PROPIEDADES DE SQL

One o f the most damaging, albeit indirect, consequences of the ANZUS split has been the deterioration of relations between the Government on the one hand, and the MOD and the Services, on the other. Indeed relations are probably worse than at any other time in New Zealand's history. The point needs to be stressed that, although few in the military

support the Government's anti-nuclear policy, the MOD accepts without question the Government's right to implement policy as it sees fit. W hat has caused real rancour between the politicians and the military has been the way in which Mr Lange and Mr O'Flynn in particular have publicly treated the concerns of the Services.

The first such instance of this came with Mr Lange's response to a statement signed by sixteen former Chiefs of Staff in early October 1985. The statement, entitled Current Issues and ANZUS , expressed concern about the military consequences of the rift in ANZUS, and was widely published.117 In spite of the seniority of the people concerned, and the fact that the views given by a majority of former New Zealand military commanders of the post-war period ought to have been taken seriously, Lange's dismissive comment was that they were "geriatric Generals." He later apologised for this remark, but not for the similarly insulting press release statement which said of the former Chiefs that:

Under the National Government they were silent while our ability to defend ourselves withered away and they snuggled under the bomb.(H8)

The MOD itself has felt that on many occasions the Government has been disinclined to take its advice seriously. Defence personnel were not permitted to give evidence before the Committee of Enquiry into public attitudes on defence matters (the Corner Committee).119 The 1987 Defence Review itself was conducted by an 'Officials Committee' and headed by a representative from the Prime Minister's Department specifically to prevent the MOD from having a dominant input into the review process.

Relations with Defence Minister O'Flynn have been strained, a fact which was made public in January 1986 when the Chief of General Staff, Major General John Mace, appealed to M r Lange to reverse O'Flynn's decision not to send an Army officer to a

training course in Canada.120 Of itself, the issue was comparatively minor, but the Services were treating it as a benchmark of O'Flynn's attitude as Minister. Mr O'Flynn's response came in the form of a remarkable twelve page press release in which he freely accused sections of the defence bureaucracy of "disloyalty", "blackmail" and telling "wicked lies".

O'Flynn declared that;

The real difficulty is that from the first the Government's policy of not allowing nuclear weapons into New Zealand even temporarily on visiting ships was unpalatable to the defence establishment generally.(i2i)

This in a sense was true, although the more immediate concern was that O'Flynn wanted to limit overseas training opportunities at a time when the Services had already lost access to US courses. More fundamentally, his press release and the events leading up to it were evidence of O'Flynn's hostile attitude to the military and their traditional concerns. O'Flynn made it clear prior to the election in July 1984 that he did not want to be the Defence

Minister, and he has indicated since that he has not enjoyed the jo b .122 On a number of occasions he has been dismissive of what he perceives to be the mind-set of the military. Of the former Chiefs of Staff, for example, he told a gathering of the Navy League that "...it is small wonder that they are indoctrinated with the defence philosophy that has been current at least since World W ar Two."123 His audience was not impressed. He has referred to one prominent critic of government policy, Air Vice Marshal Morrison (Rtd) as "Joe McCarthy resurrected".124 O'Flynn has also on occasion proposed such novel - and in view of his critics, ill considered - defence options for New Zealand as blowing up bridges and tunnels to ensure that "...an invasion could be made extremely dificult" for the enemy.125 It is fair to say that O'Flynn has something of an adversarial attitude in dealing with his department. Private discussions with Defence officials con firm that they find him a difficult man with whom to work and often resistant to departmental advice on even the most technical aspects of weapons systems and platform s.126

One consequence of this has been that senior Defence officials have been more inclined to speak out against government policy after retirement. Thus far, in addition to the former Chiefs of Staff, a former Chief of Naval Staff (Rear Admiral Cedric Steward), a Chief of Defence Staff (Air Marshal Sir Ewan Jamieson) and Defence Attache in

Washington (Brigadier Alex Hamilton) have made highly critical comments about the effect Government policy is having on the AFNZ's capabilities.127

information unfavourable to the government to 'leak'. This reflects a general feeling that information relating to the costs of the ANZUS split has been kept from the public. Leaks o f this type brought forth the above noted O'Flynn statement about disloyalty in January

1986. Most recently the section of the Officials Committee report titled Impact o f the ANZUS Rift: Chapter Three was leaked at a time designed to compromise the 1987 Defence White Paper's optimistic view of the AFNZ's capacity for greater self-reliance in the South Pacific.

This then characterises the present state of feeling between government and the defence bureaucracy. Relations between the two are made difficult by a mutual suspicion, charged with what at times amounts to ill disguised contempt for opposing points of view. The military feels that the government has a faulty grasp of fundamental defence concepts, has refused to listen to departmental advice, and has failed to outline a plausible defence strategy for New Zealand outside of ANZUS. The Government, for its part, feels that the military's opposition to its policy is bureaucratic stonewalling which amounts at times to disloyalty towards their political masters.