All theoretical perspectives have limitations and Bourdieu’s theoretical framework is no exception. As Bourdieu emphasizes the way in which structure is incorporated into the body, his work is often accused of being deterministic (Jenkins 1992) and, as such, it does not allow enough room for agency and consciousness or intent on the part of the social agent (DiMaggio 1982; Jenkins 1992; Throop and Murphy 2002; Mouzelis 2007). Despite Bourdieu’s efforts to construct theoretical tools that are not devoid of agency and do not preclude agency, for some researchers his theory of practice is conceived of as being wholly deterministic, as the habitus is perceived as the unconscious driving force of human action, entirely generated by structure. However, this has been hotly debated and Bourdieu denies the charge of determinism on three counts. First, the same habitus will produce different practices in different social fields. Secondly, the habitus can be changed by alterations to the field. Thirdly, the
75 habitus may be controlled by the: “awakening of consciousness and socioanalysis” (Bourdieu 1990: 116).
As a cultural reproduction theorist, who is often criticized for asserting class structures to be overly deterministic of life choices (Levinson and Holland 1996: 7), Bourdieu dismisses ‘blaming-the-victim’ scenarios, arguing that structural disadvantages are internalized (through socialization) and produce forms of behaviour which result in unequal educational attainment (Swartz 1997: 104). Additionally, many social theorists have expressed frustration that Bourdieu cannot be located on either side of the agency/structure divide (Grenfell and James 1998) and that his theory is simply a socialization theory and, therefore, not designed to explain individual actions (Nash 1990). By not locating himself on either side of the agency/structure divide Bourdieu addresses the tensions between the two, perhaps making his research a stronger articulation of experience.
Habitus
In his investigation of the relationship between schooling and systems of thought, Bourdieu argues that the school is a central generative space for habitus, where the student is directly and indirectly imparted with patterns of thinking (Ingram 2009). Habitus is the “social grammar of taste, knowledge and behaviour” (Giroux 1981: 9) and Bourdieu answers this criticism with recourse to the social patterns located in the individual. Working-class habitus is an integral part of the puzzle as to why some working-class boys consistently reject education or why education rejects them. Despite disagreements regarding whether Bourdieu’s work has transcultural transferability (Robbins 2004), Charlesworth, using Bourdieu’s concepts in a meticulous ethnography of working-class Rotherham, articulates habitus is being transmitted from one generation to the next; therefore there is class ethos which: “is a specific embodied morality that operates in a practical mode and it governs the nuances of honour between people” (2000: 30). Whilst habitus is valuable, it remains an abstract and contested sociological
76 concept that took many shapes even in Bourdieu’s own writing (Reay 2004) and, consequently, social researchers must be clear about how the tool is used.
According to Giroux (1981), Bourdieu’s habitus is helpful in pointing to a “mode of domination in which the oppressed contribute to their own subjugation through processes of socialization and self-formation,” as the concept of “habitus smothers the possibility for social change,” while ignoring reflexive thought (9). Sullivan (2002) disputes that “habitus is theoretically incoherent and has no clear use for empirical researchers” where it remains too nebulous to be operable (144, 150). Sullivan, in fact, argues strongly that habitus simply provides: “a veneer of theoretical sophistication to empirical findings” (150). Whilst Sullivan’s work has forced me to think critically about Bourdieu’s theoretical tools, I find her analysis of Bourdieu problematic as she does not look at the tools in relation to one another, which is absolutely essential.
Cultural capital
Cultural capital has recently been central to educational research, though debates exist about how to define it and how it varies according to characteristics of the
educational field (Andersen and Hansen 2011).39 Originally, cultural capital was
conceived as too narrow, pertaining simply to: “having objects of art at home, or a home furnished with ‘style’, visits to art museums or the theatre, or cultural training” (ibid: 2). This narrow conception of cultural capital has been effectively problematized by Sullivan. Sullivan (2001) shows how there is a strong relationship between cultural resources, such as playing musical instruments, visiting museums being transmitted from parents to children (902), but is critical of all forms of cultural capital influencing educational success (911). She argues that reading and watching sophisticated television programmes impact on GCSE attainment but that musical habits (listening and playing) do not have a direct impact. Van de Werforst and Hofstede (2007) found cultural capital strongly
39 “According to Bourdieu, the relative weight of stylistic or symbolic aspects of cultural capital…vary systematically in different settings." (Andersen and Hansen 2011: 3) The impact of cultural capital should vary by characteristics of educational fields and also should vary by characteristics of the tests. (ibid: 4)
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influenced education outcomes but had little impact on educational aspirations. 40
Lareau and Weininger (2003) criticize DiMaggio’s interpretation with a: “conceptualization of cultural capital in terms of prestigious, ‘highbrow’ aesthetic pursuits and attitudes, and an insistence that it be conceptually and causally distinguished from the effects of ‘ability’” (575). They argue for a broad definition of cultural capital which also includes cognitive skills. These skills may be used in a strategic manner by individuals, who thereby receive advantages or profits.
Reflexivity
In Bourdieu’s analysis of the capacity of social actors in modern societies, one of his critics, McRobbie (2002), challenges Bourdieu’s methodology and research outcome. She considers the work to be “unreflexive” and guilty of the “‘imposition effect’” where the researchers fail to acknowledge their own research fields while supplying skewed accounts of severe suffering in their quest for “personal perspectivism” (Kenway and McLeod 2004: 533). Bourdieu has been criticized for not accounting sufficiently for gender, so for my research I draw upon Connell, Mac an Ghaill and Reay in order to examine working-class masculinity as a process within the habitus.
Adaptability
While there is not enough space to delve into all the ‘revisionists’ of Bourdieu, it is worth noting a few that informed my data analysis. Thornton’s Club Culture (1995), an ethnographic study of music subculture(s), re-presents Bourdieu’s cultural capital theory as a form of subcultural capital within the clubbers’ music scene. Subcultural capital, which is objectified and can be embodied: “confers status on its owner in the eyes of a relevant beholder” (1995: 11). More recently,
40 Problematizing Sullivan’s work, Bodovski explored cultural capital and its potential impact on kindergarteners progress in school where she concluded, “certain parental behaviors potentially have a more profound effect on children’s cognitive development, such as having a large number of children’s books at home or participation in specific extracurricular activities” and “participation in athletic activities, dance, and music lessons is associated with greater achievement." (153)
78 Elder-Vass (2007), for example, argues that: “many and perhaps most of our actions are co-determined by both our habitus and our reflexive deliberations” (335). Clearly, Elder-Vass is working on the assumption that reflexive action is located beyond habitus, and by reducing habitus to something devoid of intention and consciousness he falls into a similar trap as Throop and Murphy (2002).