Programación y Control

The revolutionary activity which spread across the MENA region in the early 2010s was unprecedented in its speed and redefining of the geopolitical landscape. This is known as the ‘Arab Spring’, a term which will only be utilised within this thesis for its universal recognition of this phenomenon not to propose a reductionist uniformity of the activity and states in the region. Social media activism played a significant role in the proliferation and execution of these demonstrations (Musa, 2014, p. 273). Within this subsection, this thesis will attempt to underline theories on the relationship between the ‘Arab Spring’ and social media. Primarily, most case studies within the literature for this subsection are focused on Egypt – largely due to its 2011 revolution being the subject of significant intensive study, in comparison to the revolutions of other states. As such, this will be reflected in my analysis.

According to David Faris, organisation of demonstrations of the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 was carried out by digital activists utilising social media as a form of mobilisation (Faris, 2013, p. 176). He adds that this revolution utilised a combination of social media and on-the-ground work in order to achieve its goals, however takes care to state the revolution was not singularly down to social media and had other underlying factors which worked in tandem with online activism, though it would not have been possible without the latter (Faris, 2013, pp. 176-177).

This is in line with the theoretical framework of this thesis, in relation to the 2018-2019 Sudanese Revolution. It is also partly supported by Bala A. Musa who, on a wider note pertaining to the ‘Arab Spring’ as a whole, goes as far as to argue that circumstance regarding individual states was required align in order for online activism to be effective (Musa, 2014, pp. 273-274). Musa utilises Tunisia, Egypt and Libya as case studies exemplifying the success of social media activism, due to the external circumstances which aligned in order to enable successful revolt (Musa, 2014, p. 274). He then highlights Syria, Bahrain and Iran as examples of states wherein these factors did not align, despite the influence of social media activism (Musa, 2014, p. 274). Taking the arguments of Musa and Faris into account, as well as the concept of phenomenistic theory, it is highly unlikely social media during the ‘Arab Spring’ was a force powerful enough to singularly drive a revolution. In no state, Arab or otherwise, can a popular revolution be fully driven through a tool utilised as a means of communication. Social media, while highly effective and likely instrumental in the success of ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions, is no replacement for revolutionary ideology. Thus, the much-repeated notion of the ‘Arab Spring’ being one of fully social media origin is false. Social media facilitated the spread of revolution and enabled activists to capitalise on sentiment which already existed within respective states, in this case numerous states in the region. However, without its ideology, no revolution is capable of succeeding and revolutionary social media is not capable of altering this fact; though, as the research on Sudanese social media has outlined and as is likely to be reflected within the ‘Arab Spring’, social media is fully capable of ensuring this ideology spreads and garners the necessary support.

In Faris’ work, he argues digital elites comprised much of the leadership driving popular revolt in Egypt, particularly those affiliated to a movement known as the ‘We Are All Khaled Said’ movement (Faris, 2013, p. 176) and the ‘April 6th _{Youth Movement’ (Faris, 2013, p. 159).}

Khaled Said was a blogger who was abducted and beaten to death by Egyptian police in Alexandria in 2010 after he posted a video depicting police corruption (Faris, 2013, pp. 149- 150). His death sparked this online movement which progressed from organising demonstrations calling for justice for the incident to becoming forums for pro-revolutionary propaganda, including the call for demonstrations on the 25th _{of January 2011 which marked}

the beginning of the revolt (Faris, 2013, pp. 157-170). In his work Faris also describes tactical manoeuvres undertaken by the ‘April 6th _{Youth Movement’ to encourage Egyptians afraid of}

reprisal to participate in the protests, such as the manipulation of protest imagery to indicate larger volumes of people and therefore allay fears of being caught in a possible crackdown (Faris, 2013, p. 163). According to Linda Herrera, the administrator of the ‘We Are All Khaled Said’ Facebook page was kept anonymous up until the beginning of the revolution, despite activism before, and went by the name al-Šaheed (the martyr) (Herrera, 2014, p. 52). Al-Šaheed insisted on his anonymity, stating on the page that he was aided by a group of volunteers and maintained no specific political affiliation nor was a member of any specific opposition group – specifying they were simply Egyptian youth (Herrera, 2014, p. 53). Herrera states the management of the page was highly organised, taking deliberate measures to ensure support among Egyptian youth through direct contact to other online activists, calls on them to participate, posts on the site geared to encourage unity amongst the audience, and what is described in her work as effective marketing of the page (Herrera, 2014, pp. 53-69). However, following the revolution, ‘We Are All Khaled Said’ lost its dominance in the social media sphere due to it not providing a fundamental change in thought within Egypt (Herrera, 2014, p. 155). According to Herrera, a demonstrator stated “We don’t need the Khaled Said page to recruit us to clean the streets. We need it to clean the system from corruption, from all kinds of problems” (Herrera, 2014, p. 155). She argues that while the page enabled youth awareness and encouraged challenge towards the government, it was not radical enough to provide long-

term leadership for the revolution due to its selection of relatively non-drastic content (Herrera, 2014, p. 155). It is clear the participants of the Egyptian revolution were lacking in guidance following the initial phase of demonstration and the organisers of the revolt were either incapable or unwilling to deliver that guidance via their social media medium. As they were members of the youth, not those with political experience, it is highly unlikely they were capable of providing the demonstrators with the means to ‘clean the system’. This is despite the fact that their social media activism and leadership thrust this expectation upon them.

With regard to leadership across the region during the ‘Arab Spring’, Kawa Hassan argues there were no singular groups fully driving the protests (Hassan, 2012, p. 234). Rather than singular groups being the driving forces, all participating states saw a “…type of loose networking that brought about the ad hoc alliances, which at times joined forces for common actions, and at other times departed” (Hassan, 2012, p. 234). In his work, this is confirmed to be the case within Egypt as well as other states (Hassan, 2012, p. 234). What he terms as “loose, leaderless networks” were following an idea of karama (dignity), wherein citizens of the revolting Arab states felt long-term dictatorship of the region and the economic ramifications of this, as well as rampant corruption, violated their dignity (Hassan, 2012, p. 234). This led to the leadership of the revolutions being an idea, rather than a specific group (Hassan, 2012, p. 234). Hassan argues this was symbolised by Mohamed Bouazizi (Hassan, 2012, p. 234), when he self-immolated in Tunisia in protest at his economic state and consistently poor treatment by government officials (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2020). His actions and the reasoning behind them, were not only representative enough of public sentiment to spark the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia but also to spark revolutions across the Middle East as a whole (Hassan, 2012, p. 234). Bouazizi had, in effect, self-immolated due to feeling a lack of karama. The notion of government repression taking away the dignity of the region’s citizens resulted in

what is termed a “collective dispossession”, thus resulting in the ideal of reclaiming this lost dignity being a narrative for the revolutions and uprisings of the ‘Arab Spring’ (Hassan, 2012, p. 234). Hassan subsequently argues that social media is not the driving force behind the revolts and uprisings, but rather the facilitator – as seen in Syria with opposition to Bashar al-Assad, wherein social media is utilised to expand knowledge of events which occur even in far-flung corners of the country in conjunction with the physical activism of the people themselves (Hassan, 2012, p. 235).

Building on the findings of these works, it is clear that social media is the tool of the ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions. The discussion is oriented around those who wield this tool. The works discussed generally indicate that while the revolutions may have had significant players, such as ‘We Are All Khaled Said’ and the ‘6th _{of April Youth Movement’ in Egypt, these groups}

did not have the capacity nor perhaps the desire to form significant long-term leadership geared towards mobilising the revolutionaries and forming an opposition which would shape the post- revolutionary outcome. Their activism, primarily online with social media being the tool for dispersal, was geared around the ideology which was endemic on a regional scale. Due to the accepted communications mean being social media platforms, the question of who is responsible for management of these platforms is important. Taking into account the second hypothesis of this thesis, particularly its second clause, the ‘Arab Spring’ revolutions maintain a form of non-traditional leadership seen in the form of leadership by ideology and secondary leadership by individual and loosely connected digital activists. This is opposed to the top- down leadership of 2018-2019 Revolution, headed by the SPA and supported by subsidiary groups (the most accurate Sudanese reflection of the digital activists seen in the ‘Arab Spring’). The notion of leadership by ideology is unsurprising when taking into account the regional scale of the ‘Arab Spring’, in that it was inspired by activity in other states and thus emulated.

As such, it was an unprecedented revolution whereas the 2018-2019 Revolution in Sudan was likely meticulously planned – in terms of its ultimate goal. This does not necessarily state that the secondary clause negates the success of the ‘Arab Spring’, as karama was still a unifying notion which enabled the success of these revolutions and, therefore, a form of leadership. Hassan also argues it was have been beneficial to the revolutions in hindsight, with identifiable leaders offering an opportunity to be repressed or to co-opt movements (Hassan, 2012, p. 234). In addition, the revolutions which succeeded were successful in achieving their stated goals (i.e. the fall of the respective states regime). However, with a lack of long-term planning and a homogenous opposition, leadership in the traditional sense cannot be found. This can be seen in the uncertainty which befell the region following the ‘Arab Spring’ and can still be seen in some states today. Social media activism in the ‘Arab Spring’ offered a means of mobilising and executing revolutionary activism during the period of active revolution, via the unified goal of karama which was so powerful as to spark a revolutionary force spanning a region. However, an ideology is not a force which can sustain a revolution following its initial phase of active demonstration without consistent physical leadership supporting it. Therefore, while the revolutionaries of the ‘Arab Spring’ states achieved success in their navigation through social media activism of active revolution by digital activist groups through a leading ideology, non-homogenised leadership created an environment which differed entirely from that of the 2018-2019 revolution – wherein leadership was seen to display a strategy geared around an ideology (civilian leadership) but symbolised by an organisation (the SPA), utilising social media as their tool and their anonymity as a shield from the potential drawbacks Hassan describes.