Propuestas de actuación ante un conflicto multicultural

In her Prize Lecture in Stockholm, Sweden, in December 2009, Dr. Elinor Ostrom, the Nobel Prize winner in Economic Sciences, discussed the governance of complex economic systems. By analyzing the use of common-pool resources15 among various communities around the world, Elinor Ostrom emphasized the value of polycentricity in understanding and managing complex human action situations. Polycentricity, she argued, may enable a better fit than a top-down hierarchical system of governance. Almost 50 years earlier, Elinor’s husband, Vincent Ostrom, and his colleagues discussed polycentricity in the context of the organization of urban governments. Ostrom et al. (1961) described a polycentric system as “having many centers of decision making which were formally independent of each other.” Vincent Ostrom was inspired by political thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Woodrow Wilson, and Alexis de Tocqueville and discerned two enduring patterns of governance: a hierarchical order and a polycentric order (Sproule-Jones et al. 2008). The hierarchical order is based on a theory of sovereignty that exercised ultimate authority and exemplified in practice as an all-powerful Leviathan (Hobbes 1651). In contrast, the polycentric order represented in the self-governing communities of New England described by Tocqueville (1863) and in the constitutional democracy espoused by James Madison and Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist

Papers (Madison et al. 1787).

15 _{Common-pool resources (e.g., water, forests, and fisheries) have the following two characteristics: 1) they are}

subtractable (i.e., one person’s use reduces the amount available for others) and 2) it is difficult to exclude or limit potential beneficiaries (users) once they are provided by nature or through activities of other individuals [Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., and Walker, J. 1994. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.]

Singh | Dissertation | POLYCENTRICITY THEORY 67 The term “polycentricity” was first introduced by Michael Polanyi (1891–1976) in The Logic of

Liberty, a collection of essays published in 1951 (Ostrom 1972). Polanyi distinguished between

two different methods of organization of social tasks: 1) a deliberate, monocentric order and 2) a spontaneous, polycentric order. In a monocentric order, an ultimate authority (like Hobbes’ Leviathan) coordinates by exercising control through a unified command structure (which Polanyi called a corporate structure). This centrally-directed structure can be conceptualized as a superior-subordinate relationship where a superior A may direct subordinates B1, B2, B3,…Bn to perform specific tasks or to accomplish particular missions (Ostrom 1972). In contrast, in a polycentric order,

Many elements are capable of making mutual adjustments for ordering their relationships with one another within a general system of rules where each element acts with independence of other elements. Within a set of rules, individual decision-makers will be free to pursue their own interest subject to the constraints inherent in the enforcement of those rules. (Ostrom 1972)

The existence of polycentricity does not preclude the possible existence of monocentricity (Ostrom 1972). In fact, monocentricity and polycentricity can co-exist and be equally effective, depending on context. Whether the governance of metropolitan areas, or any organizational unit, can be organized as a viable political system will depend upon various aspects of rule-making and rule-enforcing being performed in polycentric structures (Ostrom 1972). If individuals or units operating in a polycentric order have incentives to take actions to enforce general rules of conduct, then polycentricity will become an increasingly viable form of organization (Ostrom 1972). Polanyi emphasized such a general system of rules as providing a framework for ordering relationships in a polycentric system (Ostrom 1972). The notion of polycentricity maintains that there are independent sources of authority and judgment that act informally but collectively in determining community standards of behavior and the focus of collective (but voluntary) action (Ostrom 1972). Figure 5.1-1 shows typical monocentric and polycentric arrangements:

Singh | Dissertation | POLYCENTRICITY THEORY 68 Figure 5.1-1 Monocentric and Polycentric Arrangements

Monocentricty (Top) and Polycentricity (Bottom) – from Polanyi (1951)

The centers of decision making in a polycentric system may function independently or instead constitute an inter-dependent system of relations (Ostrom et al. 1961). Further,

To the extent that they take each other into account in competitive relationships, enter into various contractual and cooperative undertakings or have recourse to central mechanisms to resolve conflicts, the various political jurisdictions in a metropolitan area may function in a coherent manner with consistent and predictable patterns of interacting behavior. To the extent that this is so, they may be said to function as a “system.” (Ostrom et al. 1961)

Thus, a metropolitan area could be conceptualized as a polycentric political system in which ordered relationships underlie the “fragmentation of authority and overlapping jurisdictions” (Ostrom et al. 1961). These overlapping jurisdictions need not be inefficient or “pathological” because they created a duplication of services or functions. In this seminal article, Ostrom and

Singh | Dissertation | POLYCENTRICITY THEORY 69 his colleagues (Ostrom et al. 1961) argued that such polycentric arrangements were, in fact, no less efficient than fully integrated systems with one governmental unit having exclusive jurisdiction over any particular metropolitan area. Vincent Ostrom argued later that the only condition for polycentric arrangements to be successful was that the agencies should offer “differentiated services that impinge upon diverse communities of interest” (1972). As a result, the overall performance of a polycentric system will depend upon the patterns of cooperation, competition, and conflict that may exist among its various units (Ostrom et al. 1961). A polycentric view should, therefore, explain the patterns of behavior observed in the organization of government in urban areas and predict the behavioral tendencies of such units.

Ostrom argued that both individuals and organizations could become the unit of analysis in a polycentric order. He stated:

Individuals are the basic unit of analysis. Individuals are assumed to be interested decision-makers who can calculate potential benefits and costs subject to elements of risks and uncertainty. Individuals will select those strategies which are anticipated to enhance their net welfare potential. Individuals may occupy positions where decisions are taken on behalf of the interests of others. All such cases will involve a choice from among strategic opportunities in light of potential payoffs derived in part from the calculation of power and liability contingencies where each choice is a move in a series of simultaneous games. Business firms,

legislatures, political parties, public agencies, or nation states may also be used as units of analysis where structural conditions expose the sets of individual decision-makers involved to similar strategic calculations. (Ostrom 1972)

[Emphasis added]