Propiedades eléctricas

It is now possible to assess a number of factors to see what New Zealand‘s status is in terms of robust human rights governance i.e. how effective has it been? To aid this, Table 9 with 20 criteria has been developed relating to each of the six phases of New Zealand‘s human rights history. Four categories are used: strong, developing, weak and non-existent. The rationale for using these has already been set out in Section 1.5 on developing criteria for effectiveness.

Looking at Table 9 in detail the ‗strong‘ status is largely related to legal and structural factors i.e. Phase One (international law-making); Phases Two to Four (creation of domestic architecture and streamlined institutions and legislation); Phase Five (judiciary/legal system enforcing international obligations and treaties are ratified after careful checking); and Phase Six (rule of law adhered to, domestic remedies for breaches of international rights). This is not surprising for two reasons. The legal aspect to human rights implementation has always been much more developed than any other, including several decades of academic support in this area. Also, the West‘s focus on civil and political rights has meant that these first generation rights have received more legal protection and this is reflected in New Zealand‘s points of strength. The point was made earlier, however, that having an effective human rights system in New Zealand is not just about enacting laws. Other non-legal elements work together to form a wider and tighter framework for international human rights to enter this country and be transformed in the domestic context, and as will now be seen it is these non-legal elements which are the weakest.

Table 9. New Zealand status – effectiveness in robust human rights governance

FACTOR CURRENT

STATUS

PHASE ONE

Growth of international architecture – UN-NZ interplay

(1) Involvement in UN structural development and international law-making Strong PHASE TWO

Growth of domestic architecture

(2) Evolving domestic architecture – institutions (especially NHRI), legislation, policies and practices

Strong

(3) Ongoing incorporation of international obligations into domestic law if relevant and possible

Strong

(4) Clear lead government department with overall domestic oversight for international human rights treaty body reporting and implementation

Weak

(5) ‗Formal‘ inter-departmental network of officials (or Human Rights Working Group)

Non-existent

PHASES THREE AND FOUR Stock-take and planning initiatives

(6) Streamlined institutions and legislation, and stock-take and planning initiatives carried out when necessary

Strong

PHASE FIVE

More effective implementation

(7) Judiciary/legal system enforcing international obligations Strong (8) Treaties ratified after careful check for compliance Strong (9) Exploring proactive approaches instead of always being reactive Developing (10) Four-fold human rights domestic framework: organisations, legislation,

policy, human rights governance level

Developing

(11) Increasing parity across first, second, third and fourth generation rights Developing (12) Early mainstreaming of human rights considerations into policy making Developing

(13) Cultural issues being worked through Developing (14) Effective public human rights education programme Developing (15) State sector and NGOs working together on human rights issues Developing (16) Internal human rights training in department and cross-agency training of

policy advisors to ensure good understanding of international instruments and obligations

Weak – Developing

(17) Concluding Observations recognised as important Weak – Developing PHASE SIX

Robust human rights governance

(18) Good international citizen and role model – human rights abuses much less likely

Strong

(19) Good governance practices: democracy, rule of law adhered to, judiciary and officials not corrupt; public participation

Strong

(20) Individuals can get redress for civil and political rights through domestic remedies

Developing – Strong

It is clear from Table 9 that the ‗developing‘ status is almost solely related to Phase Five about more effective implementation, and this again is not surprising because New Zealand has only just completed a 15-year period of review i.e. stock-taking and planning initiatives. These looked at problems in implementation which, having only just been identified in the stock-take phase, will take some time to set in place. The

‗weak‘ and ‗non-existent‘ status areas are in Phase Two and Phase Five. In fact, two out of the four Phase Two factors are not at all strong which indicates this is a phase that definitely needs more work. Summarising, Phases One, Three, Four and Six are strong and Phases Two and Five need to be addressed. This research suggests that if a Human Rights Working Group (or similar body) was established (currently the only ‗non-existent‘ factor), they could monitor the development of progress towards achieving robustness using these (or similar) phase and status factors.

Since developing this table, a table in the Bradford and Scott (2009) report on developing robust economic governance systems was sighted that takes a similar approach entitled

‗Moving Governance Institutions from a Fragile to a Developed State‘.¹⁴⁷ The term

‗human rights‘ does not feature in their extensive lists, again confirming the disjuncture between general international policy making and the field of international human rights.

However, their analogous approach (of moving from fragile to developed – in this thesis from fragile to robust) strengthens this research as the core concepts are being used in another field to understand a related issue. They also make the perceptive point that: ‗The mirror image of the strengths of EGMs [economic governance mechanisms] are the weakness factors‘ (Bradford and Scott, 2009: 101). This is true also of the attempt in this thesis to develop the 20 criteria for robustness; these too are the ‗mirror image‘ of the attributes for fragility. For robust economic governance, Bradford and Scott conclude with nine ‗design principles‘ for establishing this in fragile states.¹⁴⁸ Each of these principles could equally well apply to the development towards robust human rights governance in a fragile state, and there is probably room for some cross-fertilisation between this research and any efforts to better understand state-level improvements in the human rights field.

7.3 Summary

The second research question can now be answered about how effective New Zealand has been in relation to robust human rights governance. It is possible to characterise not ‗total‘

effectiveness, but ‗a great measure of‘ effectiveness, having entered the sixth stage of robustness and with work still to do to bring Phase Two and Phase Five issues into a position of strength. Again, as with the first research question, the diagnosis about how to reach the status of robust human rights governance can be given at least in part, but making the necessary changes can only occur if there is a strong commitment from within the state sector to formally move in this direction.

The next chapter now turns to the two case studies that show how easy or difficult it can be to implement rights from the international arena. That is, the complex alignment that needs

147 Table 2.1 in their report looks at three status levels (conflict prone state/fragile state/developed state) and suggests features that would indicate the range ‗no governance‘ to ‗good governance‘ across three areas (politics/economic and social/security) (Bradford and Scott, 2009: 22-23).

148 These principles are: understanding the ‗historical and political context‘ of the fragile state; seeking a ‗stable political and security environment‘; the need for ‗political endorsement‘; the necessity of ‗political reform‘ so that robust economic governance can happen; ‗long-term commitment‘ by other (donor) countries who are trying to help; ‗donor coordination‘ among these countries;

‗capacity building‘; ‗oversight, monitoring and evaluation‘; crucial involvement of ‗civil society‘ (Bradford and Scott, 2009:

131-to happen starting with a ratified international covenant, its progression possibly in131-to law and/or policies, and its route down to the rights being enjoyed by individuals, can be more or less out of sync. The military justice system example is a positive one, however, showing the specific processes and mechanisms of the human rights system working at best international good practice and allowing effective complementarity between the law+litigation and public policy fields. Once the case studies have been presented in Chapter 8 (which also deepen New Zealand‘s human rights story), it will then be possible to make concluding comments in Chapter 9.

CHAPTER 8: CASE PRACTICE: REACTIVE AND