Programa de educación en Tecnología para el siglo XXI PET 21 40 ¡Error! Marcador no definido.

The protraction of the war in Mozambique has indexed a sophistication in analyses of the causes of the war and its effects on patterns of flight.

The war has variously been described as a war of external aggression prosecuted by South Africa (Isaacman, 1988), and a civil war (Hoile, 1991). Hard though it is to be objective about the causes of war, the truth is perhaps more complex. RENAMO was created in Rhodesia in 1976, its task to spy on guerillas of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) being sheltered by the new FRELIMO government in Mozambique (Finnegan, 1992). Following Zimbabwean Independence in 1980, RENAMO headquarters were transferred to South Africa. The purposes for doing so are debated, but there is no doubt that at least until the Nkomati Accord in 1984, South Africa backed a campaign of destabilisation through destruction by RENAMO in Mozambique (Winter, 1981). Whether or not South African support continued after 1984, RENAMO developed an internal dynamic divorced from external support (Hall, 1990; Hall, 1991; Vines, 1991; Young, 1990).

Initial studies understood the phenomenon of displacement as the ’human’ face of this war (Cammack, 1986; Gersony, 1988; Knight, 1988; Magaia, 1988; Quan, 1987). Some sought to examine the cause of displacement in a wider political-economic context (Adam, 1991; Ibeanu, 1990). However, more detailed case studies have stressed the need to distinguish analytically between underlying causes and inunediate précipitants in understanding the causes of displacement. Often flight from Mozambique was precipitated by the collapse of the local economy and/or drought, for example. Such studies also emphasised that the causes of displacement varied through time and between areas in Mozambique (Cistemino, 1987; Finnegan, 1992; Wilson and Nunes, 1991), and that the process was mediated by variables such as the varying allegiance of some people with RENAMO (Geffray and Pederson, 1988; Roesch, 1992); human rights abuses by FRELIMO soldiers not just RENAMO soldiers (Africa Watch, 1992); local ’cults of violence and counter-violence’ (Wilson, 1992c) and the resurgence of local neo- traditional authorities (Vines, 1991).

While there have been some very detailed studies of the local configurations of war and patterns and processes of displacement in other provinces such as Nampula (Geffray and Pederson, 1988); Gaza (Roesch, 1991); Tete (Wilson and Shumba, 1991; Adam, 1991) and Zambezia (Wilson, 1991; Wilson, I992d), there have been none in Niassa to date. The following observations are therefore largely based upon my interviews with refugees fi*om Niassa and the security reports held by MSF (Holland) in Cuamba, Niassa.

Vines (1991), adopting Gersony's (1988) categorisation of RENAMO influenced areas of tax areas, control areas and destruction areas, described Niassa as a tax area. Tax areas were in zones with a scarce, and generally dispersed population in territory marginal to RENAMO interests. RENAMO demanded of these populations a tax on food or labour in return for leaving the population otherwise alone and in peace. Tax areas did not receive any reciprocity from RENAMO in the form of aid or alternative services, except the guarantee of not being violently treated. As a result, between 1979 and 1984 there were no chronicled attacks in Niassa, and between 1985 and 1990 no more than 20 (Vines, 1991).

From refugee accounts I have formed the following brief chronology of events in Niassa. A RENAMO unit of perhaps 100 entered southern Niassa from Zambezia in early 1987. On 13 July 1987 a major offensive upon the border town of Mandimba was launched. It was repelled by FRELIMO forces based in Cuamba and Lichinga. The unit then apparently divided, some troops returning South, others pushing North. On 21 September 1991 there was another repelled attack, this time on the coastal town of Cobue (Figure 5.2. shows these locations).

These seem to have been the only two organised attacks which have occurred in the Province. During their advances upon these two towns, RENAMO camped in outlying villages, raiding food and taking porters to carry it. There appear to have been few atrocities perpetrated by these forces, who seem to have been quite well disciplined. The majority of my respondents lived in villages close to the two towns, and fled either upon the arrival of RENAMO in their villages or in the towns, or in anticipation.

F ig u re 5.2 T he D is trib u tio n of R e fug e es in M alaw i km 200 miles 1 2 5 T A N Z A N I A NKHATA BAY t • Cobue Messumba Z A M B I A • Lichinga LILONGWE Lilongwe MCHINJI _Mandimba DEDZA • Cuamba NTCHEV Blantyre i m u la n je ! r MWANZA CHIKWAWA

stationed in the area and small roving bands of RENAMO soldiers. These bands appear to have broken away from central control, as by 1989 RENAMO was concentrating its efforts in Zambezia. A much higher rate of atrocities occurred under these bands, and were experienced by those refugees who have fled Niassa since 1989. The following refugee account, from Kalanje, is a typical story:

’My village wasn’t actually attacked. I was on the way to visit some relatives with my wife and children when we were caught by RENAMO. They killed my wife and three children in front of me, there and then...I had to work for them for six months, carrying luggage and firewood...during the six months they attacked at least five villages. They burnt houses and took possessions and women to cook for them...I don’t know where the villages were, we only walked by night. I do know that we crossed seven rivers...There were only eight soldiers...They didn’t have radios and never contacted other soldiers, although when I escaped they did say they were on their way to meet another group of soldiers...We were preparing food for the soldiers one night. They sent me in to the bush to collect firewood, and I ran’ (K :ll)

During 1991 these opportunistic attacks continued, although at low frequency. By 1992 attacks had become functional. For example the only district centre in Niassa continually attacked was Metarica, which was the only district with a food surplus from the 1991-

1992 harvest.

In many cases, these more recent events were no longer attributable to RENAMO. In some cases break-away groups were active. But increasingly bandidos armados (armed bandits) and also break-away FRELIMO troops, responding to the shortage of food and wages in Niassa, looted under the cover of RENAMO. One refugee told me that it was very difficult to distinguish between RENAMO and bandidos armados: they wore the same clothes and carried the same weapons. However RENAMO never recruited troops in Niassa, so the RENAMO troops spoke different dialects.

As a result of this local configuration of conflict, several waves of flight occurred from Niassa. The principal waves were from the south in response to the attack on Mandimba, and from the north from the attack on Cobue. These account for the majority of Niassan refugees. Since 1989 the influx decreased as people fled small-scale local attacks. The low intensity and low frequency of recent attacks also engendered opportunities for

return.

Before flight, Niassa was the least populated Province of Mozambique, with a population density of only some six persons per square kilometre. According to the 1980 census, Niassa had some 500,000 inhabitants. In 1990 the Government of Mozambique estimated a total population, including refugees and internal displacees from the Province, of 681,000. This represents a 2.5% population increase per year on the 1980 census.

In 1990 it was estimated that some 36,000 Niassans were refugees in Malawi. On the basis of my visit to the various camps in which the majority of refugees were from Niassa, I would estimate that by 1992 the figure had increased to approximately 45,000. There are also an unquantified number of Niassans in Tanzania: the Tanzanian Government’s 1987 estimate of 72,000 refugees, the majority of whom were from Niassa and Cabo Delgado, also included those who had never repatriated following Independence. According to these figures there were perhaps as many as 100,000 refugees from Niassa in 1992. In August 1992 it was estimated by the Government of Mozambique that some 240,000 Niassans were internally displaced. It is not clear whether the internally displaced were still in Niassa, nor whether the Province housed internally displaced persons from other Provinces. The implication of these figures is that at least half of the population of Niassa remained in the Province during the war.