Proceso de implementación

From the very start, the FAWU experienced numerous internal and external problems which prevented it from executing its ‘new’ responsibilities satisfactorily, at least until 1975. The new union immediately faced serious financial problems. The existing check- off system had been suspended, pending the national reorganisation of trade unionism. Workers were requested to sign new forms in which they consented to the automatic deduction of the union dues from their wages. Very few trade union officers, however, had organised the actual signing of these forms. Moreover, the introduction of a new system for the distribution of the check-off contributions aggravated the union’s financial crisis. In accordance with the NUCW Statutes, the FAWU would receive 50% of its members’ contributions, the remainder being divided among the national centre (30%) and the Fako Divisional Union of Trade Unions (FADUTU) (20%). A state-controlled National Committee for Trade Union Contributions in Yaoundé was made responsible for collecting and allocating the check-off contributions throughout the country, resulting, not surprisingly, in frequent and often protracted delays in the committee’s due remittances to the divisional unions, as well as in massive embezzlement of funds.

One of the gravest consequences of this crisis was that the new union was no longer able to pay the salaries of its full-time officers. Even when it started receiving its share of the check-off contributions in 1974, its monthly income only allowed for the payment of four full-time officers - all men, save for the check-off clerk. This meant that the newly elected president, Mr C.P.N. Vewessee, scarcely received any assistance in running the union. He soon became president of the Fako Divisional Union of Trade Unions (FADUTU) as well, thus monopolising the most important trade union functions in the Fako Division.

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The union lacked funds for the continuation of its welfare services. Consequently, it stopped selling cheap palm oil to its members and closed down its stores. This inevitably contributed to the union’s loss of standing among the workers.

There is substantial evidence that the CDC management took advantage of the reorganisation of trade unionism and the new union’s internal problems. Firstly, it ceased to respect previous agreements with the former CDCWU and almost entirely ignored the new union, as shown by its persistent refusal to invite the union leadership for negotiations and consultations. Secondly, it undertook a new offensive against ‘unproductive’ and ‘militant’ workers, transferring and laying off a substantial number of them during the corporation’s reorganisation in 1973.

The union petitioned the Provincial Inspector of Labour several times to assist both parties in overcoming the complete breakdown in industrial relations. Shortly after the election of full-time union officers on 8 May 1974, the Provincial Inspector of Labour finally appealed to the CDC General Manager ‘to restore the formal cordial relationship which existed between your management and the defunct CDCWU and to extend the same mutual understanding to the FAWU’.2 _{This appeal did not receive any positive reaction until}

7 April 1975 when the newly appointed General Manager, Mr J.N. Ngu, invited the union’s executive committee to his office and promised it that ‘the union and management link would now be restored’.3

The General Manager kept his word. After this meeting there was a noticeable improvement in joint consultation at all levels. Notably, certain issues of vital importance to the workers, such as redundancy and retirement, continued to be decided upon in ‘secret’ meetings between the union president and the General Manager, without previous consultation of the union executive and shop stewards. As these decisions often turned out unfavourable to the workers, rumours rapidly spread among the rank and file that their president had been ‘bought over’ by the General Manager. Although the president continued to render services to his members, representing their individual and collective grievances, the vast majority of the rank and file had lost faith in him.

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Under constant supervision of the party and the NUCW Confederal Bureau, the union tended to give priority to the education of its members in the ‘need’ for social peace and high productivity. During one of the regular Workers’ Educational Seminars in 1982, Mr Vewessee declared:

The union places priority in the education of the workers in order to enhance and obtain maximum and quality production ... Since the exploitation of our natural resources is basically in the hands of Cameroonians, the word ‘confrontation’ should no longer have a place in the trade union vocabulary, as this has been replaced by the words ‘dialogue and consultation’.4

Mr Vewessee seems to have always been in high esteem within management circles as a controller of labour. He has regularly been asked by management to explain ‘sensitive’ issues to the workers, even to CDC workers outside the Fako Division, and to assist in quelling any ‘illegal’ strikes. He has usually advocated severe punishment for ‘ringleaders’ of ‘illegal’ strikes, including termination of contract. After the suppression of such strikes, however, he has sometimes identified himself with the ‘genuine’ grievances of the workers and tried to solve them in subsequent negotiations with the state and management. In this way, he aims to demonstrate to the workers that the union’s settlement of conflicts through the ‘correct’ procedures was more likely than strike actions to satisfy justified workers’ demands.

The severe economic crisis that hit the corporation since the mid-1980s has further undermined the union’s representation and defence of workers’ interests. In view of the continual deterioration of the corporation’s financial position, the union was requested by the management in 1987 (i) to make suggestions on what contributions the workers could make to lowering the corporation’s production costs and its economic recovery, and (ii) to ‘sensitise’ the workers on the prevailing economic crisis and elicit their support for any necessary austerity measures. On 3 August 1987 the union agreed with management upon a series of measures to combat the crisis, including a substantial increase in task work (see Chapter 6). When these measures proved inadequate, a new agreement was

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concluded between union and management on 6 January 1990, involving drastic cuts in workers’ income and fringe benefits (see Chapter 3). The union leadership thought that its acceptance of these draconian measures would save the jobs of its members. This again proved to be wishful thinking. Between 1990 and 1991 the management implemented a new reorganisation plan involving mass transfers and layoffs.

Interestingly, in the wake of the political liberalisation process in the 1990s, one could observe the gradual emergence of conflicts between the unions and the state: a number of trade union leaders, especially in Anglophone Cameroon, began to strive for a return to the ‘colonial’ model of trade union autonomy, which they tended to perceive as the best safeguard for the representation and defence of the workers’ interests. Clearly, this was a significant change in the close post-colonial state-union relations. Even after Paul Biya had taken over power from Ahidjo in 1982, the union continued to strongly support the new government, and it faithfully followed any changes initiated by the party. When the party changed its name from Cameroon National Union (CNU) into Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) at its Bamenda Congress in 1985, the NUCW soon followed suit by changing its name into Cameroon Trade Union Congress (CTUC). The union leadership also adopted the party’s ideological ‘innovations’: it championed the party’s ‘new’ rhetoric of ‘rigour, moralisation and democratisation’ among the workers (Mehler 1993; Konings 2009b). In the early 1990s, however, the first signs of dissent disappeared. Faced with the deteriorating economic situation and increasing calls in society for political reforms and political pluralism, some union leaders began criticising the regime in power and challenging the union’s subordination to the party.

The FAWU president, Mr C.P.N. Vewessee, was actually the first union leader who openly dared to attack the regime and demand a return to trade union autonomy. Two factors may explain his bold stand. First, Mr Vewessee hails from the North West Province that became the centre of Anglophone Cameroon’s opposition to the regime and the cradle of the struggle for political pluralism in the country (Takougang & Krieger 1998; Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003). After the introduction of the multi-party system in Cameroon in

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1990, he joined the opposition. Secondly, having been one of the leading members of the former CDCWU, he has never been in favour of state control over the union, but was forced to accept it in the then prevailing political situation. In February 1991, he declared:

The workers expect an independent and strong trade union organisation that would be autonomous in relation to all political parties and state bodies and institutions ... This will relieve the trade union of the rubber-stamp element in the country’s political life. If the trade union does not become more militant and resolute in its demands, then the CTUC won’t be of much help to the workers.5 And on 1 May 1991, Labour Day, he added:

The trade unions in this country have been bedfellows with the single political party and unable to do anything in the protection of employment. The ‘New Deal’ dream has been a nightmare because rigour and moralisation have only helped to make billionaires and millionaires out of a special group in the public service who are appointed to financially milk public enterprises. Political pluralism and an independent free trade union movement are the only hopes to free this country from greed and regression.6

He strongly condemned the corrupt leadership of the CTUC for its continuing alliance with the ruling party and its complete neglect of the defence of workers’ interests during the economic crisis and the structural adjustment programme. His relentless efforts yielded some success. On 2 April 1991, the CTUC recognised the rights of its members to join the political party of their choice.7 _{Without a}

doubt this can be seen as a landmark in the history of trade unionism in Cameroon. Unfortunately, although the Cameroonian government officially started commending trade union autonomy, it nevertheless made renewed attempts to keep the unions under control. First, the 1992 Labour Code stated that any newly formed trade unions should be registered. This enabled the state to deny legal existence to any trade union suspected of supporting the opposition. Second, the government continued to intervene in the existing unions and to harass any members and leaders engaged in oppositional actions (Konings 2009b).

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Shop stewards on the Tole Tea Estate

In 1968 shop stewards were introduced on the Tole Estate. In the first part of this section, I describe their position and functions on the estate. In the second part, I discuss their performance on the estate.