4.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to conduct two political risk analyses of Sierra Leone using the models presented in chapter three along with the matrix developed by BERI and the matrix developed for the Iroanya model (the latter was developed for the purpose of this study) to provide an overall risk rating of Sierra Leone. The first framework and its matrix are taken from BERI and the BRS country risk analysis, the PRI component which focuses on socio-political risks. The second framework was developed using the alternative political risk model suggested by Iroanya (2008), and a matrix was created for this model as Iroanya did not provide one in this work. The intention is to see if and how the proposed alternative political risk model may aid in achieving a more accurate political risk rating.
4.1.1 History and background of Sierra Leone
Facts about Sierra Leone Population: 6,440,053 (July 2009 est. CIA 2009) Urban population: 38% of total population (2008). Rate of urbanization: 2,9% annual rate of change (2005‐10 estimate). Population below poverty line: 70,2% (2004). Ethnic groups: 20 African ethnic groups make up 90% of the population which is composed by 30% Temne, 30% Mende and 30% other. 10% of the population is Creole (Krio) which are descendants of freed Jamaican slaves who were settled in the Freetown area in the late‐ 18th century and refugees from Liberia’s recent civil war and a small number of Europeans, Lebanese, Pakistanis and Indians. Religion: Muslim 60%, Christian 10%, indigenous beliefs 30%. Language: English (official, regular use limited to literate minority), Mende (principal vernacular in the south), Temne (principal vernacular in the north), Krio (English‐based Creole, spoken by the descendants of freed Jamaican slaves who were settled in the Freetown area, a lingua franca and a first language for 10% of the population but understood by 95%) Education(2004):Literacy‐‐35.1%.
Health: Life expectancy (2009 est.)‐‐41.24 years. Infant mortality rate‐‐154.43 deaths/1,000 live births. HIV infection rate for adults, ages 15-49 years (2007 est.)‐‐1.7%.
Work force: Agriculture‐‐52.5%; industry‐‐30.6%; services‐‐16.9%.
Table 5. Facts and Figures on Sierra Leone (U.S. Department of State 2009; CIA 2009).
Sierra Leone gained independence from Britain in 1961 and was a country known for educational achievements, trading activities, entrepreneurial skills and art and was considered top in the region in terms of education and scientific accomplishment (U.S. Department of State 2009; Healy 2009). Since independence Sierra Leone has struggled with mismanagement and patronage for decades, most notably through the autocratic rule of Siaka Stevens (ICG 2008). Up until the civil war in 1991, The All People’s Congress (APC) had ruled Sierra Leone for 23 years, initially by Siaka Stevens and then succeeded by President Joseph Momo in 1984 (Zack-Williams 1999:143). Since 1961, Sierra Leone has had six general elections and five military coups (EIU 2008). Siaka Stevens won the general election in 1967, but was not able to resume office as a he was put under house arrest by Force
Commander Brigadier Lansana and later removed from office by a military junta known as The National Reformation Council (NRC) (Zack-Williams 1999:144). It did not take long before officers calling themselves the Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Movement (ACRM) ousted the NRC and welcomed back Siaka Stevens. Already in 1971 Stevens had managed to turn the national coalition government into a de facto one-party government and years of personalised and monolithic rule began (Zack Williams 1999:144). Under the rule of Stevens politics of clientelism and networks of informal markets were set up, the latter was important to try and control the diamond-rich Kono district (Zack-Williams 1999:145). The Kono district would prove to be an important contribution to the prolongation of the civil war as will be mentioned below. Stevens rule and, later the rule of his successor Joseph Momo, were instrumental in causing the civil war as the years of mismanagement had left Sierra Leone with disenchanted youth and disenchanted population due to poverty and dire social conditions.
The civil war in Sierra Leone began in March 1991 when the group known as Revolutionary United Front (RUF) staged an armed offence against President Joseph Momo and his government the APC (Zack Williams 1999:143). RUF was led by Foday Sankoh and did not seem to be based on ethnic background; rather the group was formed by intellectuals who were politically and economically excluded (Zack-Williams 1999:147). Decades of mismanagement and a centralisation of power and resources by the APC and Siaka Stevens, succeeded by Joseph Momo, helped establish and strengthen the RUF (EIU 2008; Country Watch 2007). The civil war in neighbouring Liberia may also have been a contributing factor and RUF were aided by the aggrieved, Liberian warlord Charles Taylor (Zack-Williams 1999:147). After years of mismanagement and abuses of power under President Momoh, the RUF started to attack villages in eastern Sierra Leone on the Liberian border in 1991. The RUF was able to gain support due to the dire social conditions and years of bad governance and endemic corruption, and a large number of economic excluded youth (Freeman 2008). The RUF quickly gained control of the diamond mines in the Kono district and this helped RUF finance their rebellion throughout the war. The civil war was not necessarily caused by ethnic tensions, but access to economic resources, such as alluvial diamonds and a large number of people who had no incentives to end the war as the war became the only source of income (EIU 2008).
The Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces were able to remove the military junta from Freetown after heavy fighting in the capital for years and Kabba was reinstated as President (Zack- Williams 1999:160). Sierra Leone officially declared peace in 2002 after more than ten years of civil war and several coups (Countrywatch 2007). Sierra Leone has thus had seven years to rebuild its infrastructure and social and political institutions. The current government is active in its pursuit of FDI and marketing of Sierra Leone as a tourist destination. After more than a decade of civil war, the country struggles to convince outsiders that it does not pose a high political risk, and seeks to improve its negative image. There are currently three major parties in the country, Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), APC and People’s Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC). Sierra Leone is a republic with a democratically elected president and unicameral parliament. The civil war left the once Athens of West Africa (Healey 2009) in a dire state as the third lowest ranked country on the Human Development Index (2009), only behind Afghanistan and Niger. Sierra Leone is at present struggling to rebuild the war torn country. It seeks to improve the dire social conditions and the prospects of a large group of disenchanted youth, along with curtailing rapid levels of urbanisation (ICG 2008). Being located in a region with a longstanding history of conflict, regional security and stability is fragile, and this predisposition to violence in its history poses a significant potential threat for the internal prospects of peace and stability (ICG 2003).
The next section of this study will analyse the political risk of Sierra Leone at a macro level using two models, one conventional political risk model and one alternative, African- orientated political risk model.
4.2 Political risk analysis of Sierra Leone using PRI
This section will analyse the macro level political risk of Sierra Leone using the political risk component of the BRS, the PRI. The PRI matrix will be used to interpret the results of the political risk analysis in section 4.3. As this is a macro level analysis, it will focus on overall possible political risks.