THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 178467. April 26, 2017 Ponente: BERSAMIN, J.
FACTS:
The petitioners assail the decision promulgated on December 7, 2006, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered on May 22, 1998 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 157, in Pasig City (RTC) dismissing the petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. 65725 for its lack of merit, and awarded attorney's fees under the respondent's counterclaim
Petitioners filed an action for damages, alleging that they had experienced emotional shock, mental anguish, public ridicule, humiliation, insults and embarrassment during their trip to Thailand because of the respondent's release to them of five US$ 100 bills that later on turned out to be counterfeit. They claimed that they had travelled to Bangkok, Thailand after withdrawing US$ l ,000.00 in US$ 100 notes from their dollar account at the respondent's Pateros branch; that while in Bangkok, they had exchanged five US$ 100 bills into Baht, but only four of the US$ 100 bills had been accepted by the foreign exchange dealer because the fifth one was "no good;" that unconvinced by the reason for the rejection, they had asked a companion to exchange the same bill at Norkthon Bank in Bangkok; that the bank teller thereat had then informed them and their companion that the dollar bill was fake; that the teller had then confiscated the US$ 100 bill and had threatened to report them to the police if they insisted in getting the fake dollar bill back; and that they had to settle for a Foreign Exchange Note receipt.
The petitioners claimed that later on, they had bought jewelry from a shop owner by using four of the remaining US$100 bills as payment; that on the next day, however, they had been confronted by the shop owner at the hotel lobby because their four US$ 100 bills had turned out to be counterfeit; that the shop owner had shouted at them: "You Filipinos, you are all cheaters!;" and that the incident had occurred within the hearing distance of fellow travelers and several foreigners.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. On appeal, the appellate court upheld the trial court’s ruling.
ISSUE
: Whether or not respondent should be liable for moral and exemplary damages on account of their suffering the unfortunate experience abroad brought about by their use of the fake US dollarbills withdrawn from the latter
RULING
:The contention cannot be upheld. The relationship existing between the petitioners and the respondent that resulted from a contract of loan was that of a creditor-debtor. Even if the law imposed a high standard on the latter as a bank by vi1iue of the fiduciary nature of its banking business, bad faith or gross negligence amounting to bad faith was absent. Hence, there simply was no legal basis for holding the respondent liable for moral and exemplary damages. In breach of contract, moral damages may be awarded only where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. That was not true herein because the respondent was not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith. This is pursuant to Article 2220 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
With the respondent having established that the characteristics of the subject dollar notes had made it difficult even for the BSP itself as the country's own currency note expert to identify the counterfeiting with ease despite adhering to all the properly laid out standard operating procedure and precautions in the handling of US dollar bills, holding it liable for damages in favor of the petitioners would be highly unwarranted in the absence of proof of bad faith, malice or fraud on its
assuage their inconvenience did not necessarily mean it was liable. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of liability, and is inadmissible as evidence against the offeror.
Res ipsa loquitur
CARLOS BORROMEO, Petitioner, v. FAMILY CARE HOSPITAL, INC. AND RAMON S. INSO, M.D.,
Respondents.
SECOND DIVISION,G.R. No. 191018, January 25, 2016 Ponente: BRION, J.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Carlos Borromeo, was the husband of the late Lilian V. Borromeo. Lilian was a patient of the respondent Family Care Hospital, Inc. under the care of respondent Dr. Ramon Inso. Over the next 48 hours, Lilian underwent multiple tests . However, the tests were not conclusive enough to confirm that she had appendicitis. Meanwhile, Lilian's condition did not improve. Dr. Inso decided to conduct an exploratory laparotomy on Lilian because of the findings on her abdomen and his fear that she might have a ruptured appendix. During the operation, Dr. Inso confirmed that Lilian was suffering from acute appendicitis. He proceeded to remove her appendix which was already infected and congested with pus.
The operation was successful. Lilian's appearance and vital signs improved. Roughly six hours after Lilian was brought back to her room, Dr. Inso was informed that her blood pressure was low. Dr. Inso immediately went to Lilian and saw that she was quite pale. He immediately requested a blood transfusion. Nevertheless, her condition continued to deteriorate.
Dr. Inso suspected that Lilian had Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC), a blood disorder characterized by bleeding in many parts of her body caused by the consumption or the loss of the clotting factors in the blood. Dr. Inso informed her family that there may be a need to re- operate on her, but she would have to be put in an Intensive Care Unit (ICU). Unfortunately, Family Care did not have an ICU because it was only a secondary hospital and was not required by the Department of Health to have one. Dr. Inso informed the petitioner that Lilian would have to be transferred to another hospital. Dr. Inso then personally coordinated with the Muntinlupa Medical Center (MMC) which had an available bed.
Upon reaching the MMC, a medical team was on hand to resuscitate Lilian. Unfortunately, at around 10:00 A.M., Lilian passed away despite efforts to resuscitate her. At the request of the petitioner, Lilian's body was autopsied. Dr. Reyes concluded that the cause of Lilian's death was hemorrhage due to bleeding petechial blood vessels: internal bleeding. Based on the autopsy, the petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Family Care and against Dr. Inso for medical negligence. In their defense, Dr. Inso and Family Care presented Dr. Inso, and expert witnesses Dr. Celso Ramos and Dr. Herminio Hernandez.
Dr. Ramos submitted that the cause of Lilian's death was hemorrhage due to DIC, a blood disorder that leads to the failure of the blood to coagulate. The RTC rendered its decision awarding the petitioner damages, attorney's fees, and the costs of the suit.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Dr. Inso and Family Care were negligent in caring for Lilian before, during, and after her appendectomy and were responsible for her death; and
2. Whether or not that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to this case.
RULING:
1. Whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. This is a basic legal principle that equally applies to civil and criminal cases. In a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff has the duty of proving its elements, namely: (1) a duty of the defendant to his patient; (2) the defendant's breach of this duty; (3) injury to the patient; and (4) proximate causation between the breach and the injury suffered. In civil cases, the plaintiff must prove these elements by a preponderance of evidence. The expert witness must be a similarly trained and experienced physician.
care that Dr. Inso was expected to observe nor assessed Dr. Inso's failure to observe this standard. His testimony cannot be relied upon to determine if Dr. Inso committed errors during the operation, the severity of these errors, their impact on Lilian's probability of survival, and the existence of other diseases/conditions that might or might not have caused or contributed to Lilian's death. On the other hand, the respondents presented testimonies from Dr. Inso himself and from two expert witnesses in pathology and surgery.To our mind, the testimonies of expert witnesses Dr. Hernandez and Dr. Ramos carry far greater weight than that of Dr. Reyes. The petitioner's failure to present expert witnesses resulted in his failure to prove the respondents' negligence. The preponderance of evidence clearly tilts in favor of the respondents. 2. Res ipsa loquitur is not applicable when the failure to observe due care is not immediately apparent to the layman.
The petitioner cannot invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to shift the burden of evidence onto the respondent. Res ipsa loquitur, literally, "the thing speaks for itself;" is a rule of evidence that presumes negligence from the very nature of the accident itself using common human knowledge or experience.
This doctrine is used in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge. The rule is not applicable in cases such as the present one where the defendant's alleged failure to observe due care is not immediately apparent to a layman. These instances require expert opinion to establish the culpability of the defendant doctor. It is also not applicable to cases where the actual cause of the injury had been identified or established. While this Court sympathizes with the petitioner's loss, the petitioner failed to present sufficient convincing evidence to establish: (1) the standard of care expected of the respondent and (2) the fact that Dr. Inso fell short of this expected standard.
Settlement of the estate of deceased