In the previous section, I stressed that the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire was one among the country’s ethno-regional groups. That based on the taxonomies presented in the previous section the current civil war in Côte d’Ivoire started as a category two-war (rebels aiming at state dominance of some identity group) and evolved into a category four-war (ethno-groups seeking control of local resources).
On 19 September 2002, Côte d’Ivoire experienced a failed coup attempt that evolved into a rebellion. The civil war war started by multiple factors, including unfair policies and humiliating treatments adopted by the various regimes after 1993, and most
importantly the failure of the subsequent leaders to maintain the existing relative national unity. After President Houphouët-Boigny died, a fierce battle ensued over succession matters bewteen Allasane Ouattara and Konan Bédié, the two main contenders for the highest office (Wiseman 1995, Wauthier 1997, Akindes 2003 and 2004, and Bassets 2003).
Article 11 of the Ivoirian Constitution stipulates that in case of a vanancy of the of the presidency, the president of the National Assembly (in this case Bédié) takes over the mandate of the deceased or ill Head of State (Konate 2004). The constitution allowed Bédié to assume power until 1995. Bédié easily won the 1995 presidential elections by 95% of the votes against a weak opposition, and after Ouattara’s candidacy was
dismissed on the grounds that he did not conclusively establish that his parents were both of Ivoirian parentage. Ouattara was again disqualified in the 2000 elections by the junta led by General Guéï (Bakary-Akin 1991).
In order to respond to his detractors, Ouattara had applied and obtained an identification certificate (Certificat d’Identité) delivered by Judge Zoro Bi Ballo in Dimbokro (center), where he was allegedly born in 1942. The Bédié regime rejected that certificate claiming he had forged a legal document. There was huge public outcry amongst Ouattara’ supporters (Konate 2004, Bassets 2003, and Toungara 2001).
Meanwhile, Bédié had published a book titled: Les Chemins de Ma Vie (The Paths of My Life) in which he viciously attacked Ouattara for interfering with Ivoirian politics, calling him a Burkinabè (Burkina Faso citizen). Bédié also created the infamous concept of Ivoirité, which was aimed at discriminating between who was an Ivoirian and who was not. Apparently, this concept was directed to Ouattara, who was already labeled as alien
to that country. Ironically, the Ivoirité drew even more support and sympathy for
Ouattara among the northerners and Muslims populations, as well as immigrants from the Sahel Region (namely from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger), for whom he had become an icon, representative, spokesman, leader, and potential liberator (Toungara 2001: 63-72, Konate 2004).
When he first came to power, Guéï claimed that he had come to clean up all the mess created by the Bédié regime. He promised to return power to the civilians in a short while. The junta then assumed power for nine months. Unfortunately, Guéï allowed his soldiers to terrorize, to harrass, and to victimize the northerners, Muslims, and foreign immigrants from the Sahel region (Africa Confidential 11 October 2002, Akindes 2003 and 2004, Bassets 2003: 13-27, Toungara 2001, and Konate 2004). Furthermore, he created the Union for Democracy and Peace in Côte d’Ivoire (UDPCI), and he decided to run in the 2000 presidential elections. Unfortunately, he lost to Gbagbo. Once in power, Gbagbo also did nothing to resolve or correct the problems his predecessors had created. Instead, he allowed many crimes to go unpunished (Toungara 2001).
It was in this context of deep confusion and social tension that the country experienced its first ever civil war after thirty-three years of relative stability. The coup was originally led by the MPCI, which was joined later by the MJP and MPIGO. Together, the three groups formed the Forces Nouvelles (FN). The FN consisted of ex- soldiers and new recruits from the north (also Burkinabè and Malians), and Yacouba and Guere people from the west (also Liberians). The failed coup split the country into two parts. The rebels occupied the north and far west, while the rest of the country remained under government control.
The initial goal of the rebels was to overthrow the Gbagbo regime in Abidjan (south). But, because the national security forces were able to push them back during the early moments, the rebels sought to control the north (rich in cattle and cotton), center, western cocoa and coffee belt, northwest (diamond and gold rich area near Seguela), and the port of San Pedro (southwest near the Liberian border). Part of the revenue generated from the sale of these commodities allowed the rebels to sustain themselves or finance their movement. As a result of this the market of the neighboring countries, which did not grow cocoa and coffee, were flooded with these cocoa and coffee. It was also alleged that the rebels had built fancy homes, hotels, and shops in these neighboring countries in preparation of their old days.
Also, immediately after seizure of the north, west, and northwest regions, the rebels broke into several regional West African Central Bank branches in Bouaké (center) and Korhogo (north) under their control for some quick cash. Several French soldiers were also accused to do the same. The above narrative suggests that the current civil war in Côte d’Ivoire is one among ethno-regional groups, it started as a civil war in which rebels aim at state dominance of some identity groups then it evolved into a civil war in which ethno-regional barons seek control over local resources. However, some analysts find this explanation of the crisis is too simplistic.
Richard Banégas and Ruth Marshall-Fratani (in Bøas and Dunn 2007: 6) agree with this argument, for they argue that this conflict is primarily political, with the local and international intertwined, generating a war about borders in which nation-states play a central role. As they comment: The case of Côte d’Ivoire illustrates how those able to
define themselves as autochthones demand that migrants, who already have suffered resentment for quite some time, should be expelled.
Thus, the current crisis is an outcome of the unwillingness of the political elite to acknowledge that the system of governance for citizenship and land rights established under Houphouët-Boigny increasingly was becoming dysfunctional, and the principles of citizenship and rights from the Houphouët-Boigny model of patrimonial integration to the exclusiveness of an autochthonous Ivoirité discourse (Bøas and Dunn 2007: 34).
Another group of scholars have interpreted the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire as evidence of state “weakened,” incapable of controlling its borders, the state finds itself faced with “ethnic leagues” and transnational rebellions recruiting mercenaries from throughout the sub-region (Bøas and Dunn 2007: 8). Other observers contend that the Ivoirian conflict was fueled above all by the search for profit and the greed of actors. For this group, “much of the rhetoric of division and ethno-nationalist hatred on both sides of the conflict is highly theatrical and a cover for ilicit economic gain.” (ICG 2004b: 2-3, Bøas and Dunn 2007: 82)
But, Banegas and Marshall-Fratani (2007: 82) do not share these interpretations. Instead they maintain that the Ivoirian conflict is eminently political. It is about who actually Ivoirian is, and who is foreigner? Or more prosaically, it is conflict over political, economic, land, educational, cultural rights, which the possession of identity papers confers, in which are opposed two distinct conceptions of citizenship, one open and the other based on the political ideology of autochthony, which carries within it the seeds of exclusion. In other words, it is a war of identification whose history is long and complex (see also Marshall-Fratani 2006). Finally, the current conflict is the indirect
result of struggles for succession following the death of Houphouët-Boigny, beyond these recent events it is above all the latest phase of a structural crisis rooted in the colonial period (Bøas and Dunn 2007: 83).