(PROTOCOLO 7) MOMENTO: Profundización.

in the "Resolution on the Complete Eradication of the Red Menace" adopted on February 21, 1937. In an overbearing- tone, the KMT denounced the C C P 's subversive activities as the main cause for China's disunity and laid down four conditions for alliance: 1. abolition of the Red Army and its incorporation into the united command of the nation's armed . forces; 2. dissolution of Chinese Soviet Republic and centralization of government power in the hands of the Nationalist Government; 3, cessation of

Communist propaganda and absolute acceptance of the Three People's 142

Principles; and 4. termination of class struggle.

In his article entitled "The Key to the Salvation of the Chinese People" written shortly after the KMT's Third Plenum, Ch'en Shao-yü responded with a violent criticism of the resolution as a "slanderous attack" on the CCP, which had been the first and the most resolute supporter of national unity. In contrast to the CCP's sincere desire for national salvation, Ch'en claimed, the KMT's resolution reflected the "political shortsighted­ ness" of a small group of landlords and capitalists who were willing to sacrifice national interests for their selfish ends. He proclaimed the Communists' understanding of the four conditions as follows: 1. abolition of the Red Army could not be the physical , . disintegration of the Red Army, and the CCP would continue to maintain all offices and political workers within the army; 2. abolition of the Soviet Government could not be the dissolution of the Soviet Government but the redesignation of its name and the conversion of Soviet power into democratic power; 3.

Communist acceptance of the Three People's Principles was based on the fact that Communists shared with Sun Yat-sen's true disciples the struggle for national independence, democracy and improvement of the livelihood of

the people, but it was not an abandonment of communism; 4. class struggle was not created by the Communist Party but rather the Communist Party was

created out of the class struggle in society - implying that the Communists could neither be held responsible for the phenomenon of class struggle nor be requested to terminate it at will. Ch'en agreed that for the purpose of

achieving unity in the country, the CCP should cease confiscating the land of landlords, but warned that such was the limit to its concessions. He further accused the KMT of attempting to delay negotiations by imposing harsh and unreasonable demands. Finally, to clarify the confusion follow­ ing his earlier call for emulation of the French and Spanish People's fronts, he delineated the qualitative difference between the national and people's fronts as follows:

The people's front is mainly a front of working people directed first and foremost against the enemy of the people at home. The social composition of the national united front is far.broader than the people's front and is (jl^ected against the foreign invader and his agents.

As contemporary Japanese analysts observe, Ch'en's article was

unmistakably a "critique of the KMT's Third Plenum" and a declaration that there were limits to the CCP's concessions. In particular, it was noted that Ch'en's interpretation of the four conditions for alliance

144 was "extremely advantageous to the CCP".

By contrast, the CCP's response to the KMT's Third Plenum was much milder in tone. In his interview with Agnes Smedley on March

1, 1937, Mao clarified, first of all, the differences between the people's 145

frcnt and national front in the same manner as Ch'en Shao~y(i. He then reiterated the CCP's willingness to rename the Soviet Government and the Red Army and "accept the direction of the Nanking Government and the

Military Council", introduce a thoroughly democratic system in the special regions, terminate the policy of insurrection against the Nationalist Government, and cease the confiscation of the landlords' land. The CCP, he also declared, would not bind itself to the interests of only one class, but would subordinate class interests to the national interests. To

"suitably resolve the problem of class struggle", he continued, the CCP would require the landlord-capitalists to improve the living conditions of the worker-peasants, but on the other hand also discourage the worker- peasants from unreasonable demands. Finally, he delcared that the Communists had "always been fervent disciples of the Three People's Principles", and equated their continued faith in communism with other people's belief in capitalism, anarchism, Confucianism, buddhism and

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Christianity.

Mao's relunctance to offer overt criticism of the KMT might be explained by several factors. As Chang Kuo-t'ao recalls, Mao was anxious to realize the KMT-CCP truce in order to prevent a renewal of the civil

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war. At the same time, the CCP was confronted with a vociferous demand from anti-Communist elements to dissolve itself to make

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way for national unity. As a result, it had to adopt a low-key position so as to avoid appearing provocative. Such consideration was further bolstered in March 1937 when the new Japanese cabinet adopted a moderate approach to China symbolized by the visit of a Japanese good-will

150 Chou En-lai's difficulties in negotiating with the Nanking officials. In an internal statement issued by the Central Committee around this time it was asserted that the prospects for CCP-KMT cooperation were not entirely "optimistic", and the Party should still exercise vigilance

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against possible KMT attacks. Nevertheless, the situation gradually improved. On March 15, the CCP announced its willingness to "begin concrete negotiations for readjusting the relations of the KMT and the

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CCP on the basis of the four conditions put forth" by the KMT. Accord­ ing to Chang Kuo-t'ao, sometime in early April the CCP leaders held an extended discussion and agreed to accept the terms laid down by the KMT

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as a basis for further negotiation. On April 3, the Propaganda Department of the CCP issued an internal "Propaganda Outline" which stated that the four conditions offered by the KMT's Third Plenum were "basically very close" to the C CP's earlier proposals and reiterated that

154 "the principle of KMT-CCP cooperation has been firmly established".

Such seemingly enormous concessions to the KMT created dis­ illusionment and discontent among certain Party rank-and-file. The situation was further affected by the Trotskyites' criticism of the C C P 's betrayal of the faith of the m a s s e s and of communist principles. As Helen Snow recalls:

It was not an easy task to bring all the Communists into line, and there was some trouble about deciding to give up the Soviets in the beginning. Even when I was in the Soviet district in the summer of 1937, there was a big campaign against potential Leftists and Trotskyists, who did not want to cooperate with the KMT. 5

(Basically, the Chinese Trotskyites accused the CCP leaders of being "Stalinists" who abandoned the principle of class struggle, gave up the Party's independence and sold out the interests of the proletariat class. They advocated opposition not only to Japan but all imperialist powers, the overthrow of warlords, bureaucrats and landlords before organizing resistance to imperialism, and the immediate implementation of socialism without going through the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. For his part in bringing about the united front, Ch'en Shao-yU was

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