This thesis makes a number of empirical, theoretical, and methodological contributions to the literature. Parts of this thesis have already been published or are under-review by some journals, as listed on the section of declaration.
1.8.1 Empirical contribution
The empirical contribution of my thesis involves primary data and empirical findings. As mentioned above this thesis establishes a primary database about the Chinese intellectuals’ debate on legitimacy. This Chinese language materials database provides a shortcut for non- Chinese speakers to understand Chinese discourses of legitimacy. Thus, it can be used to build future research studies.
Based on my primary database, this thesis presents many new empirical findings. First, Western scholarship focuses on performance legitimacy and pays insufficient attention to ideology; however, analysts within China still consider ideology to be crucial and express serious concern about performance legitimacy. Second, while many in the West frequently point out the successes of the Chinese response to the financial crisis, Chinese intellectuals seem to become more pessimistic. Third, this thesis finds a fundamental shift in the
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legitimacy debate in China, which is driven by various worsening problems caused by economic growth – socioeconomic inequality in particular. Fourth, while many overseas China observers are focusing on the search for Chinese philosophies to underpin a new polity, the Chinese intellectuals are looking to the West instead. Fifth, there is a distinct rising appeal of social autonomy that runs counter to the dominant official line in this debate. Finally, this study finds a correlation between authors’ backgrounds institutions research locations and funding sources) and their dominant arguments about legitimacy. Overall, my empirical study reveals a variety of different views on the CCP’s legitimacy between the Western and Chinese scholarship.
In addition, in order to study the institutional development of power succession in China, this thesis also collects a large amount of primary and secondary data about Chinese elite politics.
1.8.2. Methodological Contribution
The mixed qualitative/quantitative research method is developed from the pioneering work of Gilley and Holbig (2009). More details about how it departs from the previous work will be explained in Chapter 4. This research method can be used in many other fields, as it provides a systematic way to study Chinese language materials. For example, it can be used to study the domestic discourse of China’s foreign policies. pecifically it can help to understand how Chinese intellectuals view “China ream” and contribute to the field of international relations.
1.8.3. Theoretical Contribution 1.8.3.1. Literature of Chinese Studies
This thesis poses a series of theoretical challenges to the relevant literature on the subject of the CCP’s legitimacy. As mentioned conventional wisdom argues that performance legitimacy – in particular economic performance and stability – is a principal pillar of legitimacy in China. If we observe China from the outside, it is very easy to focus on economic performance. However, within China itself, it is clearly recognized that economic growth may also undermine legitimacy and that economic growth alone may not be able to provide sufficient legitimacy for the CCP’s rule as Chapter 4 will show. Thus this thesis suggests that China observers should move from simply growth/performance-focus to consider other elements – for example, how to deal with the negative consequences of economic growth.
Moreover, although there were a few studies on ideology, as discussed above, the issue of ideology is still under-researched in the political science literature on contemporary China in general. This thesis contributes to the limited studies on this topic. By proposing a new analytical framework, this thesis shows how the regime used informal ideology and formal ideology to maintain its rule, which provides a valuable contribution to fill the gap in the relevant literature.
This thesis also contributes to the limited studies on political reforms in China. As Schubert (2008:191) pointed out:
“Political reform is not considered viable and usually discredited as too limited and manipulated by the Communist Party as to deserve its name. Consequently, the impact
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of these reforms on the current regime’s legitimacy is under-researched, arguably blinding us for a better understanding of its resilience.”
As such, Schubert (2008:191) proposes a new research agenda to study the CCP’s legitimacy. Unlike chubert’s agenda that focuses on political reforms at local levels this thesis contributes to the relevant literature by studying political reforms at the top (i.e. the institutionalization of power succession).
There are many studies that focus on political reforms at local levels – in particular village elections and their impact on regime legitimacy – in both English and Chinese language literature (e.g. Kennedy, 2009; Ma and Wang, 2012; O' Brien and Han, 2009; Schubert, 2008; Schubert, 2014; Schubert and Chen, 2007). Both Chinese and Western scholars agree that village democracy has enhanced legitimacy of local governments in China. As Chapter 4 will discuss, many Chinese intellectuals suggest the further implementation of elections at local levels to maintain legitimacy. Although many Chinese intellectuals highly value village elections, it is notable that none of them suggests extending them to the national level.
Many Western scholars are also very positive on the development of village elections. The positive consequences of village elections in increasing political participation and legitimacy have inspired a debate on future research agendas for the study of village democracy (O' Brien and Han, 2009; Schubert, 2008; Schubert, 2014; Schubert and Chen, 2007). For example, O' Brien and Han (2009) argue that future research should focus less on election procedures and more on democratic quality. In other words, the outcome of democratic election in Chinese villages is worth more attentions than the specific election procedures. However, Kennedy (2009:359) argues that “reseachers should not dismiss the importance of elections procedures too quickly.”In my view election procedures and outcomes are perhaps equally important. Procedures are the essence of electoral democracy; however, only with a positive democratic outcome, electoral democracy will be appealing to the Chinese society.
This thesis accepts that institutional changes at local levels are clearly important – and this is reflected in the relatively large body of work that these elections have spawned. The intention here is not to deny their significance, but instead to focus on the much less often studied dimension of institutional development at the top, and its impact on regime legitimacy. This relative lack of interest is understandable given the opaque nature of elite politics in China and, more importantly, the lack of any move towards elections of top leaders, as I will discuss in Chapter 3. However, the argument here is that there is more to institutional change at the top than elections, and by focusing on the institutional development at the top and its implications for regime survival, this thesis can make a more substantial contribution to the study of legitimacy in China than repeating existing debates on local elections.
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Authoritarian systems are widely considered as rigid; however, the theory of “authoritarian resilience” suggests that authoritarian regimes can be resilient. By providing a notable addition to support this theory, this thesis also contributes to the literature on comparative politics. Indeed the debate on authoritarian resilience is inspired by the CCP’s first smooth leadership transition in 2002. While some argue that the institutional changes have made the authoritarian system more sustainable (Miller, 2008; Nathan, 2003; Shambaugh, 2008c:176) and served to strengthen the CCP’s rule (Brown, 2009; Dickson, 2008; Fewsmith, 2006), others contend that this view overestimates the strength of the authoritarian system and ignores its vulnerability (Baum, 2007; Gilley, 2003; Li, 2012a; Pei, 2008; Shirk, 2007).
The success of the leadership transition in 2012 further supports the existence of authoritarian resilience. In 2002, Jiang Zemin only handed over the posts of PRC President and CCP head and still retained the post of military head until 2004. However, in 2012, Hu Jintao handed over all power including military head to Xi Jinping. It was the first time that a new CCP head could take charge of the Chinese army at the beginning of his term since 1978. The full retirement of Hu Jintao marked a more complete and normalized leadership transition. In this regard, the transition in 2012 was more institutionalized than that in 2002.
As mentioned, how to successfully transfer power at the top and prevent a split in the leadership during this process have always been extremely challenging to authoritarian regimes. However, having learnt from the dangers of elite divisions, the CCP has taken great efforts in institutionalizing power succession. The CCP has instituted many rules – such as a retirement age limit – to ensure a rapid cycle of ruling elites without holding democratic elections. Its peaceful leadership transition is arguably a role model for other authoritarian regimes.
Moreover, as mentioned learning from the protest of 1989 and the fall of other communist regimes, the CCP gradually realized the danger of the changing social values toward liberal democracy. In order to maintain its rule, the regime has produced various informal ideological discourses to delegitimize liberal democracy. By deploying this ideological strategy, the CCP has managed to maintain its one-party rule. It posed a strong challenge to the theory of modernization, which asserts that socioeconomic modernization brings value shifts and democratization.