’s reduction of Hegel’s Geist to man as a species- being, Marx came to realize that man and not Geist is the centre of the universe. Despite Feuerbach’s positive influence on Marx, Marx himself later criticized Feuerbach for not having gone far enough in his reductionism. He had not been radical enough in that he failed to conceive of real sensuous man. He was still very much wrapped up in his idealism and man was therefore limited to an object of contempla­ tion, This is how Marx sums up Feuerbach’s deficient conception of reality;

The chief defect of all previous materialism - that of Feuerbach included - is that things (Gegenstand), reality,

sensuousness, are conceived only in the form of the object, or of contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity,

practice, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in contradistinction to materialism, was set forth by idealism - but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such, Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from

conceptual objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective activity. In Das Vfesen des Christenthums, he therefore regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude while practice is conceived and defined only in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance. Hence he does not grasp the significance of 'revolutionary1 , of practical-critical, activity. 143

M a r x ’s insistence on praxis as the basis of all forms of conscious-

ah— — „ — —

ness, does not negate the importance of consciousness. Indeed, as he himself admits, praxis and "theory" are bound together. Consciousness is derived from praxis, but then praxis is in turn shaped by consciousness. There is therefore a relational dynamic operating between the two.

Now, in his description of man, Marx is preoccupied with man as an alienated being who must be (and who will be ultimately) rescued from his dehumanized and depersonalized state. Man suffers from total alienation; his consciousness of himself and the world is distorted and demeaning. The capacity to perceive his \^orld, to know that he is the being he is distinguishes man as a species-being from animal, Hut, though man still retains the quality of knowing who he is, and that he lives in society participating in activities of the species, he, nevertheless, suffers from illusions and distorted perceptions and conceptions of reality. His thinking mirrors his alienation and serves to perpetuate it even further. Both the capitalist and the worker suffer from such false consciousnesses. The capitalist’s attempt at micro— reform are doomed to failure from the very outset. He is not

radical in his thinking for he merely seeks to reform society after having accepted it as it is. The legitimacy of his dominant and exploitative position in society is never questioned. He is unable

to see that all his efforts at reform are only "patchwork" relief, which are incapable of reducing, let alone ultimately ending political and religious alienation. Despite the capitalist’s efforts at reform, socio-economic alienation remains intact. This means that human

emancipation is still a far cry from historical realization, Marx is convinced that the capitalist would not embark on a radical socio­ economic transformation of society which would endanger his dominance over the worker - his labour, his product, his consciousness, etc.

The worker, for his part, is still unaware that he is both the architect and victim of his own alienation. He is forced in his imagination to make real what is not. He suffers from ideology which is imposed upon his consciousness by the bourgeoisie,”^

Thus alienated, the worker (and the non-worker) responds by creating various and sundry fetishes, "Imagination", Marx says, " b o m of desire gives to the fetish-worshipper the illusion that an ’inanimate object’ is about to abandon its natural character and acquiesce in his lusts. Therefore the crude desire of the fetish-worshipper smashes the

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fetish when it ceases to be its docile servitor," This process recurs again and again and serves to re-inforce and further man's alienation. Because he is alienated man's needs and desires do not accurately reflect the needs and desires of his species-being. Indeed, they are distorted reflections of his "essence", and in his attempt to satisfy these needs and desires, his creativity is turned to alienating ends. He is constantly creating fetishes, pouring upon commodities and other objects of his own creation, awe and power, and noble and highly esteemed qualities which rightfully belong to himself. His experience of his products, both practically and theoretically, is that of aliena­ tion, Having a sense of something higher and superior to what he

presently experiences,' he continually fails to see and acknowledge that it is an integral part of himself that has become separated from and dominant over him,

Marx had a healthy appreciation of the tenacious grip ideas can come to have over the mind. He therefore argued that alienating ideas which distort reality must be radically rooted out. This is no simple

task. In his initial reactions to French socialism we gain a fairly illuminating picture of Ma r x ’s understanding of the power of ideas. He states:

We are firmly convinced that the true danger does not lie in the practical attempt to carry out communist ideas but in their theoretical development; for practical attempts, even by the masses, can be answered with a cannon as soon

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