It is helpful in understanding Hobbes’ account of volition that it be examined within the context of his general economy of the mind. There are three broad concepts that act as tools and constraints giving shape to Hobbes’ picture of mind, and thereby, of volition: materialism, empiricism, and the New Science. From within this
framework, a model of mind emerges that exhibits telltale features that are shared with other Modern empiricist, New Scientist accounts.
Recall that Hobbes believes that everything is matter in motion. For Hobbes, the particles out of which everything is comprised behave according to deterministic and universal laws of nature. Hobbes’ commitment to materialism is an expression of a metaphysical commitment that is logically separate, though consistent with, his
to the New Science. He affirms that motion operates in a mechanical fashion based on contact, and this is consistent with the empiricist orientation toward the senses as the source of knowledge.
Hobbes’ empiricism is expressed in his foundational belief that everything that is in the mind was first in the senses. Unlike Descartes, Hobbes orients himself toward
sensory experience as a source for, and foundation of a theory of knowledge. Because the sensory is fundamental for knowledge for Hobbes, the sensory organs and by extension the body, are directly implicated in the development of knowledge. This contrasts sharply with the rationalist orientation away from the senses as a source and foundation for a theory of knowledge. This difference can be seen very clearly by looking at Descartes as a relevant foil to the empiricist position.
Descartes is “struck by the large number of falsehoods” he had accepted as true based on data from the senses; “I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once”
(Descartes, 12). The distrust Descartes feels toward the senses as a foundation for knowledge motivates him, according to his Meditations, to look for another source and foundation for knowledge. In search of this, he orients himself inward, asking himself if there is anything in his experience that cannot be doubted. This method of “radical doubt” is a step in Descartes’ search for knowledge in the ability to grasp truths through the understanding:
I now know that even bodies are not strictly perceived by the senses or the faculty of imagination but by the intellect alone, and that this perception derives not from their being touched or seen but from their being understood; and in view of this I know plainly that I can achieve an easier and more evident perception of my own mind than of anything else. (22)
Because of his initial move away from the body to establish knowledge, Descartes must eventually re-establish the connection between the “internal” and the
“external” worlds in a different way.
This difference in orientation toward the senses between Hobbes and Descartes deeply impacts the way each explains the relationship between mind and body, or corporeality. Descartes affirms a strong distinction between mind and body on the grounds that such a distinction can be “clearly and distinctly” perceived by the mind. In other words, he appeals to what can be thought to ground his account of the
relationship between mind and body. Because it is the mind’s powers that ground knowledge, what the mind can clearly and distinctly perceive can be trusted. But because Hobbes orients himself toward sensation as the foundation for knowledge, this appeal to what can be “clearly and distinctly perceived” by the mind is not justifiable, from his perspective. This important difference about what one can appeal to in order to justify a knowledge claim comes out in Hobbes’ Fourth Objection to Descartes’ Meditations on the nature of the human mind. In this objection, Hobbes again takes issue with Descartes on the matter of his distinction between mind and body. Descartes had presented the argument that, because he has a clear and distinct idea of the mind, and a clear and distinct idea of the body, it follows that the two are distinct. This is because anything that can be clearly and distinctly conceived of, God can create. Hobbes writes,
There is a great difference between imagining, that is, having an idea, and conceiving in the mind, that is, using a process of
reasoning to infer that something is, or exists. But M. Descartes has not explained how they differ…Now, what shall we say if it turns out that reasoning is simply the joining together and linking of names or labels by means of the verb ‘is’? It would follow that the inferences in our reasoning tell us nothing at all about the nature of things, but merely tell us about the labels applied to them; that is, all
in accordance with the arbitrary conventions which we have laid down in respect of their meaning. If this is so, as may well be the case, reasoning will depend on names, names will depend on the imagination, and imagination will depend (as I believe it does) merely on the motions of our bodily organs; and so the mind will be nothing more than motion occurring in various parts of an organic body (Descartes, 125-126).
In response, Descartes directs his reader to the proof of the “real distinction” in the Sixth Meditation. There, Descartes argues that the “real distinction” between mind and corporeality is “clearly and distinctly” perceived. In Descartes’ second reply he admits that metaphysically, if not conceptually, it is possible that there is no real distinction between mind and body when he writes,
[Hobbes] is quite right in saying that ‘we cannot conceive of an act without its subject’. We cannot conceive of thought without a thinking thing, since that which thinks is not nothing. But then he goes on to say, quite without reason, and in violation of all usage and all logic: ‘It seems to follow from this that a thinking thing is
something corporeal.’ It may be that the subject of any act can be understood only in terms of a substance (or even, if he insists, in terms of ‘matter’, i.e. metaphysical matter); but it does not follow that it must be understood in terms of a body. (123-124)
The contrast between Hobbes and Descartes highlights the differences that arise in their accounts of mind on the basis of their orientation toward sensation. Rather than mistrust the senses, Hobbes turns toward them in giving his account of mind. In order to expose how his empiricism, materialism, and New Science commitments eventuate in a very particular view of volition, I present Hobbes’ theory of
According to Hobbes, tiny particles make contact with the sense organs, and these motions work on the nerves and the brain to produce internal experience. They can be experienced variously—as conceptions, if they are thoughts in the head, or passions if they are in the heart. Passions and conceptions have different properties, and they function in distinct ways. Thoughts are images, and these images can be “marked” internally with symbols or words, and this is how they can be organized and recalled for later deliberation or reasoning. Hobbes thinks reasoning is
essentially syllogistic. He calls reasoning ratiocination or computation. Thoughts are objective in the sense that the symbols they represent can be made available for inter-personal evaluation. For instance, two men can argue between themselves over inferences made in an argument, and so long as they both follow correct rules of reasoning, they can come to agree on the same view. This is one way thoughts differ from passions. Because they are inherently subjective, passions are not similarly available for evaluation by others. For this reason feelings are not moral objects. Hobbes calls passion an internal “endeavour”, which means that passion solicits movement. They are essentially provocations to draw near something that is
pleasing, or away from something displeasing. When the movement is toward what is pleasing it is appetite; when the movement is away from that which is displeasing, it is aversion. At the experiential level, feelings are pleasures and pains. Passions create movement in the body, and supply the motivation necessary for action. In combination with thoughts, they create the full range of subtle and diverse human experiences, including glory, fear, dread, and hope.
According to Hobbes, many of the problems that we have in thinking about volition come from the mistaken idea that volition, or the will, is a faculty. In fact, volition is nothing more than the motion of particles. Perhaps because it motivates action, in Hobbes’ view volition is identified with passion, namely the last appetite or aversion that occurs before action takes place. Hobbes writes, “In deliberation the last
appetite, as also the last fear is called WILL (viz.) the last appetite will to do; the last fear will not to do, or will to omit. It is all one therefore to say will and last will”
wills. Hobbes writes,
Forasmuch as will to do is appetite, and will to omit, fear; the causes of appetite and of fear are the causes also of our will. But the
propounding of benefits and of harms, that is to say, of reward and punishment, is the cause of our appetite and of our fears, and therefore also of our wills […] (Elements of Law, 63)
Passions are not voluntary: “Appetite, fear, hope, and the rest of the passions are not called voluntary; for they proceed not from, but are the will; and the will is not voluntary” [italics mine] (Elements of Law, 62). Volition cannot be free from the universal laws of nature, and thus cannot be free from the consequences of previous events or actions. It can be free only in the sense of being unencumbered or
unconstrained. For example, a person in a locked room cannot voluntarily leave that room, constrained as they are by the lock. In this sense, the person’s will is not free. By way of contrast, a person in an unlocked room is “free” to leave, being
unconstrained. But there is no sense of freedom over and above this one; Hobbes is clear that volition, as well as everything else, occurs as the result of antecedent causes.20
To summarize: mind is particles in motion. Thoughts and passions interact to produce inner experience; they also work together to create deliberate action. Volition is passion, more particularly, the last appetite or aversion that takes place before action. Because the universe is lawful, everything moves according to these laws in combination with antecedent events or causes. Hobbes’ account of volition fits squarely and consistently within his general view of mind as it is informed and constrained by materialism, empiricism, and the New Science.