According to most available accounts, Nagarjuna was a brahman from South India. Archaeological discoveries at Amaravatl confirm the fact that he was a friend of the Satavahana king, GautamTputra Satakarni, to whom he addressed his Friendly Epistle (Sahrd-lekha).1 On the basis of this evidence, Nagarjuna is believed to have lived during the latter part of the second century and the early part of the third century (ca. 1 5 0 -2 5 0
A . D . ) . 2
Two slightly differing accounts of his early life are available. Tibetan sources state that his parents decided to ordain him as a Buddhist monk early in his childhood, after learning from an astrologer that he was des
tined to die prematurely. The boy is said to have escaped this fate as a result of practicing the amitayur-dharam under the tutelage of his teacher, Rahulabhadra, at N alanda.3 Even if one is skeptical about the historicity of this account, there is no reason to doubt the efficacy of the practice of dkarani (see Chapter xxn) or the association of Nagarjuna with the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, where he is honored as a second buddha. The second account is available in Kumarajlva’s Kao-seng- chuan, 4which tells us that Nagarjuna, in the company of two other friends, practiced psychokinesis (rddhi), made himself invisible, and, entering the royal harem, seduced its ladies. His friends were caught red- handed by the palace guards when they failed to make themselves invisi
ble again, and were executed. Nagarjuna narrowly escaped. This inci
dent made him realize that craving for sense pleasures is a potent cause of suffering, which is the second noble truth in Buddhism; hence his deci
sion to join the Buddhist Order. The allusion in this second story is as compelling as that in the first. While traditional yoga emphasized the mystical aspect, Buddhist yoga underscored its moral dimensions. One cannot find a better anecdote to illustrate this difference.
Here, then, we have a Nagarjuna who was looking for the original Buddhist tradition. He discovered it in the Prajnaparamita tradition, alle
gorically explained as something he obtained from the nagas, the Buddha
being the foremost among them (hence his title, mahdnaga, the “great serpent” or “great elephant,” both symbolizing great powers of memory and discrimination). The Prajnaparamita tradition was gradually becom
ing popular in India at this time. We have already suggested the close relationship between the early discourses and the early Prajnaparamita tradition. The biographical accounts of Nagarjuna agree in maintaining that, after being deeply satisfied with the Prajhaparamita-sutras, Nagar
juna went in search of the “other teachings of the Buddha.”5 The impor
tant question is, Where did he go looking for the “other teachings of the Buddha”? It would not have been very sensible for a philosopher like Nagarjuna to depend on texts like the Saddharmapundarika-sutra (Lotus Sutra, which was, in fact, gradually evolving during his day reaching its final form around 220 a.d . ) 6 for any information about the Buddha’s
“other teachings.” This was the first Mahayana sutra that downgraded the early discourses as mere fodder for the unintelligent disciples who surrounded the Buddha. Nagarjuna was probably not swayed by such theories, especially after being influenced by the sophisticated philosoph
ical thinking embodied in the Prajnaparamita tradition. Indeed, Nagar
juna’s attitude toward the Pratyekabuddhas and the Sravakas is very dif
ferent from that of many other extreme Mahayana thinkers.7 This should eliminate any assumption of prejudice on his part against the early discourses.
Even a cursory glance at the M ulam adhyam akakarika, Verses on the Fundamentals o f the M iddle Way (abbreviated hereafter as the Karika) will leave the reader of this most significant work of Nagarjuna with the impression that it is not only a grand commentary on the Buddha’s dis
course to Kaccayana, the only discourse cited by name,8 but also a detailed and careful analysis of most of the important discourses included in the Nikayas and the Agamas, especially those o f the Atthakavagga of the Sutta-nipdta. In my Nagarjuna: The Philosophy o f the M iddle Way (1986), I have provided a detailed analysis of the Karika in relation to the early discourses of the Buddha.9 Here I will deal only with Nagarjuna’s basic philosophical approach, as embodied in his Karika, in order to understand his position among the various luminaries that dotted the his
tory o f the Buddhist tradition.
Moggallputta-tissa, as described in Chapter x i i i, was compelled to adopt a polemical standpoint, since he was confronted by an array of metaphysical thinkers as well as those who misinterpreted the simple rules of discipline (vinaya). This was forced on him by circumstances, especially the invitation of Emperor Asoka to purify the Buddha’s dispen
sation. Yet he demonstrated a philosophical acumen that remained unparalleled until the time of Nagarjuna. Not burdened by any such responsibilities, Nagarjuna was able to confine himself primarily to the philosophical issues, and therefore was able to produce one of the most
remarkable treatises ever compiled by a Buddhist. It is also possible that Moggallputta-tissa had to deal with philosophical issues relating to the conceptions of person (puggala), phenomena (dhamma), and transcen
dence (lokuttaravada) in their nascent stages. By the time of Nagarjuna, almost five centuries later, these metaphysical theories had come to be presented with greater sophistication, so the task was not made easy for him. Yet he seems to have risen to the occasion equipped with an extremely analytical mind.
Even though the metaphysical concept that was repeatedly rejected in the Prajnaparamita literature is referred to by the terms atma, sattva, jiva, and pudgala, Nagarjuna identifies the doctrines of the metaphysical schools with the two terms svabhava (own-nature, self-nature, sub
stance) and atman (self). Yet his major problem was the Sarvastivada doctrine of substance.
Nagarjuna seems to have realized that the problem of substance is the problem of explaining causality and change. These were two basic themes in the Buddha’s explanation of existence. Therefore, before pro
ceeding to establish the non-substantiality of all elements (dharma- nairatmya), Nagarjuna devoted two chapters to the clarification of these two issues. The Buddha’s conception of “dependent arising” was an attempt to avoid introducing mysterious substances to account for causal relations. Nagarjuna had no objection to the Abhidhamma formulation o f causal relations so long as the relata are not regarded as having a unique nature or substance (svabhava) in terms of which they are to be related.10 Similarly, if a causal relation can be established without posit
ing a unique substance, and if this causal relation can account for the experienced identity (which is not absolute), then there is no need to pos
tulate absolute difference or otherness (parabhava) either.11 In other words, this is a rejection of the rationalist solution to the problem of cau
sation. How that rationalistic explanation leads to a paradox has already been pointed out (see Chapter x i i). Yet a total renunciation of the rational content of knowledge would not leave the empirical sound and secure. Hence Nagarjuna turns to the pragmatic definition of an event as fruit (artha), arguing against the rationalist that the fruit is dependently arisen, neither pre-existing as a substance nor something absolutely dif
ferent, without at the same time arguing for an essentialist explanation that the fruit itself is a unique event.
A similar set of metaphysical theories relating to change is taken up next. Movement or motion being one of the most perceptible processes o f change, he chooses three metaphysical views for criticism:
1. A moving entity moves.
2. A non-moving entity moves.
3. A moving and non-moving entity moves.
The first of these represents absolute identity between two events deter
mined on the basis of motion, the second assumes absolute difference, and the third is a combination of the first two. Nagarjuna’s rejection of the three views is stated as follows:
An existing mover does not carry out the movement in any of the three ways. Neither does a non-existing mover carry out the movement in any of the three ways. Nor does a person carry out a movement, both existing and non-existing, in any of the three ways. Therefore, neither the motion, nor the mover, nor the space moved is evident.12
A philosopher who recognizes a theory of dependence cannot speak of motion, a mover, or even the space moved in an essentialist way. Here, only the substantialist and essentialist perspectives are criticized by Nagarjuna, not any and every conception of causation and change. The substantialist and essentialist perspectives, as mentioned earlier, were advocated by the Sarvastivadins and the Sautrantikas, respectively.
T he Non-substantiality of Elem ents (Dharm a-nairatmya) Chapters ill to xv of the K arika are intended to establish the non-sub- stantiality of elements (dharm a) but not, as is generally believed, to elimi
nate the conception o f elements altogether. Here our analysis relates to elements treated from an objective standpoint; the subjective standpoint will be considered in the next section. Three of the prominent categories of the early discourses as well as the Abhidhamma are at the top of the list. Categories discussed are as follows:
1. Faculties (indriya) 2. Aggregates (skandha) 3. Elements (dhatu) 4. Lust (raga)
5. Dispositionally conditioned (samskrta) 6. Action and agent (karm a-kdraka) 7. Antecedent state (purva)
8. Fire and fuel (agnindhana)
9. Prior and posterior ends (purvaparakoti) 10. Suffering (duhkha)
11. Dispositions (samskara) 12. Association (samsarga) 13. Self-nature (svabhava)
Some of these categories constitute the subject matter of the Abhidham
ma. These even reflect some aspects of the Abhidharma methodology,
namely, enumeration, classification, and synthesis. While the first eleven categories represent enumeration and classification, avoiding the weari
some repetition of the Abhidhamma, the twelfth category accounts for synthesis.
Without taking into consideration the fact that Nagarjuna was specifi
cally criticizing the substantialist and essentialist interpretations of these categories, and misled by Candraklrti’s view that Nagarjuna is here adopting the reductio ad absurdum (prdsahgika) method of analysis, many a modern scholar has been led to believe that Nagarjuna was plac
ing these categories under the executioner’s block. However, a more cau
tious examination reveals that he was using a surgeon’s scalpel to peel off the cancerous elements infecting a healthy body of conceptions.
We have mentioned that the categories discussed here relate to ele
ments examined from an objective standpoint. It is well known that an objective standpoint can deteriorate into a view regarding ultimately objective realities independent of any human perspective, i.e ., a view from nowhere.13 Nagarjuna’s concluding statement after analyzing “ele
ments” (dhatu) should serve as a corrective not only to the rather trans
cendentalist interpretation offered by Candraklrti but also to that of the substantialist, whose conception of objectivity calls for an annihilation of the human perspective:
Those who are of little intelligence, who perceive the existence as well as non-existence of existents, do not perceive the appeasement of the object, the auspicious.14
What Nagarjuna is recommending is the appeasement of the conception of the object, neither its elevation to an ultimate reality nor its annihila
tion. It is not the elimination of any and every conception of it. Here he was faithfully following the footsteps of the Buddha (see Chapter vn).
Thus, after performing a careful and delicate surgery in relation to all thirteen categories, Nagarjuna, in Chapter xv, utilizes the executioner’s block to get rid of the conception of substance (svabhava).
The metaphysical conception associated with the category of faculties (indriya) is taken up first, although it is the second mentioned in the early discourses as well as in the Abhidhamma. In doing so, Nagarjuna is giv
ing priority to epistemology. Among the faculties, he focuses on the eye (caksu). Even though the chapter is called “The Examination of the Fac
ulty of Eye” (Caksur-indriya-parlksa), Nagarjuna is not interested in examining the visual faculty itself, for there was not much controversy about it. The subject of controversy was the function of the eye, namely, seeing (darsana). The metaphysical view that was prevalent, even as far back as the Upanisads, was that there were two processes involved in see
ing: seeing itself, and seeing the object. According to the Upanisads, the
latter is the experiencing of the object (= the bird enjoying the fruit), and the former, the coordinator of the perceptions of the object (= the bird who simply keeps on watching). In the rationalist traditions of the West, the seeing itself can be compared to the Kantian “transcendental unity of apperception,” which is a necessary condition for the empirical under
standing of the object. Among the Buddhist metaphysicians, this was consciousness perceiving itself (svasamvedana), which results in the dichotomies necessary for rational thinking (see Chapter x x ). Nagar
juna’s criticism relates to this metaphysical conception only. A similar analysis is made of the remaining categories.
Arguments against the Conception of Substance
The chapter on “The Examination of Self-nature” (Svabhava-pariksa), though brief (only eleven verses), is one of the most important. Nagar
juna’s main argument is that a conception of self-nature or substance cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of “dependent arising” (pratityasa- mutpada) or the theory, as developed in the Abhidhamma, that things, events, or phenomena are dependent on causes (hetu) or conditions (pra
tyaya). If substance were to arise as a result of causes and conditions, it has to be made (krtaka). This would be inconsistent with the very defini
tion of substance. If it is not made (a-krtaka), then it is unique and has no relationship to or is not dependent on another. Self-nature or substance thus involves the conception of the “unique,” the “unshared,” or the
“independent” (referred to in the later Theravada tradition as a-sadha- rana; see Chapter xxi).
Having argued that the conception of substance is incompatible with a theory of dependence, Nagarjuna makes a further claim that if self
nature or substance does not exist, one cannot speak of other-nature or a different substance, “for self-nature of other-nature is called self-na- ture.”15 The conceptual trap into which the Rationalist falls is then highlighted. If existence were understood in terms of identity (substance) and difference (otherness), then without these two aspects existence itself would be meaningless. If existence (bhava), in this sense, is meaningless, non-existence (abhava) is also not available. Yet it is the change of exis
tence that people normally call non-existence. In other words, the con
ceptions of identity and difference militate against the recognition not only of dependence but also of change.
At this point Nagarjuna refers to the Buddha’s discourse to Kacca
yana16 and draws the connections between self-nature and eternalism, on the one hand, and other-nature and annihilationism, on the other. Thus, when Nagarjuna abandoned the conceptions of self-nature and other- nature, he was simply following the Buddha, who rejected the notions of eternalism and annihilationism.
The Non-substantiality of the Subject (Pudgala-nairatmya) Here we begin with a discussion of the problem of transmigration, explained either in terms of the aggregates or of personal beings. The themes under examination are:
1. Bondage and release (bandhana-m oksa) 2. Fruit of action (karm a-pbala)
3. Self (atma) 4. Time (kala)
5. Harmony (samagrt)
6. Occurrence and dissolution (sambhava-vibhava) 7. Thus-Gone-One (tathagata)
8. Perversions (viparyasa) 9. Noble truths (arya-satya) 10. Freedom (nirvana)
All these relate to the person who is either in bondage (bandhana) or has attained freedom (moksa). As in the previous section, Nagarjuna’s attempt here is to weed out the metaphysical conception of a subtle per
sonality (pudgala), which is supposed to transmigrate from one life to another until the attainment of freedom, as well as the equally metaphys
ical conception of a permanent and eternal being who has attained freedom.
In the previous section, the conception that was criticized most often was that of the substantialist Sarvastivadins, while the essentialist per
spective of the Sautrantikas took a secondary place. In the present sec
tion, it is mostly the conception of the essentialist Sautrantikas that comes under fire. It is well known that the essentialism of the Sautranti
kas paved the way for the Vatslputriyas to openly espouse the conception of a subtle personality, neither identical with nor different from the aggregates— a theory discussed at length by Vasubandhu in an appendix to his A bhidharm akosa-bhasya.17
In dealing with the problem of transmigration of a subtle personality, Nagarjuna could not help being dialectical or argumentative. If some
thing is permanent, then it is meaningless to say that it transmigrates.
Transmigration implies moving from one place to another, i.e., disap
pearing from one place and appearing in another. Disappearing and appearing mean change, not permanence. Permanence would mean eter
nal presence, whereas if things are impermanent, in the sense of disap
pearing (uccheda), they will never transmigrate.
Immediately after presenting the above argument, Nagarjuna appeals to the empirical analysis of the human person provided by the Buddha.
He says that after examining the five constituents of the human person, a
transmigrating personality was not discoverable. The problem of moral responsibility (i.e., action and its fruits) is then taken up, and he carefully distinguishes the sense in which the Buddha explained them (i.e., in terms of dependent arising) from that of the metaphysician who relies on the conception of substance. Explaining moral responsibility in terms of dependence required not only abandoning the notion of a permanent self (dtma) but also renunciation of the metaphysical views pertaining to time (kala), harmony of causes and conditions (samagrt), and the processes of occurrence and dissolution (sambhava-vibhava).
After dealing with the metaphysical issues relating to the human per
son, bondage, and moral responsibility, Nagarjuna proceeds to examine similar metaphysical interpretations of the person who has “walked the way” (tathagata), that is, attained freedom. If non-substantiality is a syn
onym for dependent arising, and both conceptions explain the open- ended nature of the universe, which is neither eternal and fixed (sasvata) nor discontinuous and haphazard (uccheda), then that openness should allow for possibilities or new situations to occur without generating con
flicts. Conflicts are often creations of human conceptualizations that tend to fix the empirical world of flux and change into eternal objects, truths, and events, as well as of concepts that are supposed to correspond to such eternal objects, truths, and events, respectively. The desolidifica
tion of such concepts allows for flexibility and change. Similarly, a per
son who has attained freedom from such conceptual obsessions is able to pursue a peaceful way of life (arana-vihara) without becoming involved in any conflicts. The Buddha’s statement, “M onks, I do not conflict with the world; the world conflicts with me,”18 explains the behavior of the person who has attained freedom. The universe, when it is not structured by the solidified dispositions (samskara) of human beings, is likewise.
The true nature of the universe (jagat)— in contrast to the “world” fabri
cated by metaphysical conceptions— as well as that of a person who has
“walked the way” (tathagata) of that universe is not artificially put together or structured (samskrta) but dependently arisen (pratltyasamut- panna). Nagarjuna’s positive conclusion here is that, just as the universe (jagat) is non-substantial (nihsvabhava), so is the person who has attained freedom.
The next three chapters of the K arika reflect Nagarjuna’s understand
ing of the extremely important aspect of the Buddha’s discourse to Kac
cayana. In that discourse, the Buddha admonished Kaccayana as fol
lows:
The world, for the most part, Kaccayana, is bound by approach, grasping,
The world, for the most part, Kaccayana, is bound by approach, grasping,