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Text 1 tends to be adduced in support of the standard interpretation. However, this is not the only way of translating G (here quoted again

for ease of reference), and a different translation will support the standard interpretation much less.

[G]: VII.12.1153a7-15 [1] ἔτι οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινές φασι τὸ τέλος τῆς γενέσεως· [2] οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, [3] ἀλλ’ ἐνέργειαι καὶ τέλος· [4] οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· [5] καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. [6] διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, [7] ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως, ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴνἀνεμπόδιστον. Text 1* [T1*]: VII.12.1153a7-15

[1] Further, it is not necessary that there be something else better than pleasure, in the way people say the end is better than coming to be. [2] For not all pleasures are comings to be, or are accompanied by a coming to be, [3] but rather they are activities, and an end, [4] nor do they occur because a coming to be is in train but because capacities are being put to use; [5] and not all pleasures have something else as end, but only those involved in the bringing to completion of one’s nature. [6] Hence it is not right to say that pleasure is a perceived process of coming to be; [7] rather one should say that it is the activity of a natural disposition, and replace ‘perceived’ with ‘unimpeded’.26 _{(tr. Rowe)}

26 _{Rowe translates G7 as ‘it is an activity of a natural disposition, and replace} ‘perceived’ with ‘unimpeded’.’ (my emphasis). Nothing in the Greek corresponds to ‘an’ (cf. T. Irwin 1999:270). The difference between the stronger reading adopted in the text and Rowe’s (and Irwin’s) rendering is that on the stronger reading, all unimpeded activities of a natural state are pleasures, whereas on the weaker reading only a certain kind of unimpeded activities are pleasures. I will justify this decision in §3.5.1.

Support for the standard interpretation, as we saw, might be found in G2 and G3. However, it is not crucial for Aristotle’s argument that no pleasure should be a coming to be. All he needs to show is that not all pleasures are a coming to be. Since Aristotle is very conservative here, trying to make only minimal changes to what others have said (as is clear from G7), it would perhaps be unexpected if he were to claim that no pleasure is a coming to be, seeing that this is not required for his argument. The Greek can bear this out: if we do not restrict the scope of the quantifier (πᾶσαι) in G2 to the second conjunct only, we might translate it as e.g. Rowe: ‘not all pleasures are comings to be, or are accompanied by a coming to be…’27 _{If this is}

the correct translation, then Aristotle implies that there are some pleasures which are processes of coming to be - and this would be just those pleasures mentioned in G5.28

Moreover, the crucial phrase that pleasures are activities and an end (G3) does not necessarily support the standard interpretation. It would support it only if it were the case that only complete activities could be an end. However, this is not the case: in Met. 9.8.1050a4-b3 where Aristotle tries to show that actuality is prior to potentiality, Aristotle is happy to point out that activities are ends (relative to states), regardless of whether they are complete or incomplete. Building, the prime example for an incomplete activity, is said to be more of an end than the capacity to build because it is closer to the house, the product of building (1050a23-34).

27 _{Pace Gauthier 1970:795 who claims that the Greek cannot mean this. This} assessment seems biased by his interpretation.

28 _{There is, thus, no need to have Aristotle speak in G5 about incidental pleasures.} This would at any rate be dialectically unwise, since Aristotle tries to make his case for proposing a definition of his own where this definition captures the pleasures in restorative processes only incidentally.

The contrast required for Aristotle’s argument in G and T2 is between state and activation of the state, not between complete and incomplete activities. Aristotle’s opponents obviously assign great importance to states, including natural states, as they are the primary bearers of value.29 _{The only activity related to a state acknowledged}

by the opponents is a coming to be of the state - which is why pleasure, not being a state, would turn out not to be good itself. The opponents have apparently overlooked that the coming to be of a state is not the only activity relevant here, but that there is also the use of a state. Aristotle reminds them of this 1152b33 (T2.1). This oversight seems to be at the root of their misguided account of pleasure: pleasure is always found in the use of a state, not in its coming to be (G4), which is why he ventures to replace the Platonic definition with DEF. This point does not at all require to assume that the use of a state should be a complete activity. To account for G3, all that Aristotle needs to claim is that the activation or use of a state is an end, and if pleasure is such an activation, it will be an end.30

So, instead of supporting the standard interpretation, G and T2 would seem to lend support to an interpretation according to which there is no significant distinction between complete and incomplete activities. What is significant is that pleasure should be found in the activity of a certain state (in DEF it is a natural state). In other words, the texts seem to support an alternative interpretation:

29 _{Remember, in the Philebus Socrates and Protarchus seek to identify ‘the state} (hexis) or disposition (diathesis) of the soul that can render life happy for all human beings’ (11d4-6).

30 _{In Met. 9.8.1050a9-10 Aristotle maintains that the activity of a state is the end; it is} for the sake of the activity that the state is had. Among the examples to illustrate this point is building, an incomplete activity: people have the art of building (a

[ALTERNATIVE*] i) there is no exclusive contrast between coming to be and activity in EN VII.11-14; ii) pleasure (properly speaking) is a certain activity; iii) some pleasures are comings to be.