The international efforts to combat climate change started with the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. Its aim was to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in order to avoid dangerous climate change (UNFCCC 1992). The Convention currently (2013) has 195 parties, 194 states and the European Union.
UNFCCC holds negotiations throughout the year culminating in the annual conferences of the parties (COPs). The most substantial international agreement that has been reached to combat climate change is the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol (UNFCCC 1998), which entered
into force in 2005 and is closely linked to the Convention. The Kyoto Protocol commits Annex I countries, i.e. industrialised countries and countries in transition to a market economy, to reduce their overall emissions of greenhouse gases by an average of 5.2 percent below the 1990 levels, between 2008 – 2012 (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2010). However, the emission reduction targets vary from country to country. Importantly, the Kyoto Protocol does not include any commitments for developing countries and theconsequences of this particular decision are still experienced in negotiations today (Depledge 2005), as some of those countries are already major greenhouse gas emitters. The Kyoto Protocol’s commitment period was set to expire in 2012, which makes reaching a new binding agreement a matter of some urgency if mitigation efforts are not to be stalled. 190 countries have now ratified the Kyoto Protocol. In practice, this means that countries which are responsible for about 63.7 percent of the world’s emissions have now ratified it (UNFCCC 2011b). However, the US is the only major actor, which has never ratified the Protocol.
A significant step on the way to replacing the Kyoto Protocol were the COP13 negotiations in Bali, Indonesia, where the Bali Road Map was adopted. This included planning a two-year negotiating process, where the deadline for completing the negotiations was set to be at the COP15 in Copenhagen. COP13 established two key bodies: the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP). They both have had several negotiating sessions between the COPs (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2010). However, these negotiating sessions have a much lower profile as they are preparatory for the annual conferences. Both recent COP15 and COP16 climate change conferences (in Copenhagen and Cancun respectively) examined in this thesis were part of the effort to reach a new more ambitious legally binding agreement.
The COP15 took place between 7 – 19 December 2009. The deadline for reaching an agreement on legally binding emissions reductions was set for this occasion, so both pressure and expectations were very high. Prior to the conference ambitious statements were made by leaders from across the world about the necessity of reaching a deal. These were echoed in the world’s media. These statements of political will further raised expectations (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2009). Copenhagen was widely seen as an historic opportunity for the world to unite against climate change. 115 heads of state and government attended the conference, which was considered the largest high-level UN gathering outside New York. More than 40,000 people applied for accreditation at the conference, and Copenhagen was full of activists who had travelled from all over the world
in order to try and convince the negotiating parties that action was imperative. The media also had an unprecedented level of personnel at the conference, with about 4,000 media workers in Copenhagen (Painter 2010). In fact, it could be argued that climate change had never been higher on both media and political agendas than at the time of the conference.
In terms of the actual negotiations, COP15 was characterised by a lot of drama. Overall, it was marked by “...bitter divisions, confusion and setbacks...” (Diringer, Cecys, Patodia, & Bodansky 2009: 2). The negotiations did not start well when a draft text, which only had been seen by a few countries, was leaked to the Guardian. This leaked draft resulted in a lot of mistrust and suspicion about the transparency of the process, especially on the part of the developing countries (Diringer et al. 2009; Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2009). These complaints about the lack of transparency and the undemocratic process characterised the remainder of the conference as well, resulting in temporary suspension of negotiations and walkouts. This also meant that a lot of the focus was on procedural issues, and less so on the substantial issues of the negotiations. Additionally, there were clear problems with regards to the involvement of civil society who after applying for accreditation could not be accommodated into the Bella Centre. The number of civil society and observer organisations was reduced to next to nothing during the last few days of the conference, resulting in a lot of anger from NGOs, who claimed that exclusion would be damaging for the outcome of the negotiations (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2009). There were also a lot of ‘friends of the chair’ consultations. During these, countries came together to negotiate in small groups, rather than including all the different parties the whole time. Again, this added further to the concerns about the transparency of the process (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2009). The Danish hosts came under heavy criticism for their poor leadership during the negotiations, both from delegations, stakeholders and the media (Streck et al. 2011). Another key feature which characterised the conference was the deadlock between the two main protagonists, US and China, especially concerning financing for developing countries and the international monitoring process for emissions targets (Diringer et al. 2009), which China felt would undermine its national sovereignty.
Several observers saw the COP15 negotiations as a complete disaster (Dimitrov 2010b; Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2009). Overall, the conference did not reach a legally binding
agreement as intended. However, the COP ‘took note’ of a Copenhagen Accord, which was negotiated by a small number of countries behind closed doors in the final hours of the conference, even after the scheduled end of the conference. These parties included the US and the major emerging economies: China, South Africa, India and Brazil (Diringer et al. 2009; Roberts 2011). Many delegates first saw this text on the Internet, before it had been officially produced by the UNFCCC, resulting in strong statements of discontent from various countries. Still, despite serious doubts about the procedure during the negotiations, the majority of the parties supported the Copenhagen Accord (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2009).
Overall, the Copenhagen Accord faced strong criticism for being too vague, not legally binding, and a step backward from the Kyoto Protocol (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2009). The parties agreed (amongst other things) to a target of limiting the temperature increase to 2o Celsius with a possibility of reviewing this goal to 1.5o Celsius at a later stage.
They also agreed on broad terms in relation to the reporting and verification of the individual countries’ actions (UNFCCC 2009b). The most successful part of the Accord was probably with regard to the financing for developing countries, which had been a key element of the negotiations (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2009). The parties agreed to a collective commitment by developed countries for $30 billion in new and additional resources in the short term, i.e. in 2010-2012. This was to help developing countries reduce emissions, preserve forests and adapt to climate change. A further goal of mobilising $100 billion a year in both public and private funds by 2020 to address developing countries’ needs was also acknowledged. The most vulnerable countries would be given priority when it came to funds for adaptation (UNFCCC 2009b). However, as pointed out before, the Copenhagen Accord was merely a political declaration, not a binding document. Dimitrov (2010b) argues that there are three reasons why the Copenhagen Accord was weak:
“First, it is a nonbinding political declaration. Second, the text is light on policy content, with no global targets for aggregate emission reductions to ensure environmental results. Third, the Conference of Parties did not formally adopt the Accord as an official decision, and the text remains a free- floating agreement without institutional home” (Dimitrov 2010b: 815).
However, despite such strong criticisms of the Copenhagen Accord, it did reach some consensus on some difficult issues, including adaption and mitigation by developing
countries and the nature of both short and long-term finance (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2009).
The sixteenth Conference of the Parties (COP16), held in Cancun in Mexico from 29 November – 11 December 2010 could not be less similar to COP15. In fact, on that occasion, expectations for a legally binding agreement were very modest, media coverage was limited and relatively few heads of state and government attended (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2010). Additionally, the hosts were very careful in trying to restore faith in the UNFCCC process through their commitment to a more transparent and inclusive process than that used in Copenhagen (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2010; Streck et al. 2011). The Mexican Presidency ensured that civil society groups were kept informed and given a chance to participate during regular open sessions. Despite this, there were some disagreements concerning the process, with Bolivia expressing discontent, arguing that the reached agreement was too weak and immoral (Diringer, Cecys, & Patodia Rastogi 2010; Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2010; Roberts 2011). However, the vast majority of countries were satisfied with the process and lauded the Mexican Presidency for their role in the negotiations (Diringer et al. 2010).
Both conferences have followed a twin track approach with negotiations taking place within the two main bodies AWG – LCA (Convention Track) and AWG – KP (Protocol Track). The former body works on negotiating a long-term new agreement under the Convention, whilst the latter is concerned with negotiating a second commitment period for Kyoto with binding post – 2012 emissions targets for developed countries. There are two major concerns with regard to extending the Kyoto Protocol. Parties to it do not accept a second commitment period without some corresponding pledge from the US, who never ratified it. Secondly, Kyoto does not include the major emerging economies. Therefore there is a need to negotiate along the second track, which takes into account the major emitters, such as the US, China, Brazil, India etc. This was a major hurdle in Cancun, as countries such as Japan, Canada and Russia expressed their reluctance to continue with the Protocol (Diringer et al. 2010; Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2010; Streck et al. 2011). Developing countries, however, were very keen on the continuation of the
Kyoto Protocol as that is the only legally binding international agreement which forces developed countries to reduce their emissions (Goldenberg 2010).
In practice the negotiations in Cancun went across both tracks, as mitigation pledges and future binding outcomes needed to be anchored into the Convention track and therefore the outcomes were brought together under one umbrella (Diringer et al. 2010; Streck et al. 2011). The COP16 actually did reach an agreement, although some would say that this represented only minor steps towards reducing emissions and therefore mitigating climate change (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2010). In fact, it is clear that current emission pledges fall far short of avoiding dangerous climate change (Streck et al. 2011). However, important progress was made on several issues, including bringing the mitigation targets and actions of industrialised and developing countries formally under the UNFCCC process. Additionally, the agreement established the Green Climate Fund (a ‘technology mechanism’) and the Cancun Adaptation Framework, whose purpose is to help countries - especially developing ones - mitigate, adapt and reduce their vulnerability to climate change through technology transfers and financing for adaptation to climate change (UNFCCC 2010b). However, the major achievement of Cancun was the restoration of faith in the UN process and the ability of the international community to work together to address climate change (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2010).
It is clear that having almost 200 negotiating parties and taking decisions by consensus on such a challenging issue is very difficult at the best of times. The parties are very diverse. They have different interests, capabilities and responsibilities for creating and solving the problem of climate change (Giddens 2009). Depledge (2005) argues that the defining characteristics of these negotiations are two fold, complexity and inequality. Due to the diversity of national circumstances, which are shaped by vulnerability to climate change, level of development, economic dependence to sale of fossil fuels, and emissions per capita, there were are obviously a wide range of preferences for particular outcomes or lack thereof. Additionally broader issues such as inequalities of wealth, power and stage of development also shape the range of possible preferences (Depledge 2005).
In view of the number of parties to the Convention, it is natural and actually necessary that negotiating blocs are formed (Berridge 2010). This simplifies the process in most cases, but in others also complicates it, as there are a wide range of preferences within these groups as well (Depledge 2005; Roberts 2011). One of the most important coalitions is the ‘Group of G77 plus China’, which is the main one for developing countries and has about 130 members (UNFCCC 2011a). Other negotiating groups, like the Alliance of Small Islands States (AOSIS), the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and, more recently, the new very important bloc BASIC (which consists of emerging economies, Brazil, South Africa, India and China), are closely linked with the G77, although they negotiate independently. The presence of smaller groups means that the negotiations are becoming increasingly complex and fragmented. The implication is that countries can make alliances with several groups depending on the particular issue at hand and how it relates to their national interest. The coalition of G77 and China is unable to reflect such specific and multi-dimensional concerns, although the bloc still plays a crucial role in coordinating the developing countries’ stances on foundational issues (Roberts 2011). The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) also participates in the process (UNFCCC 2011a), as does the European Union which considers itself a champion of ‘combating climate change’. Given the different circumstances of the actors in these coalitions, it is unavoidable that there will be disagreements within these alliances, although some negotiating blocs such as the EU are more cohesive than others (Depledge 2005).
Depledge summarises some of the key challenges with the UN process very well in stating that:
“A key challenge for the climate change negotiations since their inception has been a strong tendency to competiveness, rather than cooperation, among the negotiating parties. This is partly the result of the high political stakes of climate change, including concerns over national economic interests and competitiveness as well as the long-term horizon of the problem, which has led to a focus on short-term costs rather than on benefits that would only accrue in the future. The tendency to competiveness is also a product of the North- South divide to the negotiations, where the imperative of global cooperation struggles against a history of mistrust and different perceptions of the problem” (Depledge 2005: 32).
Therefore it is apparent that reaching an agreement on climate change amongst such a range of diverse actors is a very challenging task.