Proceso Unificado de Rational (RUP, según sus siglas en inglés)

Since the passage of federal sentencing reforms in the mid to late 1980s, drug offenders apprehended by the federal Drug Enforcement Administration and prosecuted in federal court by U.S. attorneys have faced stiff mandatory minimum sentences and long prison terms in federal penitentiaries. In the years since, the federal prison system has grown eightfold, with roughly half of federal prison inmates serving time for a drug offense. In August 2013, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced a major policy shift in the sentencing of low-level drug offenders in federal courts: drug quantities would no longer be listed in the charge. As a result, prosecutors in federal cases essen-tially bypass the mandatory minimum sentences, permitting judges more liberty to graduate the sanction according to the severity of the offense.

In a speech to the American Bar Association, Holder cited the significant financial and social costs associated with incarcerating low-level offenders and the need to prioritize in the face of the federal budget sequester.² Beyond economic costs, however, Holder noted that many who are serving long sentences pose very little threat to society: “It’s clear . . . that too many Americans go to too many pris-ons for far too long, and for no truly good law enforcement reason.

It’s clear, at a basic level, that twentieth-century criminal justice solu-tions are not adequate to overcome our twenty-first-century chal-lenges. And it is well past time to implement common sense changes that will foster safer communities from coast to coast.”

Holder’s sentiments are supported by a growing body of empiri-cal research suggesting that the crime-fighting effects of incarceration are subject to what economists call diminishing marginal returns. To be specific, prison affects crime rates through two primary avenues.

First, by incapacitating someone in an institution, they are physically prevented from committing further crime. Second, the threat of

pun-ishment with a prison sentence likely deters crime.³ Research on this topic tends to suggest that for the most part, prison reduces crime through incapacitation (see Buonanno and Raphael [2013]).

There is ample evidence that prisons incapacitate criminally active people. However, this incapacitation effect varies considerably from inmate to inmate, and for some inmates it is trivially small to nonexistent. This heterogeneity in the propensity to offend among those we incarcerate has increased greatly with the expansion of the prison population, with the average propensity to offend declining.

In other words, the average offender incarcerated today is much less criminally prone than the average offender incarcerated in years past.

The proportion of offenders with very low probability of reoffending, especially for serious violent crimes, is also higher than in years past.

These patterns are suggestive of diminishing marginal crime-fighting benefits to incarceration. Put simply, the incarceration rate grows when we apply incarceration as punishment more liberally (e.g., in punishing less serious as well as more serious felonies) or when we apply incarceration more intensively (e.g., when we hand out longer sentences). Applying prison sentences more liberally essentially casts a wider net across the population of offenders reining in less serious offenders along with the more serious. Applying incarceration more intensively incarcerates people into advanced ages, when offending levels generally fall. Interestingly, even among prison inmates, there is a strong decline in within-prison offending with age (Raphael and Stoll 2013, Chapter 7). Both dimensions of expansion imply that the bang-per-buck spent on prisons in terms of crimes prevented will be lower when incarceration rates are high.

Several researchers have documented diminishing crime-fighting benefits to prison in the United States, with most showing that the amount of crime prevented per prison years served is currently quite low and skewed toward less serious crimes (see Johnson and Raphael 2012; Liedka, Piehl, and Useem 2006; Owens 2009; and Raphael and Stoll 2013). Others have demonstrated diminishing returns in other countries with much lower incarceration rates than the United States.

(Buonanno and Raphael [2013] provide evidence for Italy; Vollaard [2013] provides evidence for the Netherlands.) Moreover, there is ample empirical research supporting the efficacy of alternative crime control strategies. For example, innovative efforts in Hawaii to moni-tor drug use among probationers with swift yet modest sanctions for violations has greatly reduced drug abuse, absconding from proba-tion officers, and subsequent prison admissions.⁴ A growing body of research demonstrates substantial crime-deterrent effects associ-ated with expanding police staffing levels (see Chalfin and McCrary [2013]). There is also ample evidence showing that preventing high-risk youth from dropping out of school substantially lowers the high-risk of incarceration as an adult (see Lochner and Moretti [2004]).

Diminishing marginal returns and the current low average inca-pacitation effect of prisons, coupled with the availability of viable alternative crime control tools, strongly suggest that we could sub-stantially scale back our use of incarceration and maintain current, historically low crime rates. Doing so requires that we revisit, reevalu-ate, and modify the changes in sentencing policies that have occurred since the early 1980s, a process that perhaps has begun with the 2013 policy change that Holder announced. Scaling back our use of incar-ceration would make a large dent in the reentry challenge because, quite simply, there would be fewer people reentering society from prison.

How would we scale back the use of prison? First, our sentenc-ing philosophy needs to shift in the direction of reservsentenc-ing involuntary confinement for those who pose the greatest risk and alternative sanc-tions for those who do not. Long mandatory minimum sentences for possession of small amounts of drugs with intent to sell, life terms for third strike offenders convicted of felony larceny (theft with value over what is often a relatively low threshold), and parole revocations triggering new prison terms for technical violations (such as fail-ing a drug test or missfail-ing an appointment) all provide examples of sanctions that add to our incarceration rate without preventing much crime. While violations of the law certainly must be met with a

sanc-tion, more modest (but perhaps more swift and certain) sanctions would likely achieve similar ends at lower cost.

Sentencing decisions generally are made by the interactions of local district attorneys (often elected officials) and local circuit court judges (sometimes elected, sometimes appointed). In states with very severe sentencing policies, district attorneys tend to wield great power, as the threat of a harsh mandatory minimum sentence will induce many defendants to plead. County employees (district attor-neys in particular) also exert great influence over who is sent to prison while state government picks up the tab for subsequent incarceration.

This collage of incentives from the perspective of local policymakers certainly tips the scale toward incarceration rather than locally based sanctioned and rehabilitation services. Hence, in addition to revisiting and perhaps undoing many categories of mandatory minimum sen-tences, creating better incentives for local government to not overuse state prisons would reduce both the prison population and by exten-sion the magnitude of the prisoner reentry challenge. For example, states could share cost-savings with localities that reduce admissions to state prison or introduce taxes for states that appear to overuse the system relative to a determined benchmark.

IMPROVING THE PROCESS OF TRIAGING