I have argued that minimally approving, in the sense I have articulated, should play a central role in attributional-responsibility, but I have not yet specified just what the relationship is between minimal approval and the causal chain that leads the agent to act. The fact that the agent would min- imally approve of ϕ-ing and the fact that she in fact ϕs, at minimum, should not be wholly coincidental. Consider the following case:
Coincidental Compulsion: Carrie has a compulsion to do a jumping jack at 3pm every day. She has absolutely no ability to stop herself from acting on her first-order urge to do it, but she almost always hates that she does it. It often interferes with whatever else she actually wants to be doing at 3pm, but her first-order urge takes over and she does the jumping jack anyway. Today, as 3pm rolls around Carrie is feeling a bit low energy, and thinks to herself that doing a jumping jack might actually be nice for helping her wake up a bit, and so she desires to some degree to act on her desire to do the jumping jack for a reason other than just to get rid of the urge. However, she will be in a work meeting at that time, and all things considered she definitely would not prefer to act on the urge, since it will be embarrassing and difficult to explain to her colleagues. At 3pm the urge overtakes her considered opinion about what she wants to do entirely via the exact same mechanism it does every day (one that is not sensitive to any in- formation about what she approves of doing), and she does the jump- ing jack.
Carrie, it seems, is not attributionally-responsible for her jumping jack. Even though she did minimally approve of doing the jumping jack, this had absolutely nothing to do with what caused her to act. Minimal ap-
proval seems to matter only when it is non-coincidental that the agent acts in accordance with what she minimal approves of doing.
But, given the fact that minimal approval is hypothetical, we can’t ex- plain the connection by telling a simple causal story on which the approv- al causes the action. It might be the case that an attributionally-responsible agent explicitly reflects, approves of acting on one of her desires and this approval itself brings her to act. But this is not the only possibility on which her approval and the causal chain leading her to act might be non- coincidentally related. The process leading to her action, or some part of it, might cause her to be such that she would minimally approve. Or she might have a mental state that both her minimal approval and her action. The common principle shared by these relations is that for some particular chain of mental states leading to action, C, which leads the agent to ϕ, if the agent’s ϕ-ing is caused by C, then the agent minimally approves of ϕ- ing.
But now consider the following case:
Conditional Fallacy Frankie: Frankie is addicted to alcohol and would give anything to stop drinking, but despite his other plans for himself he is often overtaken by an extremely powerful urge to drink. One day, while feeling hopeless about his powerlessness against his urge he decides to think hard about whether or not he should just form and act on a desire in order to act on it before it overpowers him. Ultimate- ly, he does. Given what I have been arguing, it seems he should not be attributionally-responsible. His thinking leads him to act and so is part of the mental states making up the causal chain that leads to his action. But, now imagine that this same thinking also leads him to put his head down on some objects on his desk, one of which he hits hard enough that it stimulates his brain to have certain mental states, mak-
ing it the case that at the moment of action he minimally approves of acting on his desire to drink alcohol.89
In this case, Frankie’s causal chain of mental states leading to his action does make it the case that he minimally approves of acting on his urge to drink. But, intuitively, this is not the kind of connection that would make him attributionally-responsible for his resultant action.90 Instead I think the relevant connection is not that the causal chain of mental states lead- ing to the agent’s action actually makes it the case that the agent minimal- ly approves, but rather that the causal chain of mental states disposes the agent to minimally approve in the vast majority of cases (all non-fluky cases).9192 The thought here is that it is not any particular counterfactual that matters for attributional-responsibility, but rather the fact that the agent has the actual mental states that dispose her to approve, whatever they may be. We’re not really interested in what the happens, that, gener- ally speaking, in (most of) the worlds in which the agent considers this
89 I call this case “Conditional Fallacy Frankie” because the problem here may be an ap- plication of some version of the Conditional Fallacy. For discussion of the Conditional Fallacy in general, see Bonevac, Dever, and Sosa (2006).
90 Less science-fiction-y cases can also be generated, although it is less clear that they pose a genuine threat to the view as stated. For example, a person who never reflects on her motivations might undergo an organic personality change if she were to reflect on her first-order desires. It is not wholly clear that these post-personality-change hypothetical approvals are not what matters for attributional-responsibility. But if this seems prob- lematic enough to provide reason to think that the view should say that certain aspects of agent’s personalities ought to be held fixed, this gives additional reason to move to a dis- positional view.
91 This means that there will also be inverse Conditional Fallacy Frankie cases on which the agent does not actually minimally approve due to some fluke caused by the causal chain leading to action.
92 The reader is invited to insert her own favorite theory of the metaphysics of disposi- tions here.
particular choice situation, she approves to some degree of her desire. In ruling out certain outlier worlds, moving to a dispositional account en- sures that there is actually some feature of the agent’s psychology that plays the relevant role here, rather than a mere fluke of the environment. One final tweak must be made before an adequate account can be for- mulated. It seems important to attributional-responsibility that the mental states involved in the causal chain of action, as well as in the agent’s min- imal approval are really her own. By that I mean something quite modest, just that they are not inserted, say by an evil scientist or the like.93 There is an extensive literature here, and I am aware that making this concession opens the door for potential incompatibilist arguments to get a foothold.94 However, I reluctantly adopt a modest ownership condition since it seems to me a trade-off worth making.95 Although the account loses theoretical simplicity, it gains the ability to make good on some of our strongest intui- tions about attributability.
Putting all of these pieces together, we can now formulate the Minimal Approval view:
The Minimal Approval View of Attributional-Responsibility: An agent is attributionally-responsible for ϕing-at-t iff the actual sequence of mental states involved in the production of her action is non- implanted and together with her other mental states makes it the case that at t, if she were to reflect on her desire to ϕ at t, she would be suf-
93 See Matheson (2018) for a recent discussion of Manipulation Cases as they pose coun- terexamples to Deep Self views.
94 The most famous of these argument, Derk Pereboom’s Four Case Argument aims to show that there is no relevant difference on which to base an ownership condition be- tween a case in which an agent’s deep self mental states are implanted and when they are acquired in the normal fashion, given the truth of determinism (Pereboom 2001).
95 For a recent defense of adopting a modest ownership condition to protect against ma- nipulation cases, see McKenna (2016).
ficiently likely to want to act on her desire to ϕ at t, with some further aim in doing so other than merely eliminating this desire.96