Assistance Initiative (MIA) for the Philippines. See ibid, p.446. The MIA was initiated by the US to assist in the economic recovery of the Philippines. It calls for reforms in the Philippine economic structure designed to enhance free enterprise and thereby, so the US hopes, neutralize Soviet diplomacy in the region, reverse the indigenous communist insurgency and retain its bases. Japan, along with the US, other governments and multilateral lending institutions, has pledged a total of US$5 billion. The US and Japan have not only twice pledged their joint support for a successful multilateral program, in this case Japan has categorised its share of funds as contributing to 'regional stability'. Former Japanese Foreign Minister, Saburo Okita, reflected this when he remarked that 'the Philippine's political stability and economic growth benefit Japan's national interests' and that the sea lanes near the Philippines are 'crucial for Japan's crude oil imports'. See Victorio, L.C., 'Look MAI, $14 billion', Filipino Express, 31 July-6 August 1989. Cited in Bauzon, op cit, p.126
Japanese Security Policy in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific
Japanese security policy in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific formed a microcosm of Japan's wider pursuit of security. In the absence of military projection capability, ODA has been a major component of Japanese security policy in both Southeast Asia and the South Pacific; indeed, since the 1960s Southeast Asia has been the major recipient of Japanese ODA.23 As Muthiah Alagappa writes:
approximately 70% of Japan's imports of crude oil and 20% of its imports of iron ore pass through the Strait of Malacca and another 4% and 19% respectively, pass through the Lombok Strait. Much of Japan's trade with Asia and Europe must also transit the vital straits of region. Southeast Asia is also an important source of raw materials and the ASEAN countries collectively account for 9.3% of Japan's international trade, making them the third largest trading partner. Japan has substantial investments in the region. Thus, safety of navigation and, more generally, peace and stability in Southeast Asia are important for
-r 2 4
Japan.
The delicacy of Japan's relations with Southeast Asia has forced it to use discreet means like ODA in order to consolidate its interests without alarming regional states of a new Japanese imperialism. During the early 1970s, strong anti-Japanese feeling surfaced as a reaction to Japan's 'economic diplomacy'.25 According to Masahide Shibusawa the 1972-73 student demonstrations in Thailand
'made Japan realise for the first time, the economic size and scope of its presence in the Southeast Asia as well as the political responsibilities of carrying on such
Alagappa, M. , Japan's Political and Security Role in the Asia-
Pacific (ISIS, Malaysia, 1988), p.29.
24
Alagappa, M. 'The major powers and Southeast Asia', International
Journal, Summer 1989, p. 569. Also see Shibusawa, M. , Japan and the
Asia Pacific Region (Croom Helm, London, 1984), p.46.
25
Cited in Chinwanno, C., 'Japan as a regional power', The Indonesian Quarterly, XV, 3.
26
extensive activities in other countries'.
Thus the 'Fukuda Doctrine', announced by Prime Minister Fukuda in Manila in 1977 following attendance at the second ASEAN summit, emerged out of growing Japanese realisation that pursuit of purely economic interests in isolation of the political, was increasingly unworkable - an awareness evident across the spectrum of Japanese foreign policy. The Fukuda Doctrine marked a major turning point in Japan's relations with the region in so far as it was an explicit statement of Japan's political interests in Southeast Asia.27 It occurred, as did the overall shifts in Japanese security policy, in conjunction with US pressure on Japan to contribute more to regional security, and coincided with ASEAN fears of a US withdrawal and regional instability.
The Fukuda Doctrine encompassed three main principles: the rejection by Japan of any kind of military role beyond the defence of Japan itself; an affirmation by Japan of its intention to do its best to consolidate relationships of mutual confidence and trust based on 'heart-to-heart' understanding; and a stress that Japan was an equal partner of ASEAN, while aiming at fostering mutual understanding with the nations of Indochina. It Fukuda Doctrine remains the framework within which Japan has pursued a more active diplomatic role in Southeast Asia.
Japan's strategic interests in Southeast Asia coincide with Australia's policy of regional outreach - what Senator Evans called "comprehensive engagement". Fostering regional stability is central to the concerns of both countries. This point is reinforced in the Australian government report Australia and North-east Asia in the 1990s: Accelerating Change:
...Of more concern is the vulnerability to military interdiction in the event of conflict of focal areas and choke points in the confined waters of South-East Asia and in the approaches to Japan and South Korea. It is therefore important for Australia to concentrate on
Shibusawa, op cit, p.75. 27
Morrison, op cit, p.422.
28
Sudo, S., 'Japan-ASEAN relations: new dimensions in Japanese foreign policy', Asian Survey, May 1988, p.512.
planning with like-minded states (the United States and Japan) for control of shipping in the unlikely event of conflict.”29
Similarly, both Australia and Japan desire the continuation of a US strategic presence to underpin regional stability. This point is particularly noteworthy from Japan's perspective since it is the US military umbrella which has enabled Japan to pursue its own
security policies, within and without the region.
The same general conclusions hold true for the Southwest Pacific region. The region is of strategic importance to Japan and maintenance of peace and stability in the region is considered 'essential' by Tokyo. The Kuranari Doctrine, articulated by Foreign Minister Kuranari during the course of a visit to the region in March 1987, provides the foreign policy framework for promoting Japan's interests in the region. The main planks of the policy entail expanding the South Pacific ODA program; supporting regional initiatives; and preserving peace and stability.31 As a consequence of the doctrine, Japan is set to become the largest aid donor to the region.32 This parallels its status as the major external non-South Pacific Forum economic partner of most Southwest Pacific states .33
The Kuranari Doctrine was announced as a response to the perceived need to strengthen Japan's profile in a region contiguous to Japanese territory and important to Japanese economic and political interests.34 Although Japan had well established trade and fishing contacts with certain countries in the region, it perceived a requirement for enhanced diplomatic and aid activity, partly as a response
29 East Asia Analytical Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia and North-East Asia in the 1990s: Accelerating
Change(AGPS, Canberra, 1992), p96. 30
Defense Agency of Japan (1989), op cit, p.68. 31
Rix, A., Japan's Aid Program: A New Global Agenda (AGPS, Canberra, 1990), p.40.
32
Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade, Australia's Relations with the South Pacific (AGPS, Canberra, March 1989), p.193. 33
Garnaut, R. , Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendency (AGPS,
Canberra 1989), p.175. 34
Rix, A., Japan's Aid Program: Quantity Versus Quality (AGPS,
to increased Soviet activity in the region, developments in the Philippines (including the possibility of the US bases eventually closing) and perceived increased instability among the island nations themselves.35
However, the Kuranari Doctrine has not been completely successful in its execution. Suspicion of Japan still remains and it has not successfully addressed the problems generated by its fishing practices.36 While the Japanese recognise territorial rights over fishing zones, the Japanese Government has strongly resisted attempts by South Pacific Island countries (PICs) to establish a multilateral fishing agreement.37 As a result of pressure, Japan has agreed more recently to reduce the number of driftnet vessels in the region. However, Japanese
38
driftnet fishing continues to be a contentious issue.
As a response to these problems, and in illustration of the commonality of interests Australia and Japan possess in the region, Japan has been attempting to soften its regional aid delivery through the development of joint aid projects with Australia. Joint Australia-Japan official level aid discussions now take place annually. At the March 1989 round, current joint projects in Vanuatu, Western Samoa, and Tonga were reviewed and new areas of collaboration planned.39 At the Australia-Japan Ministerial Consultations in January 1989, Foreign Minister Uno stressed Japan's intention to 'conduct increasingly close cooperation [with Australia] with its abundant knowledge and experience, in rendering
Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, op clt, p. 42.
36
ibid, p.193. The PICs conception of 'security' is primarily tied to notions of economic vulnerability, of which fishing resources are paramount. Consequently, Japan's fishing practices go to the heart of PIC security concerns. See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
'Submission to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade', Official Hansard Report, Vol.5, Canberra, 27 April 1989, p.l. See also Fraser, H. , '"Wall of Death" worries island states', Pacific
Defence Reporter, September 1989; 'Trying to stop the slaughter',
Pacific Islands Monthly, July 1989.
37
Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, op cit, p. 20.
38
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Backgrounder, 3 November 1990.
39
cooperation toward the Pacific Island Nations' . 40 The
suggestion has been regarded by Australia as a significant development in the bilateral relationship.41
Conclusion
These shared strategic interests suggest it is only natural for Australia and Japan to engage in closer defence contacts to the extent possible given the factors constraining this linkage. The underlying logic for the Australian government, however, lies in the belief that Japan's strategic role will continue to expand, and that Australia should enter into dialogue sooner rather than
later.
This forecast raises a series of questions about the future course of Japanese security policy, the likely character of the regional strategic order and the possible opportunities, if not the need, for expanded Australia- Japan security links. Will Japan, like other previous great powers, acquire military might to supplement its economic clout? What impact will domestic forces, US pressure and regional concerns have on Japanese calculations? What will the post-Cold War regional security environment look like, and how will it influence Australian and Japanese security interests and perceptions of each other?
The next chapter addresses the direction of, and forces shaping, Japanese security policy. Based on recent trends, it asks whether Japan will acquire a more assertive, military "power projection" capability. Chapter four then
looks at possible future strategic orders and how they will impact on Australia-Japan relations.
ibid, p.42. 41
See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Tayori: Australia- Japan Newsletter, December 1990.