Facts:
Petitioner Hilaria Bagayas is found to be the legally adopted child of Maximino and Eligia. This fact was established by the RTC of Tarlac when petitioner instituted an action for partition and annulment of sale of a purportedly falsified deed of sale (which resulted to the issuance of TCT Nos. 375657 and 375658) executed by the said parents in favour of their biological children, Rogelio and Orlando. The falsification pertains to the forgery of Eligia’s signature as it was alleged that it is impossible for her to sign the deed as she was already dead the time it was executed. The RTC ruled that Eligia's signature thereon was a mere surplusage, as the subject lands belonged exclusively to Maximino who could alienate the same without the consent of his wife.It was further held that even though petitioner is an adopted child, she could not ask for partition of the subject lands as she was not able to prove any of the instances that would invalidate the deed of absolute sale. Also, the action for annulment of sale was improper as it constituted a collateral attack on the title of Rogelio and Orlando.
A motion for reconsideration wasdenied by the RTC through a resolution. Petitioner did not appeal the Resolution and so, it became final. The petitioner then instituted twin petitions before the same RTC for the amendment of TCT Nos. 375657 and 375658 to include her name and those of her heirs and successors-in-interest as registered owners to the extent of one-third of the lands covered therein. The petitions were dismissed on the ground of res judicata.
Issue: Whether the declaration by the trial court that petitioner is indeed the adopted child of the deceased adoptive parents resulted to her right or interest to the subject lands thereby entitling her as co-owner to ask for partition in a petition for annulment of the falsified deed of sale. Held:
xxx While the RTC may have made a definitive ruling on petitioner's adoption, as well as the forgery of Eligia's signature on the questioned deed, no partition was decreed, as the action was, in fact, dismissed. Consequently, the declaration that petitioner is the legally adopted child of Maximino and Eligia did not amount to a declaration of heirship and co-ownership upon which petitioner may institute an action for the amendment of the certificates of title covering the subject land. More importantly, the Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in an ordinary civil action, for matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights.
Second. Petitioner cannot avail of the summary proceedings under Section 108 of PD 1529 because the present controversy involves not the amendment of the certificates of title issued in favor of Rogelio and Orlando but the partition of the estate of Maximino and Eligia who are both deceased. As held in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Valenzuela, the prevailing rule is that proceedings under Section 108 of PD 1529 are summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly not controversial issues.Relief under said legal provision can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or hat there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest. This is now the controlling precedent, and the Court should no longer digress from such ruling. Therefore, petitioner may not avail of the remedy provided under Section 108 of PD 1529.
G.R. No. 181359 August 5, 2013
SPOUSES CLEMENCIO C. SABITSANA, JR. and MA. ROSARIO M. SABITSANA, Petitioners,
vs.
JUANITO F. MUERTEGUI, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact DOMINGO A. MUERTEGUI, JR., Respondent.
Facts:
An unnotarized Deed of Sale was executed by Alberto Garcia in favour of Juanito Muertegui over a parcel of unregistered land located in Biliran, Leyte del Norte in 1981. Juanito;s father Domingo Muertegui, Sr. And brother Domingo Jr. Took actual possession of the lot and planted thereon coconut and ipil-ipil trees. They also paid the real property taxes on said lot. However, in the year 1991, Garcia sold the lot to the Muertegui family lawyer, Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr., through a notarized deed of absolute sale. The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds and a new Certificate of Title was thereafter issued in the name of Atty. Sabitsana. The heirs of Domingo Sr., when the latter passed away, applied for registration of the lot under the Public Land Act. The same was opposed by Atty. Sabitsana.
Issue:
1. Whether the action to quiet title is lodged with first level courts considering the fact that the assessed value of the land is only Php 1,230.00.
2. What law applies to the case at bar? Is it Article 1544 of the New civil Code or Act 3344? 3. Pursuant to the proper law applicable to the case at bar, who, then is the rightful owner
of the subject lot? Held:
1.xxx an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court,an action to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC.
It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners’ August 24, 1998 letter-opposition to respondent’s application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent a cloud from being cast upon his application for a title, respondent filed Civil Case No. B-1097 to obtain a declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for declaratory relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.
2.What applies in this case is Act No. 3344, as amended, which provides for the system of recording of transactions over unregistered real estate. Act No. 3344 expressly declares that any registration made shall be without prejudice to a third party with a better right.
3.Respondent has a better right to the lot.
The sale to respondent Juanito was executed on September 2, 1981 via an unnotarized deed of sale, while the sale to petitioners was made via a notarized document only on October 17, 1991, or ten years thereafter. Thus, Juanito who was the first buyer has a better right to the lot, while the subsequent sale to petitioners is null and void, because when it was made, the seller Garcia was no longer the owner of the lot. Nemo dat quod non habet.
The fact that the sale to Juanito was not notarized does not alter anything, since the sale between him and Garcia remains valid nonetheless. Notarization, or the requirement of a public document under the Civil Code, is only for convenience, and not for validity or enforceability. And because it remained valid as between Juanito and Garcia, the latter no longer had the right to sell the lot to petitioners, for his ownership thereof had ceased.
Nor can petitioners’ registration of their purchase have any effect on Juanito’s rights. The mere registration of a sale in one’s favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor was no longer the owner of the land, having previously sold the same to another even if the earlier sale was unrecorded. Neither could it validate the purchase thereof by petitioners, which is null and void. Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Our land registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has.
G.R. No. 200858 August 7, 2013
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, PETITIONER,