3.3 El proceso de formulación del problema y adopción de alternativas.

One o f the main reasons why the opening to China was conducted “very secretly” was because Nixon and Kissinger were afraid that if it became public, the “public and political reaction could have killed off the initiative before it began.” 132 Paradoxically,

126 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 164.

127 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.

128 Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003; and Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 1, 2003.

129 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 164.

130 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003. See also Richard Nixon, Beyond Peace

(N ew York: Random House, 1994), p. 130.

131 Tucker, Interview with Komine, October 1, 2003. 132 Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003.

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it was Nixon’s life long background as a “staunch anti-Communist” that provided a strong basis within the U.S. domestic political context to open a new dialogue with Communist China.133 On the other hand, Kissinger admits the relative weakness o f his position in the early period: “I did not have the political strength or bureaucratic clout to pursue such a fundamental shift of policy on my own.”134 Moreover, as the briefing books for his October 1971 trip to Beijing indicated, Kissinger anticipated that domestic political reactions to a new China initiative would be “manageable.” 135 With his past credentials and his following from the right and center, Nixon was “much less vulnerable to attack than would be more leftist figures” in American society. Thus, the President was probably the “only leader who could carry through this policy.”136 Kissinger explained to Zhou in October 1971 that Nixon asked him to “reaffirm in the strongest terms his personal commitment” to the improvements in relations between the U.S. and China.137 Finally, during the Nixon-Mao meeting on February 21, 1972, Kissinger admitted that: “It was the President who set the direction and worked out of the plan.”138

Regarding the actual policy operational process, Kissinger emphasizes that once the President set “a policy direction,” he left it to the National Security Adviser “to implement the strategy and manage the bureaucracy.” 139 Ambrose evaluates Kissinger’s role “as agent, tool, and sometimes adviser, not as a generator of ideas” :

133 Ibid; and Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003. 134 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 163.

135 Opening Meeting, HAK Talking Points, p.6, Briefing book for H AK’s Oct. 1971 trip POLO II [Part I], For the President’s Files (Winston Lord) — China Trip/Vietnam, Box 850, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 136 Ibid.

137 Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, October 20, 1971, 4:40-7:10 p.m., p.3, HAK visit to PRC October 1971 Memcons - originals, For the President’s Files - China/Vietnam Negotiations, Box 1035, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

138 Memcon, February 21, 1972, p.3, CHINA - President’s Talks with Mao & Chou En-lai February 1972, B ox 91, Country Files - Far East, HAKOF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

“The basic thrust o f Nixon’s innovations came from the President, not the National Security Adviser.”140 Haig assesses Nixon as a “strategic thinker o f historic dimensions” and Kissinger as a “brilliantly gifted diplomatic tactician carrying Nixon’s ideas forward.”141

Interestingly, Edgar Snow’s interview with Premier Zhou shows that the Chinese knew about Kissinger through their intelligence system and through reading o f his writings. “Kissinger?” Zhou said, “There is a man who knows the language o f both worlds - his own and ours. He is the first American we have seen in his position. With him, it should be possible to talk.”142 Finally, during a meeting with Zhou in February 1972, President Nixon described Kissinger’s role:

I think that one thing which Dr. Kissinger has greatly contributed in his services to my administration is his philosophic views. He takes the long view, which is something I try to do also, except sometimes my schedule is so filled with practical matters and decisions on domestic and foreign policy that I don’t have as much time to take the long term view as he does.143

In Winston Lord’s assessment, Nixon and Kissinger “divided labor very skilfully; Nixon was providing fundamental guidance. Kissinger was a skilful negotiator and an operator, as well as a strategist.”144 Haig, Isaacson, Lord, and Solomon thus give credit to both Nixon and Kissinger in terms o f the speed o f transformation in the U.S.-

140 Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon, Volume II: The Triumph o f a Politician 1962-1972 (London: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p.655. Former Soviet Ambassador to America, Anatoly Dobrynin, assesses that Kissinger was a “good tactician” in both direct and behind-the-scenes negotiations in Soviet-American relations. Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: M o sco w ’s Am bassador to A m erica’s Six C old War Presidents (1962-1986) (New York: Times Books, A D ivision o f Random House, Inc, 1995), p. 195. 141 Haig, Inner Circles, p.204.

142 Zhou Enlai, Interview with Edgar Snow (conducted on November 5, 1970), Life, July 30, 1971 p.3. After the July 1971 secret talks, Zhou privately commented on Kissinger, “very intelligent - indeed a Dr.” Chen, M a o ’s China and the Cold War, p.266.

143 Memcon, February 26, 1972, p. 16, Box 87, POF, NSCF, NPMS, NA. 144 Lord, Interview with Komine, October 15, 2003.

China relations.145 Based on his vision, Nixon held ultimate authority, making the final decision for a new initiative. Kissinger was a dynamic theorist and tactician, very skillfully conducting a series of crucial negotiations. In reality, however, Nixon and Kissinger still needed the foreign policy decision-making machinery and bureaucratic expertise on America’s China policy, as the following chapter examines.

145 Ibid; Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003; and Isaacson, Kissinger, p.353. Holdridge recalls that: “I’m sure N ixon respected Kissinger for his intellectual capabilities, but the respect did not necessarily mean a warm and intimate friendship.” John Holdridge, Oral History Interview, p. 108, July 20, 1995, FAOHC.

Chapter 2. Foreign Policy Decision Making Machinery for the U.S.