Propuesta de valor

We have established that imagination is a fundamental aspect of cognition and outlined the types of imagination as related to cognitive functions (above). Simplistically, modelling metacognition and imagination requires us to recall and copy this model, raising it to another level, or, looking at it in another way, objectifying it as something outside of ourselves, in order to gain a metacognitive perspective. We might think that imagination in our metacognition will function in the same way as in our cognition, differing only in that we are applying those kinds of imaginative thought to the subject of our own learning. To some degree this is true but there is more to unpick if we are to truly understand the role of imagination within this act. A fundamental property of metacognition involves our ability to transcend ourselves towards a higher level of self-awareness. We have discussed previously Kant’s transcendental imagination and this as the basis of knowledge. In some ways, awareness of our awareness is the basis of metacognitive knowledge, therefore we might expect imagination to have an amplified or perhaps more deliberately applied role in metacognition. This deliberate application and direction of our thought towards our own thinking also implies the use of creative imagination in which we combine imagery in order to solve problems and produce original, valuable outcomes. It is as if, when breaking through a barrier between cognition and metacognition, the imaginational bar is raised, and rather than

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beginning with the ‘basics’ of imaging and productive thought, entering into metacognition initially demands creative imagination. Of course imaging and productive imagination are used, but metacognition is based on cognitions already acquired through socio-cultural experience and previously turned into images, productive and creative imagination at the cognitive level. These are now material for metacognitive consideration as well as tools within metacognitive manipulation – the same thought processes applied at a higher level of thinking and focused on learning.

Only when we have embarked on the creative ‘mission’ of developing metacognitive knowledge and skill do we continue to manipulate and combine imaging and products of imaging at this higher level, ‘looking down’ on our own learning, having accumulated a sophisticated enough lexicon of symbolic language in order to do so. In Vygotskian terms, we have crystallised our thoughts into mental tools which enable us to open up and work within a metacognitive context.

Having broken a metaphorical ‘barrier’ into the ‘world’ of metacognitive thought, we can look at how different kinds of imagination map onto different types of metacognition. Perhaps we can situate metacognitive knowledge and skill within a larger ‘pool’ of Imaging in relation to thinking and learning from which we are able to bring to mind what is not present in terms of our own and other’s learning. Also available to us within this pool of images is a range of cognitive tools which, at this higher level and when directed towards our own learning, enable us to manipulate and generate new thoughts which add to metacognitive knowledge and skill. Metacognitive knowledge and skill rely on and feed each other, with skill requiring knowledge as a basis from which to construct successful strategy and the obtainment of knowledge requiring the development of skill. Metacognitive knowledge requires productive imagination in order to recall existing and integrate new images/thoughts/concepts but creative imagination might also be needed in order to synthesise these thoughts by making and applying ‘rules’ to organise them coherently. Whilst it might seem counter-intuitive to include creative imagination with knowledge, seeing it as a ‘given’ or as an established kind of mental resource, this thesis has led towards and is based on an ontological perspective that knowledge is self-constructed, not discovered as an external ‘truth’. Surely we ‘make’ metacognitive knowledge through a process combining experience and thought and this requires creative imagination towards the production of relatively new and valuable knowledge ‘products’. Again, this suggests an internal version of Vygotsky’s ‘crystallisation’ although the product is abstract.

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Thus, we might make a rough guess that metacognitive knowledge is supported equally productive imagination and creative imagination, (without returning again here to the question of whether metacognition is necessarily ‘new’). The act of generating metacognitive knowledge certainly requires creative imagination.

Moving on to consider metacognitive skill, with its focus on self-regulation and strategy, surely this is largely supported by creative imagination, since both of these executive functions require the ability to reason and solve problems which are personal (and therefore novel) to the particular learner. While it is likely to draw directly on productive imagination (and of course on imaging), it also draws on productive imagination already crystallised into metacognitive knowledge. It requires the ability to think forward, to ask ‘what if?’ and to create strategies for application in a range of contexts which may each require adaptation. At first it is difficult to conceive of much of metacognitive skill as not requiring imagination if ‘Task analysis, planning, monitoring, checking, and recapitulation’ (Veenman et al., 2004, p.90) are manifestations of such skills; however, we need to ask whether creative imagination is still present if metacognitive skilfulness is employed unconsciously or automatically, when it has been developed. Veenman et al. tell us that metacognitive skills ‘…can be acquired and eventually executed implicitly’ (ibid), although again, the boundaries between cognition and metacognition begin to blur here. In terms of situating imagination with metacognitive skill, we might say that we are left with creative imagination underpinning the majority of the latter, leaving space outside of the imaginative aspects of it to account for none-creative (or none-original) execution of existing strategies and acknowledging our unaddressed question of whether creative imagination is necessarily conscious.

As yet, we have not situated ‘fantastical imagination’ within our model. At first, this form of imagination seems out of place in a model of thought which applies to such a practical focus as our learning but the arguments posited in terms of fantastical imagination within cognition still stand within a consideration of metacognition. When focusing on our learning and how to develop it, fantastical imagination might be useful in helping us to consider possibilities which are far out from or even impossible within our learning contexts, but provide a means of ‘counterfactual’ (Byrne, 2007) criticality which enables us to arrive at realistic possibilities. Arguments which support the value of fantasy in terms of our broader evolution should not be ignored in the context of a

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smaller scale, individual learning process. If, as Mithen (2001, p.42) suggests, an evolutionary function of fantasy was to enable us to over-ride existing mental categories by externalising thoughts at odds with our innate, pre-programmed sense of order, it follows that fantasy might help us as individuals to arrive at new possibilities in our thinking and learning. By considering extremes and manipulating metaphoric categories beyond the realms of the ‘real’, we might see ways of mentally pushing at the boundaries of the metacognitive knowledge and skill we had previously arrived at.

For this reason I locate fantastical imagination at transitional areas of metacognition, or at the ‘edges’ of knowledge and skill,, suggesting that it might act as a catalyst in the transformation of our learning.

Figure 4.3 Relationship between types of imagination with metacognitive knowledge and skill (detail of figure 4.4)

Taking this model further, we might start to consider the idea of what happens if we go beyond the edge of metacognition, where consciousness of metacognitive value leads the learner to consciously develop metacognition in order to improve their learning.

The very abstract nature of this idea might provoke a response including the use of fantastical imagination, since, when we go to unexplored territories, we need to ‘fill in gaps’, or address our disequilibrium with whatever we have to hand. In the absence of developed knowledge, like young children developing cognition, we may use fantastical imagination.

Key:

P=Productive imagination C=Creative imagination F=Fantastical imagination M=Metacognitive

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Figure 4.4 Model of imagination leading to and within metacognition

In figure 4.4 we see our types of imagination, represented within metacognition (as we have described them above), in the innermost circle. Metacognitive knowledge and skill interact with each other in a dynamic, two-way flow which is dependent on and almost filled by imagination. What remains within these processes beyond imagination are any operations which do not require mental images (for instance, verbal coding and perhaps, structures for thinking through, if it is possible for these not to depend on imagery). In order to reach this metacognitive state, through Imaging, we have used imagination to transcend into self-awareness (in an evolutionary and developmental sense), so that imagination is the basis for our knowledge construction. This is Kant’s Transcendental Imagination. We have then used (within our lived experience rather than as an evolved biological feature) creative imagination to crystalize our concept of self, so that we are able to consider ourselves as if we are outside of our own cognition, transcending again to become metacognitive. Imagination then continues to support this metacognitive state.

We have arrived at a very abstract model of metacognition and imagination but what might different aspects of this look like in reality? A good place to observe these phenomena in education practice might be in projects which focus on or substantially feature creativity, given that we have established a strong role for creative imagination

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within metacognition. While not necessarily being arts-based, arts-based projects are likely to require and perhaps exemplify creativity. The table below provides examples from my own practice.

Metacognition Manifestation Imagination Process

Knowledge

Table 4.4 Examples of imagination in metacognition, in practice

4.8 Implications

We have seen that and how imagination is essential to metacognition. If we find that art supports the development of imagination, then we might assume that art also supports metacognition. We will explore this in Chapter 5. For now, we can speculate that the lack of ‘right and wrong’ answers which is inherent in a subjective area of knowledge like art, is likely to raise complex problems which we can only resolve for ourselves. This may provide fertile ground for imaginative and metacognitive development since ‘Metacognitive knowledge and self-knowledge develop in, and are

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affected by, complex problem-solving situations’ (Tarricone, 2011, p.53). If we see art as a subjective embodiment of human thought, feeling and belief, we begin to see that it may be a means of nurturing metacognition since it makes explicit certain kinds of knowledge about our human experience which we relate to in a personal way.

‘Self-knowledge is influenced by feelings, beliefs, false beliefs, self-doubt, prior knowledge and understandings, suppositions, assumptions, ability, contexts and challenges which can be instigated in complex problems and can affect problem-solving processes.’ (Tarricone, 2011, p.54)

If art helps us to know ourselves as humans, this suggests a particular relationship with self and metacognitive knowledge. Art provides opportunities to exercise or examine: feelings, beliefs, false beliefs, self-doubt. It requires us to draw on prior knowledge, understandings, assumptions and abilities, in ‘one off’ cases or contexts (as the work of art) which instigate complex problem-solving tasks, due to the interpretable, subjective nature of the art. ‘Challenges to beliefs and doubt stimulate reflection and instigate problem solving strategies.’ (Tarricone, 2011, p.16).

If by developing imagination through art (and we will discuss this relationship in the next chapter) we can develop metacognition, we can look at ways of maximising on this. It may be that by focusing on aspects of self; explicitly on learning for example, we can increase the power of metacognitive development through art. However much this is the case, if arts education practitioners can develop an understanding of the psychological processes of imagination in cognition and metacognition it is likely that they will be able to help learners improve achievements not only in art, but in learning more generally, through supporting broader cognitive development as well as metacognitive development, proven to effectively improve our capacity for achievement (Higgins et al. 2013).