Propuestas teóricas de autotranscendencia desde enfermería

respect to the use of military weapons that cause ERW, it was emphasised that cluster weapons have an important military operational function. The following questions were posed with respect to the military use of weapons that cause ERW:

With respect to humanitarian concerns; is it desirable to create rules on cluster •

weapons within the context of the CCW?

With respect to scope: should only cluster weapons be included or other munitions •

too? Should rules on cluster weapons be applicable solely to international conflicts, or also to internal conflicts?

With respect to definitions: should the categories be broad (fused munitions or •

sub-munitions for example) or effect-based (for example munitions capable of detonating on contact with a person or vehicle)? How to deal with munitions that have already been tackled in CCW?

With respect to the legal aspects of ERW, it was stated that much had already been •

provided for in international humanitarian law (IHL). More reflection was needed on taking precautionary measures in operational military planning, in order to limit the humanitarian consequences of ERW. Should practical guidelines be established for field commanders?

Suggested practical measures included legal ones (in what way to assess the risks and degree of collateral damage by weapons that result in ERW?), technical ones (should technical requirements be adopted and if so, what about older munitions?), and organisational ones (provision of information with respect to the location of ERW/ practical measures feasible for clearance?).

Participants at the meeting agreed that a legal instrument would be an option, but also mentioned the fact that some measures, such as ‘best practices’ in preventing, awareness-raising and clearance, could already be implemented by states in a position to do so. It was felt that in order to make substantial progress within the CCW, a mandate would be necessary. In order to be prepared in December, the participants felt it necessary to have future consultations, including expert level meetings. It was agreed that the second PrepCom in April would be a good opportunity to discuss that idea. The Dutch government considered the meeting to be a great success.212 _{Thus, in its}

capacity as FoC it continued on the same course, organising another three informal meetings between April and December 2001. The first FoC meeting was in Geneva on 4 May 2001. Its main purpose was to provide participants with an opportunity to

212 It was claimed that taking the initiative for such a workshop had helped other countries to see the Netherlands as a front runner on ERW (file 617619, 12 April 2001). During the second PrepCom, many papers written on behalf of the workshop in The Hague were presented again. Participating countries expressed satisfaction with the workshop, because it had deepened understanding of the ERW issue (Geneva, file 8171, 13 April 2001).

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exchange information with the FoC. With respect to the strategy, the FoC wrote that it would be wise to focus both on the effects of ERW (as desired by Canada, Australia and New Zealand) and on weapons-specific categories (as desired by non-aligned countries). In preparation for the second FoC meeting on 5 July 2001, the FoC collected several draft mandates (one from France, supported by Germany, US, UK and Italy and one from Sweden) for an GGE on ERW. It also added its own draft mandate. After discussing and modifying the mandates, the following proposal was prepared:

‘The GGE shall consider all appropriate measures and proposals on the issue of ERW in all its aspects with a view to strengthening the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, in particular:

which factors and which types of munitions are most relevant to causing 1)

civilian casualties after a conflict, in particular sub-munitions;

provisions for relevant types of munitions on technical improvements and 2)

other provisions which would reduce the risk of such munitions from becoming ERW;

whether existing IHL poses sufficient operational restrictions on the use of 3)

munitions to minimise post-conflict risks of ERW for the civilian population, and, if appropriate, elaborate those restrictions further;

provisions or mechanisms on the rapid provision of information on the use of 4)

munitions and on their technical specifications, relevant to facilitating early and safe clearance of ERW;

provisions on responsibility for clearance of ERW; 5)

provisions on warning for the civilian population in or close to ERW affected 6)

areas;

provisions on assistance and cooperation in ERW affected areas, i.e. taking into 7)

account the example of article 11 of Amended Protocol II;

examine whether a legally-binding instrument on ERW is an appropriate way 8)

to address the issue;

if so, additional provisions that may be relevant in the context of such an 9)

instrument.

Given the urgency of addressing the grave humanitarian concerns raised by ERW, the Group of Governmental Experts shall undertake its work in an expedient manner so as to prepare for an early decision by States Parties on whether to proceed with

negotiating a legally-binding instrument on ERW’.

The three FoC-meetings proved to be useful for preparing a constructive discussion during the third PrepCom, which was held from 24 to 28 September 2001. The proposal for a GGE mandate was discussed, but it proved impossible to agree on a negotiation mandate. Instead, during the PrepCom it was agreed that a discussion mandate should

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