Promoción de elecciones y mandato electo.

The three main types of voting behaviour, $A.LP vote, participation (turnout), and the informal vote can be affected by the type of electoral system as well as by social factors, and so a detailing of the system type and influence follows.

1. Electoral system type

Whilst the system type itself is a variable for

analysis between countries, within most countries it is a 'global attribute' affecting all areas equally. This is so for Federal elections in Australia, and whilst the country is divided into states, and these into local government areas (with each having its own elections and constituency boundaries) the Federal electoral laws for the Commonwealth of Australia are uniform within the country. The franchise is given to all British Subjects or naturalised Australians over 21 yrs of age, with some minor exceptions such as some people in mental asylums and prisons. A striking feature of the Australian system is that both enrolment and voting is compulsory, and while this has obvious implications for the size of the turnout at an election, it has less obvious implications for both the influence upon party vote, or for the makeup of and relation between the informal vote and the turnout.

With compulsory enrolment there is an almost total sample of elegible electors on the electoral rolls, and with compulsory voting there is an almost total allocation

of ballot papers to this sample. What this might mean in terms of political apathy or experience is not known, though the implications are discussed in chapter 6. In contrast to a system with non-compulsory voting there would be fewer non-participants staying away in protest or apathy, though more of the informal vote would be a protest vote

(against either main party, or against voting). Yet having been forced to vote, most electors choose to use their ballot

Figures for the House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s election have b een used; for this House a single me m b e r is elected for each electoral division (constituency) by preferential voting. For the measure of the pe r c e n t a g e of party vote in this study, first preferences only were used; because the number of candidates can split the first preferences, then any systematic variation of the number of candidates w i t h a party's first preference vote should be investigated,

and is done so for the ALP below.

Australia has basically a two party system, yet there are two other smaller parties w h i c h tradit i o n a l l y group with one of these. The ALP is the largest single party in terms of its electoral support, and could be described as 'left wing' or modera t e l y socialist. The Liberal Party is its major opponent and is 'right wing' or conservative. The remaining two significant parties are the C o u n t r y Party (not present in cities) and the Democratic Labor Party, w h i c h usually give their pref e r e n c e s to the Liberal Party; the remaining Communists, independents, and others are of insignificant numbers. Xt is therefore logical, and an accepted practice in the analysis of A u stralian politics, to use the 'ALP versus the rest' if a dichotomy is needed. Taking the ^ A L P first p r e f e r e n c e s gives one such dichotomy: a left/right wing or s o c i a l i s t/conservative division, whi c h has a m e a ning beyond the party label, w h i c h taps one of the basic dimensions of A u s t r a l i a n society.

2. M ain measures, and others

For p a r t y preference the $ALP first preferences were used. These were taken as a percentage of all formal votes

Pa r t i c i p a t i o n was taken as the pe r c e n t a g e of electors to whom ballot papers were issued to the n umber of electors e n r o l l e d , and was taken straight from the E l e c toral Returns

The informal vote was m easured as the percentage of informal ballot papers to the n u m b e r of ballot papers issued (i.e. to the number of participants).

After the i n i t i a l decision to use ^ALP, ^ p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and ^informal vote as the primary dependent v a r i a b l e s ,

there remain a number of secondary p o l i t i c a l var iables to be assessed for t h e i r influence upon any derived r e l a t i o n s h i p s .

Xn p a r t i c u l a r these are the number of candidates

per e l e c t o r a t e , the s a f e t y of a s eat , and the donkey vote. Other le s s e a s i l y q u a n t i f i a b l e vari a bl es such as the

regional v a r i a t i o n in perception of policy and i s s u e s , or the impact of p e r s o n a l i t i e s upon the local e l e c t o r a t e , have been ignored although they w i l l presumably add to the unexplained variance of any model developed.

The unwanted influence of any v ar ia ble can be removed from a dependent variable by r eg r es s i o n transformation. New values are thus created for the e l e c t o r a t e s , and these values then c o r r e l a t e zero with the unwanted v a r i a b l e .

A cons ider at ion of these unwanted influences follows, and r a t i o n a l e s are given for accepting or r e j e c t i n g that they have a causal i n f l uence, and i f influence i s accepted, for transforming t h e i r e f f e c t out of the a n a l y s i s .

One other type of v a r i a b l e i s considered, and t h i s i s w i t h i n - d i v i s i o n a r e a l v a r i a b i l i t y of the ALP vote and

p a r t i c i p a t i o n , High or low regi ona l v a r i a t i o n within an e l e c t o r a t e could have i mp l i c at i ons for methodology,

inf erences, and theory, and so i t i s considered i n r e l a t i o n to parts of the main a n a l y s i s .

3. Number of candidates

a) Informal vote

The Current Af fa i r s B u l l e t i n (vol 43, n o . 10, 1 9 6 9) s t a t e s t h a t

the proportion of informal votes r i s e s on

average by between one-quarter and one-half of one percent with each a d d i t i o n a l candidate

of f er i n g for a si ng l e member constituency (p.158).

The primary i n t e r e s t i s t h e r e f o r e i n excluding the e f f e c t of the number of candidates from the percentage informal vote, and t h i s can be done either by s u b t r a c t i n g say for each candidate from the t o t a l percentage

Both methods were used but the subsequent c o r r e l a t i o n s of the r e s i d u a l s with other variables showed p r a c t i c a l l y no v a r i a t i o n and so the r e g r e s s i o n transformation was used i n analyses. For example i n Sydney the c o r r e l a t i o n between the ^ALP vote and the informal vote r e s i d u a l was r = . 6 0 6

w h i l s t t ha t between $>ALP and the informal vote with

percentage c o r r e c t i o n (and l o g ^ transform) was r = .5 9 7*

The frequency d i s t r i b u t i o n f o r the number of

candidates was skewed towards the few e l e c t o r a l d i v i s i o n s with large numbers of candidates, and so log transforms were applied to these d i s t r i b u t i o n s f o r both Sydney and Melbourne. Some s l i g h t skew remained but i t was

considered to be within the l i m i t s of a p p l i c a b i l i t y ( Nunnally 1 9 6 7, p .1 2 5-6).

In Sydney the c o r r e l a t i o n between the informal vote and the number of candidates (with log transform) was r = .225) and i n Melbourne, with the informal vote also having a log transform, the c o r r e l a t i o n was r = .398.

Because of the smallness of the c o r r e l a t i o n s , only a small amount of variance i s being removed from the informal vote

percentage by the r e g r e s s i o n transformation, and t h i s corresponds to the small amount indicated by the Current Af fair s B u l l e t i n .

The more candidates there are then the more e r r o r i s made on the p r e f e r e n t i a l - t y p e b a l l o t Daper, and therefor e the higher the informal vote. Consequently the informal vote used i n anal ysi s i s always that with the variance of the number of candidates removed.

b) Participation and $>ALP vote

The number of candidates also has a c o r r e l a t i o n of r = .217 i n Sydney and r = . 0 6 8 i n Melbourne with

percentage p a r t i c i p a t i o n , but i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how the number of candidates could cause v a r i a t i o n in

p a r t i c i p a t i o n , and so t h i s was ignored.

The $A.LP vote c o r r e l a t e s with the number of candidates to the degree of r = -.522 i n Sydney and r = -.004 i n

Melbourne, and w h i l s t Melbourne can be ignored, there i s the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t in Sydney the number of candidates

could s plit the first p r e f e r e n c e s and t h e r e f o r e l o w e r the ^ A L P vote. F o r this r e a s o n the r e l a t i o n s h i p i n S y d n e y is e x a m i n e d below.

c) ^ A L P and n u m b e r of c a n d i d a t e s i n S y d n e y

C o m p a r i n g f i g u r e s for 19 6 1 and 1966, the n u m b e r of c a n d i d a t e s i n 1961 do not c o r r e l a t e w i t h $ A L P i n e i t h e r 1961 or 1966 (r = -.06 and -.01 r e s p e c t i v e l y ) , b u t the n u m b e r of c a n d i d a t e s i n 1966 c o r r e l a t e s w i t h ^»ALP in b o t h

1961 and 1966 (r = -.42 and -.52 r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . T h e p r o b l e m of c o r r e l a t i o n and c a u s a l i t y is s u c h that it is not k n o w n if the l a t t e r c o r r e l a t i o n s are s h e e r l y ra n d o m , or, if there is a n infl u e n c e , in w h a t d i r e c t i o n and to w h a t degree it is.

It is o b vi o u s that the n u m b e r of c a n d i d a t e s i n 1966 d i d not cause v a r i a t i o n in the A L P v o t e in 19 6 1 , bu t it is p o s s i b l e that the A L P vo t e in 19 6 1 s t i m u l a t e d the p a r t i c u l a r d i s t r i b u t i o n of c a n d i d a t e s in 1966. I f the l a t t e r is so, t h e n this d i s t r i b u t i o n m a y or m a y not h a v e r e d u c e d the $ A L P f i g u r e s b y s p l i t t i n g the f i r s t p r e f e r e n c e vote w h e r e there w e r e m a n y c a n d i d a t e s . A p o s s i b l e r a t i o n a l e for this d e v e l o p m e n t w o u l d be that the n e a r - A L P v i c t o r y in 19 6 1 s t i m u l a t e d g r e a t e r o p p o s i t i o n in 1966, and th e n i n t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t the ex p e c t e d s w i n g a g a i n s t the A L P in 1966, (i) A L P - h e l d m a r g i n a l seats w o u l d be m o r e l i k e l y to be w o n b y the n o n - A L P if fe w c a n d i d a t e s stood - i n o r d e r to m a x i m i s e the effect of the swing, (ii) n o n - A L P - h e l d m a r g i n a l seats w o u l d be e x p e c t e d to i n c r e a s e t h e i r n o n - A L P vote, and

be c a u s e safe s e at s d o not u s u a l l y a t t r a c t m a n y c a n d i d a t e s , these s e ats w o u l d be the ones m o s t l i k e l y to a t t r a c t the l a r g e r n u m b e r of c a n d i d a t e s and to share t h e i r v o t e s more among these.

Of c o u r s e o t h e r f a ct o r s w i l l be i m p o r t a n t i n some