An effective EWS requires the public and officials to have the capabilities to respond to warning information. This involves education of risks arising from natural hazards,
participation of the community in exercises, and disaster preparedness (UN/ISDR PPEW, 2006). Warnings need to be trusted, which is influenced by the credibility of the source, and by actively developing strategies to enhance trust and credibility. False alarms need to be minimised, and potential public reactions understood to increase effectiveness of warnings (UN/ISDR PPEW, 2006). Response plans and preparedness strategies need to be developed and disseminated, and hazard and risk information communicated, particularly to vulnerable communities. It was recognised as important by UN/ISDR PPEW (2006) to involve local community officials in a ‘bottom-up’ approach to enhance EWS effectiveness. This is reflected in New Zealand’s Guide to the National CDEM Plan (MCDEM, 2006, section 19.1), which maintains that “relevant government agencies, CDEM Groups, local authorities, and lifeline utilities must maintain arrangements to respond to warnings”.
The next section includes an outline of response capabilities in New Zealand, and the history of CDEM, to set the context for this thesis. Further information on response capabilities in
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2005 (MCDEM, 2005), the Guide to the National CDEM Plan (MCDEM, 2006), and the National CDEM Strategy (MCDEM, 2007), as well as region-specific government response and volcanic contingency plans, and local government response plans; most are available on the Councils’ websites5.
2.5.1 Civil Defence and Emergency Management in New Zealand
The obligation for New Zealand’s central government and local authorities (which includes city/district and regional councils) to continue to operate to the fullest possible extent during an emergency, and be capable of responding to the situation as required, is stipulated in the CDEM Act 2002 (as described by the Guide to the National CDEM Plan; MCDEM, 2006). MCDEM is the lead agency for civil defence emergencies, provides structures and support to enhance local capabilities to respond, and manages national-scale responses if needed (MCDEM, 2006). Under the CDEM Act 2002, local authorities are required to form and maintain CDEM Groups (which are predominantly at a regional level). There are 16 Groups in New Zealand. Most CDEM Groups have several district or city councils and CDEM offices within their jurisdiction. As an example, TVC is situated within Taupo District Council’s CDEM area, which is located within the area managed by Waikato Region CDEM Group. Local authorities are expected to work in partnership with lifeline utilities and emergency services to provide CDEM at a local level (MCDEM, 2007).
The history of government emergency response organisations has been summarised in a publication by the Ministry of Civil Defence (1990). The information contained in this paragraph is sourced from this document. A national level of civil defence dates back to the 1930s, after a M7.8 earthquake struck the city of Napier in 1931, resulting in the deaths of 256 people. This event highlighted the expectation by the central government that response should be undertaken at a local level, for which the responsible organisations were completely unprepared. The Public Safety Conservation Act was passed in 1932 allowing emergencies to be declared. An Emergency Precautions Scheme was established in the mid-1930s relying on voluntary participation at a local level. A boom in volunteer numbers occurred during World
5
For example (all accessed on 23 October 2013):
Auckland Council: http://www.aucklandcivildefence.org.nz/About-Us/ACDEMG-Plan-2011-2016/
Waikato Regional Council: http://www.waikatoregioncdemg.govt.nz/Policy-and-Plans/Page-1/
Bay of Plenty Regional Council: http://www.boprc.govt.nz/knowledge-centre/plans/cdem-group-plan/
Taranaki Regional Council: http://www.trc.govt.nz/taranaki-cdem-publications/
Rotorua District Council: http://www.rdc.govt.nz/our-services/civil-defence-and-emergency/Pages/ default.aspx
Taupo District Council: http://www.taupodc.govt.nz/our-services/Civil-defence-and-emergency/about- civil-defence/Pages/civil-defence-in-the-taupo-district.aspx
War II, and several of the committees responded to earthquakes during this time. The Local Authorities Emergency Powers Act was passed in 1953 largely in preparation for a nuclear attack, and the Government Action in a Major Emergency Plan was created in 1954 focussing on roles of government departments. The Ministry of Civil Defence was officially established in April 1959, and the Civil Defence Act passed in 1962. The development and role of the Ministry was based on the British and United States Civil Defence organisations. These systems were tested in 1968 during the widespread storm which sank the Wahine ferry near Wellington, killing 51 people, as well as in the severe Inangahua earthquake on the West Coast of the South Island. The Civil Defence Act of 1962 was amended six times by 1979, and in 1983 the new Civil Defence Act was passed. The Ministry of Civil Defence was renamed the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) in 1995, and the CDEM Act was passed in 2002. A national state of emergency was declared following the 22 February 2011 Christchurch earthquake in Canterbury (a M6.3 aftershock following the M7.1 mainshock on 4 September 2010), which resulted in the deaths of 185 people in and around Christchurch city. Since the CDEM Act 2002 has been in place, no state of emergency has been called at a regional or national level for a volcanic eruption to test the system with this type of hazard.
2.5.2 Interagency communication and coordination
Multi-agency coordination is important to ensure timely, meaningful, and accurate warnings can be disseminated, and that they result in appropriate actions (IDNDR Early Warning
Programme Convenors, 1997). In New Zealand Emergency Operation Centres (EOCs), there are four main components which make up the Coordinated Incident Management System (CIMS; as described in the 2009 amendment of MCDEM, 2006): Control, Planning and Intelligence, Operations, and Logistics. When an EOC has been activated during a volcanic emergency, science advice is generally provided to the Planning and Intelligence role (Doyle et al., 2011).
As reported by Paton et al. (1998a), multi-agency coordination was a key problem for agencies affected by the 1995–96 Ruapehu eruptions in New Zealand. A range of agencies were
involved in the response to this event across a number of jurisdictions. In Paton et al.’s (1998a) research, a lack of communication was identified by 37% of those organisations surveyed afterwards. During normal circumstances there was very little contact between organisations. Therefore, it was identified that this inter-organisational communication must be nurtured before a crisis event by establishing networks, anticipating information needs and methods of communication, and establishing consistent terminology and compatible systems. Further issues while responding to an event that were identified by Paton et al. (1998a), included a
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lack of clear responsibility within and between organisations, problems with management, lack of appropriately trained personnel, and managing media. Similar issues were identified during the response to the Mount St. Helens eruptions in 2004–06, especially in managing the media and public interest during the earlier stages of unrest (Frenzen & Matarrese, 2008).
Multi-organisational readiness and response for the 2007 Ruapehu Crater Lake lahar proved successful, with mitigation and warning systems emplaced, emergency preparedness plans practised, and personnel trained ahead of the event (Keys & Green, 2008; Massey et al., 2009). This was largely helped by the small geographical area involved and the relatively high level of predictability for the initiation of the dam-break lahar. During Exercise Ruaumoko in 2008, the lack of communication between CDEM Groups and the National Crisis Management Centre (which is the national level EOC, based in Wellington) was reported as a problem (MCDEM, 2008). The placement of scientific advisors in EOCs was considered a success.
The establishment of Volcanic Advisory Groups (discussed in section 2.4.1) and conduct of exercises are likely to have greatly improved inter-organisational relationships, channels of communication, and coordinated response plans for a volcanic event in New Zealand. Lessons learnt from various events and exercises need to be transferred to establish practices and plans for an effective response to a caldera unrest crisis. The size, complexity, and
unpredictability of a caldera unrest crisis would require a greater number of organisations and jurisdictions to work together, which may amplify the difficulties which occurred during previous events and exercises.