CAPÍTULO II: LA TUTELA JURÍDICA DE LOS REFUGIADOS CLIMÁTICOS
2.1 La protección de los refugiados en el sistema jurídico internacional
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In Mackay's stimulating article "Brain and Will "1 he considers the following problem. Suppose that the universe is
1D. M. Mackay, "Brain and Will,' Listener, May 9, 16, 1957 (reprinted in Faith
and Thought, vol. 90, 1958). Also reprinted in Body and Mind, ed. G. N. A. Vessey (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1964).
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totally deterministic; all phenomena, including personal deci
sions, are completely determined in advance by, say, purely physical laws. Would it then, in principle, be possible to predict correctly another's behavior? The answer is no, as his following example shows. Consider a subject who is asked to choose between porridge and prunes for breakfast. Suppose he chooses, say, prunes. Now, present is a super-physiologist who perfectly knows the present brain state of the subject as well as the present configuration of the entire universe. The question is, can the physiologist predict to the subject what the subject will choose? If the subject is stubborn, then the answer is clearly no. The subject might well say, "If you tell me that I will choose prunes, then I will choose porridge; if you tell me that I will choose porridge, then I will choose prunes." Under these circumstances, it is logical(y impossible for the physiologist to predict correctly to the subject what he will do.
This, of course, does not mean that it is impossible for the physiologist to know what the subject will choose; it is just that he cannot correctly tell him. The physiologist could, for example, write his prediction on a piece of paper and refuse to show it to the subject until after he has chosen . At any rate, the subject's choice will depend on what the physiologist first does-i .e., on whether he predicts "porridge," "prunes," or remains silent. So we might further observe that in order for the physiologist to predict even to himself what the subject will choose, the physiologist must first know what he will do.
This, then, suggests the following variant of the situation.
What happens if the physiologist and the subject are the same person? Now the fun begins! Suppose the physiologist knows that in five minutes his wife is going to ask him whether he wants prunes or porridge for breakfast. Now, the physiologist knows so much about the universe, and is so clever and facile, it should take him only three minutes to compute what he shall choose. But suppose the physiologist is also very stub
born and decides, "If my calculations come out that I will choose prunes, then I will deliberately choose porridge, and vice versa." Under these conditions, it is logically impossible for 137
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the physiologist to predict even to himself what he will choose.2 On the other hand, if the physiologist is not in a stubborn frame of mind, then it may in principle be possible for him to predict what he will do. So whether he can make such a prediction or not may depend solely on his decision whether to be stubborn or not! In other words, it is in his power to determine whether he can predict the future or not. But, for all we know, the world may be determined, in which case it is determined whether he decides to be stubborn or not. I could carry this analysis still further, but I am getting a little weary!
Let me now return to the case where the super-physiologist decides to be stubborn, and is stubborn. Then, as we have seen, he cannot predict his future. Assuming still that the universe is deterministic, this means that he is not capable of knowing all the laws of the universe-in other words, he is not omniscient.
So the upshot of our argument is that it is logically impossible for a being to be both omniscient and stubborn. From which a theologian might be happy to draw the conclusion "God is not stubborn:'
In conclusion, let me remark that the whole question of
"determinism" is really not central to our main point. This point can be stated without reference to determinism at all;
indeed, it can be stated in the simple truism, "A being cannot predict what he will do if he refuses to do what he predicts."
Afterthought: I can imagine an omniscient being who, for some strange reason, wants to be stubborn, but who also does not want to lose his omniscience, and who realizes that he cannot have both. I can just imagine such a poor being saying, "Gee, I so want to be stubborn, but I certainly don't want to lose my omniscience; what can I do?"
2Yet the physiologist might know what he will choose. He might, for example, have an appetite for pru,nes, and none for porridge, and so he might damn well
know he will choose prunes. But "know" in this sense is very different from ability to predict in the sense of calculate.
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Vignettes
A Thought on Mysticism
D I think mysticism might be characterized as the study of those propositions which are equivalent to their own nega
tions. The Western point of view is that the class of all such propositions is empty. The Eastern point of view is that this class is empty if and only if it isn't. '
Eastern and Western Philosophy in
a
Nutshell D Easterner:And therefore our supreme aim is to understand and emancipate the mind from the troubles and anxieties of life.Westerner (anxiously): Oh no! Troubles and anxieties have survival value!
Another Thought on Mysticism
D I have sometimes wondered if mystics-or rather mystic aspirants-are not in quest of something which most people already have?
A Remark on Kant's Categorical Imperative D It recently occurred to me, quite to my surprise, that in rejecting Kant's Categorical Imperative/ I am implicitly obey
ing it, since I do indeed will it as universal law that everybody reject the Categorical Imperative.