Protección legal de la comunidad gitana a nivel internacional

MANGGAGAWA NG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS and ANTONIO L. CRUZ vs. NLRC and PLDT (1992) FACTS:



Petitioner Cruz had been an ER of PLDT for 16 years as an installer/repairman when he was terminated.

 It appears that sometime in August 1985, Cruz and co-repairman Moldera was instructed to repair installations located at 325 Acacia Lane, Mandaluyong.

According to PLDT, the telephone numbers installed on the said address were actually reinstalled and functioning at 323 Acacia Lane, Mandaluyong. This

“out-move” of the telephone was considered illegal by the company there being no service order. Hence, Cruz was dismissed on the ground of fraud and serious misconduct.



Both LA and NLRC arrived at the conclusion that said EE should be dismissed although with financial assistance (10K). This was questioned by the PLDT Issue: Whether Cruz is entitled to financial assistance HELD: YES

The dismissal of Cruz was valid. PLDT complied with procedural due process prior to termination of Cruz for violation of company rules involving what can be considered fraud and dishonesty.

When there is doubt that dishonesty was committed, financial assistance may still be awarded to an EE who has rendered long years of service. Despite the nature of offense, financial assistance on ground of compassionate justice may still be given.

PINES CITY EDUCATIONAL CENTER and EUGENIO BALTAO vs. NLRC (1993)

Mercury Drug Rule Abandoned. Reiterated the doctrine laid down in Ferrer

FACTS:

 Private respondents were all employed as teachers on “probationary basis” by petitioner Pines City Educational Center.

 Said teachers signed contracts of employment with petitioner for a fixed duration. Due to the expiration of the contracts and their poor performance as teachers,

they were notified of not to renew their contracts anymore.

 The teachers filed a complaint for illegal dismissal



LA: ruled in favor of the teachers and ordered their reinstatement and to pay their full backwages and other benefits and privileges without qualification and deduction from the time they were dismissed up to their actual reinstatement.



NLRC: affirmed the LA

Issue: Whether the LA and NLRC are correct in ordering the reinstatement and payment of full backwages

HELD: NO. NLRC reversed.

Interim earning should not be deducted from the awarded backwages. The law provides no qualification nor does it state that earned income by the EE during the period of his unjust dismissal to actual reinstatement should be deducted from such backwages. When the law does not provide, the court shall not improvise.

The order for their reinstatement and payment of full backwages and other benefits and privileges from the time they were dismissed up to their actual reinstatement is proper, conformably with Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715 which took effect on March 21, 1989.

HOWEVER, in ascertaining the total amount of backwages payable to them, we go back to the rule prior to the Mercury Drug rule that the total amount derived from employment elsewhere by the employee from the date of dismissal up to the date of reinstatement, if any, should be deducted therefrom. We restate the underlying reason that employees should not be permitted to enrich themselves at the expense of their employer. To this extend, our ruling in Alex Ferrer, et al.

vs. NLRC is hereby modified.

BUSTAMANTE vs. NLRC (1996) Pines City Ruling Abandoned

FACTS:

Evergreen Farms claimed that petitioners are not entitled to recover backwages because they were not actually dismissed but their probationary employment was not converted to permanent employment; and assuming that petitioners are entitled to backwages, computation thereof should not start from cessation of work up to actual reinstatement, and that salary earned elsewhere (during the period of illegal dismissal) should be deducted from the award of such backwages.

HELD:

The “full backwages” amendment by RA 6715 has NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT; it applies only prospectively.

Hence, the rule is: where the illegal dismissal happened before the effectivity of RA 6715 (3/21/89), the award of backwages is limited to 3 years without deduction or qualification. BUT if the illegal dismissal happened on or after the effectivity of RA 6715, the award of backwages should be computed from the time of illegal dismissal up to actual reinstatement without any deductions.

WENPHIL CORP. vs. NLRC (1989)

DISMISSAL IS LEGAL: Dismissal is justified, but because there was no due process, EE is entitled to indemnification

FACTS:

 Private respondent Roberto Mallare was hired by Wephil Corp. as a crew member at its Cubao Branch.

 Mallare had an altercation with a co-employee, Job Barrameda, as a result of which he and Barrameda were suspended and later on served with notice of dismissal.

 Mallare filed a complaint for llegal dismissal.

 LA: dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

 NLRC: reversed LA and ordered the reinstatement of Mallare

 Wenphil prayed for restraining order alleging that NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion. The court issued a restraining order.

 Mallare contended that he was denied due process because there was no investigation prior his dismissal.

 According to Wenphil, under the Personnel Manual of the corp., an investigation shall only be conducted if the offense committed by the employee is punishable with the penalty higher than suspension of fifteen (15) days and the erring employee requests for an investigation of the incident. Wenphil alleges that Mallare did not ask for investigation, hence waived his right to the investigation.

Issue: Whether Mallare was denied due process, hence entitled to indemnity

HELD: YES

The contention of Wenphil is untenable.

In the CAB, Mallare received an official notice of his termination 4 days later after he was dismissed. His refusal to explain his side cannot be considered as a waiver of his right to an investigation. Although in the Personnel Manual, it states that an erring employee must request for an investigation it does not thereby mean that the ER is thereby relieved of the duty to conduct an investigation before dismissing its EE.

The failure of petitioner to give private respondent the benefit of a hearing before he was dismissed constitutes an infringement of his constitutional right to due process of law and equal protection of the laws.

A dismissal for a valid reason is legal and valid, but the ER who does not observe due process must pay some INDEMNITY for its breach of legal procedure; the measure of damages will depend on the facts of the case, and on the gravity of the omission by the employer

HELLENIC PHIL. SHIPPING INC. vs. EPIFANIO C.

SIETE and NLRC (1991) Wenphil Doctrine does not apply.

ILLEGAL DISMISSAL: Dismissal is NOT justified; Due Process not observed.

FACTS:

 Capt. Epifanio Siete was employed as Master of M/V Houda G by Sultan Shipping Co., Ltd.,

 Sometime later, Capt. Wilfredo Lim boarded the vessel and advised Siete that he had instructions from the owners to take over its command for unexplained reason

 Siete filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

 Petitioner alleged in its answer that Siete had been dismissed because of his failure to comply with the instruction of Sultan Shipping to erase the timber load line on the vessel and for his negligence in the discharge of the cargo at Tripoli that endangered the vessel and stevedores.

 POEA: dismissed the complaint, holding that there was valid cause for Siete’s removal.

 Siete appealed to the NLRC contending that he was dismissed without even being informed of the

charges against him or given an opportunity to refute them.

 NLRC: reversed the POEA holding that the dismissal violated due process and that the documents submitted by the petitioner were hearsay, self-serving, and not verified.

 Hellenic argues that whatever defects might have tainted the EE’s dismissal were subsequently cured when the charges against him were specified and sufficiently discussed in the position papers submitted by the parties to the POEA.

Issue: Whether due process was observed by the ER HELD: NO

The law requires that the investigation be conducted before the dismissal, not after. That omission cannot be corrected by the investigation later conducted by the POEA. As the Solicitor General correctly maintained, the due process requirement in the dismissal process is different from the due process requirement in the POEA proceeding. Both requirements must be separately observed.

While it is true that in Wenphil Corp. vs. NLRC and Rubberworld (Phils.) vs. NLRC, the lack of due process before the dismissal of the employee was deemed corrected by the subsequent administrative proceedings where the dismissed employee was given a chance to be heard, those cases involved dismissals that were later proved to be for a valid cause. The doctrine in those cases is not applicable to the case at bar because our findings here is that the dismissal was not justified.

VIERNES vs. NLRC (2003)

EE entitled to full backwages because he was illegally dismissed; He is also entitled to indemnification because due process was not observed

FACTS:

 Complainants worked as “meter readers” with Benguet Electric Cooperative when they were served a notice of termination because of retrenchment.

According to the company, they need to retrench its personnel because they are already over staffed.

 The complainants filed for illegal dismissal contending that they were not apprentices but regular employees whose services were illegally and unjustly terminated in a manner that was whimsical and capricious.



On the other hand, the respondent invokes Article 283 of the LC in defense of the questioned dismissal.



LA: dismissed the complaints for lack of merit but ordered the ER to pay the EEs the amount representing underpayment of their wages, and to pay indemnity and attorney’s fees.



NLRC: modified LA and ordered the reinstatement of the complainants with payment of backwages limited to one year and deleting the award of indemnity and attorney’s fees.

Issue: Whether NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in deleting the award of indemnity

HELD: YES

An ER becomes liable to pay indemnity to a dismissed EE if the ER fails to comply with the requirements of due process. The indemnity is in the form of nominal damages intended not to penalize the employer but to vindicate or recognize the employee’s right to procedural due process which was violated by the employer.

We do not agree with the ruling of the NLRC that indemnity is incompatible with the award of backwages.

These two awards are based on different considerations.

Backwages are granted on grounds of equity to workers for earnings lost due to their illegal dismissal from work.

On the other hand, the award of indemnity is meant to vindicate or recognize the right of an employee to due process which has been violated by the employer.

In the CAB, the ER failed to comply with the provisions of Article 283 of the Labor Code which requires an employer to serve a notice of dismissal upon the employees sought to be terminated and to the Department of Labor, at least one month before the intended date of termination.

Hence, it is liable to pay indemnity to petitioners. Thus, we find that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in deleting the award of indemnity.

PHIL. TOBACCO FLUE-CURING REDRYING CORP vs.

NLRC (1998) FACTS:

 Petitioner company transferred its tobacco processing plant in Balintawak, Quezon City to Candon, Ilocos Sur. The company therein did not actually close its entire business but merely relocated its tobacco processing and redrying operations to another place.

 Two groups of seasonal workers claimed

“separation benefits” after the closure of the plant in Balintawak. Petitioner refuses to grant separation pay to the workers belonging to the first batch (referred to as the Lubat group), because they had not been given work during the preceding year and, hence, were no longer in its employ at the time it closed its Balintanwak plant. Likewise, it claims exemption from awarding separation pay to the second batch (the Luris group), because the closure of its plant was due to “serious business losses,” as defined in Article 283 of the Labor Code.



LA: ordered petitioner to pay the complainants their respective separation pay, equivalent to one-half month pay for every year of service.



NLRC: affirmed LA

 When the separation benefits were given to the complainants, the latter alleged that there is wrong computation when management did not consider 3/4 of their length of service as claimed

 According to petitioner co., the separation pay of a seasonal worker, who works only for a fraction of a year, should not be equated with that of a regular worker. Petitioner submits that the formula for the computation of a seasonal worker’s separation pay is

“Total No. Of Days actually worked / Total No. Of Working Days in One Yeas x Daily Rate x 15 days”

 The complainants claimed that their separation pay should be based on the actual number of years they have been in petitioner’s company.

Issue: Whether the computation adopted by petitioner company in granting complainants’ separation pay is erroneous

HELD: YES

The amount of separation pay is based on two factors: the amount of monthly salary and the number of years of service. Although the Labor Code provides different definitions as to what constitutes “one year of service,”

Book Six does not specifically define “one year of service”

for purposes of computing separation pay. However, Articles 283 and 284 both state in connection with separation pay that a fraction of at least six months shall be considered one whole year.

Applying this to the case at bar, we hold that the amount of separation pay which respondent members of the Lubat and Luris groups should receive is one-half (½) their respective average

monthly pay during the last season they worked multiplied by the number of years they actually rendered service, provided that they worked for at least six months during a given year.

The formula that petitioner company proposes, wherein a year of work is equivalent to actual rendered for 303 days, is both unfair and inapplicable, considering that Articles 283 and 284 provide that in connection with separation pay, a fraction of at least six months shall be considered one whole year. Under these provisions, an employee who worked for only six months in a given year — which is certainly less than 303 days — is considered to have worked for one whole year.

ASIONICS PHIL. INC. and FRANK YIH vs. NLRC (1998)

FACTS:

 Asionics Philippines, Inc. ("API"') is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of assembling semi-conductor chips and other electronic products mainly for export.

 Yolanda Boaquina and Juana Gayola started working for API as material control clerk and as production operator when they were dismissed by API

 API entered into a CBA with the Federation Free Workers ("FFW"). However, a deadlock ensued and the union decided to file a notice of strike. API was forced to suspend operations and Boaquina and Gayola were among the employee asked to take a leave from work.

 Upon the resolution of the deadlock, Boaquina and Gayola was directed to report back to work.

 Inasmuch as its business activity remained critical, API was constrained to implement a company-wide retrenchment . Boaquina was one of those affected by the retrenchment. And was informed that her services were to be dispensed with

 Dissatisfied with their union (FFW), Boaquina and Gayola, together with some of other co-employees, joined the Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Pilipinas Labor Union ("Lakas Union"') where they eventually became members of its Board of Directors.

 Lakas Union filed a notice of strike against API on the ground of ULP. API filed a complaint for illegal strike



LA: declared the strike staged by Lakas Union to be illegal and ruled that all the officers of the Unions at the time of the strike are to have lost their employment status.



Boaquina and Gayola filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against API and its manager Frank Yih



LA: held that API is guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered it to pay private respondent Yolanda Boaquina separation pay of one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, plus overtime pay, and to reinstate private respondent Juana Gayola with full backwages from the time her salaries were withheld from her until her actual reinstatement.



NLRC: reversed LA in holding that API is guilty of illegal dismissal but ruled that the strike was illegal.



Petitioner API argued that that respondents should not be entitled to separation pay because of their involvement in the strike which was declared illegal.

Issue1: Whether private respondents are entitled to separation pay despite having participated in an illegal strike?

HELD: YES

The termination of employment of private respondents was due to the retrenchment policy adopted by API and not because of the former's union activities.

Issue2: Whether a stockholder/director/officer of a corporation can be held liable for the obligation of the corporation absent of finding of bad faith

HELD: NO

A corporation is a juridical entity with legal personality separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and, in general, from the people comprising it. The rule is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers and employees, are its sole liabilities. Nevertheless, being a mere fiction of law, peculiar situations or valid grounds can exist to warrant, albeit done sparingly, the disregard of its independent being and the lifting of the corporate veil. As a rule, this situation might arise when a corporation is used to evade a just and due obligation or to justify a wrong, to shield or perpetrate fraud, to carry out similar unjustifiable aims or intentions, or as a subterfuge to commit injustice and so circumvent the law.

Nothing on record is shown to indicate that Frank Yih has acted in bad faith or with malice in carrying out the retrenchment program of the company. His having been held by the NLRC to be solidarily and personally liable with API is thus legally unjustified.

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the NLRC is MODIFIED insofar as it holds herein petitioner Frank Yih personally liable with API.

CUSTODIO vs. MINISTRY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (1990)

FACTS:

 Petitioner Victor Custodio worked for private resp.

“First Farmers Milling and Marketing Assoc.” as Asst.

General Manager for almost 17 years.

 The ER, through its board of directors, decided to purchase a boiler, the cost of which would amount to several million pesos. An evaluation committee was constituted with petitioner as chairman. A dispute arose between Custodio and the general manager regarding the committee's recommendations, particularly, the brand of boiler recommended, leading to charges and countercharges of kickbacks or commissions given to officers and directors by the suppliers. Because of this, Cutodio submitted a letter of resignation

 In the board's meeting, Custodio’s letter of resignation was discussed. The minutes stated:that

 In the board's meeting, Custodio’s letter of resignation was discussed. The minutes stated:that

In document Minorías nacionales: concepto y elementos definitorios. Especial referencia a la comunidad gitana en España. (página 46-51)