Prueba de hipótesis

The international system

Over the past century British power capacity has declined significantly, this is the context in which it has pursed its foreign policy. Having entered the 20th

century a great power with a significant empire, British foreign policy, initially defined by its attempts to maintain that power position, turned to managing its decline from power. It has done this against a background of having to defend, at first, major international commitments in both its formal and informal empire then, latterly, in terms of maintaining and securing its considerable international interests including its economic interests in the Middle East, and ensuring the security of these through bilateral ties, defence agreements and in encouraging the MEPP, seen as a key to stability in MENA.

As British power has declined, alliances have become central to maintaining security and allowing Britain to “punch above its weight”. The creation and

maintenance of the US-UK special relationship, despite the inherent imbalance of power has been a central tenet of UK foreign policy. Britain has continually sought to engage the US in the international arena in order to bolster its own interests. It was the Bevin government, quick to fear Soviet expansionism following World War Two, that sought to engage the US in taking a bigger role in the Middle East. Originally used to preserve British access to India and defend British interests, UK military bases in the Middle East were maintained long after their original purpose was gone in order to supplement the efforts of the US against the Communist threat and only decommissioned when they could no longer be justified either in terms of cost or maintaining Britain’s security. The commitment to the special relationship remained, different governments viewing it as central to their key priorities, for example, the Conservative Thatcher government seeing the US as central to European security. The Labour Blair government justified the decision to back the Iraq war, as necessary in order to ensure the US did not “go it alone”, and as an attempt to maintain some influence over US policy.

Despite the closeness geographically and the economic interdependence that ties Britain to Europe, in terms of security it would appear Britain still sees the US as its major ally which has implications for its relations in the Middle East. Close alignment to the US therefore impacts on how Britain behaves

internationally, and the close security relationship carries the risk of embroiling Britain in America’s often unpopular interventions in the Middle East.

Britain has also sought over time to balance its decline in power through its membership of multilateral organisations, in particular the EU, but also in the UN (specifically its position as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council), the IMF, the WTO and the G8. Membership of international organisations and alliances have been a key component intended to allow Britain to continue to exert influence on international relations allowing it to pursue and protect British interests above and beyond its economic and military capacities. Moreover, Britain’s role as a permanent member of the UNSC

arguably draws it into international crises, for better or worse, in a way that would not otherwise be likely for a mere middle power.

At the same time membership of these organisations provide a constraint to foreign policy behaviour as influence is indirect, and also membership requires member states accept and maintain certain agreed upon norms. Additionally, to act through these organisations and alliances requires gaining cooperation and compromise from the other members, not always something within in Britain’s capacity to influence, and sometimes makes policy less effective. Reconciling policy when two allies or organisations are at odds with each other, when to prioritise which alliance or organisation depending on the issue at hand, and what to do when the interests of other member states within an organisation are completely at odds with what Britain sees as in its interests, is

an additional challenge to membership. Furthermore, making the wrong

decision can not only undermine Britain’s own position, but the credibility of the organisations of which it is a member. (Such was the case when the Blair government prioritised Britain’s alliance with the US over its duties as a responsible member of both the EU and UN). These interdependencies then bring with them their own influence on the foreign policy behaviour of Britain.

Together with Britain’s decline in status as a great power with the ability to pursue its goals unilaterally, these alliances and interdependencies have relevance when considering British behaviour in the Middle East. Whilst the methods of achieving them may have changed over the years, British national interests in the Middle East, as seen from Whitehall, have been fairly consistent from the realist perspective. There have been two overarching interests

governing British activity in the region, firstly control of the oil resource, secondly, the need for regional stability.24

Access to the immense oil and gas resources is a priority in terms of security, both of energy resources and economic interests. A core concern for security has been a priority, initially in the sense of its physical interests in the Middle

24 _{M Sedgewick, “Britain and the Middle East: In pursuit of eternal interests” in J Covarrubias, T}

Lansford (Eds), Strategic Interests in the Middle East: Opposition or Support for US Foreign Policy, (Aldershot, 2007) p3

East, latterly in terms of the threat to British security posed by international terrorism and always, in the general sense that maintaining stability in the Middle East protects British interests in that it is better for trade and the economy. Membership of alliances and international organisations has

impacted on how Britain has pursued its policies there, most important in this sense however, is the fact that high-level British involvement in such

organisations has dictated British involvement in the Middle East region. Britain’s status as a permanent member of the UNSC is not reflective of its current power status, for example, but to maintain its relevance and seat Britain must stay involved in the world, and be seen to be working toward resolution of global level issues including those involving the Middle East.

Britain in the Middle East, Regional Context

British foreign policy is driven by the need to protect and promote the national interest. While the scope of what is considered to be “national interest” may have become a more complicated and broader concept over time, central to British national interest, alongside the security of the state, is the protection of its economic interests abroad which, partly as a legacy of empire and British trading history, are extensive. For the most part protecting British interests has meant an active concern in maintaining peace and stability and in the Middle East, generally, this has led to policy designed to preserve the status quo. As a result, there have been numerous and repeated accusations that British

governments act only when their economic interests in the Middle East are threatened, rather than following a fair and even handed foreign policy for the best interests of the region itself (though the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive). This has impacted on the perception of how far Britain can behave as a credible partner in the Middle East.

A further consequence it that British foreign policy has been largely reactionary foreign policy, where action is only taken when a threat to the stability or status quo in the region is perceived which would be detrimental to British interests. This has given even more credence to criticisms that over the years Britain has had no Middle East policy or no consistent policy, as well as numerous criticisms that British policy in the Middle East is unethical or hypocritical. In maintaining the status quo and protecting its economic interests Britain has, for example, maintained relationships with questionable regimes it deems friendly to its interests. This has led to close bilateral relations and trade agreements with states which have questionable human rights records, whilst at the same time criticising other states with similar records but where British interests are not at stake. This behaviour has damaged the Britain’s reputation, and the behaviours it demonstrates allows other regimes in the area, such as the Syrian regime, to bolster their legitimacy by using this as an example of imperial arrogance.

The contemporary relationship Britain has with the Middle East, generally, and more specifically with Syria, has been built on and in many ways constrained by the events surrounding the origins of the modern state system in the region. The construction of this state system was considered, not in the light of what was good for the people inhabiting it, but in the first instance, Britain’s

immediate needs in terms of the British war effort, and in the second instance the longer term protection of British interests in the region and the Far East. In fact, it is the British role in the creation of the modern Middle East, and British machinations in the area as the “great power” in the region--until that mantle was passed onto the Cold War superpowers--that has continued to define relations ever since, both where relations are somewhat more friendly, with states such as Jordan, and more antagonistic, such as the relationship with Syria.

The relationship between Britain and Syria has, to a large extent, been defined by these flawed foundations despite the country never having been a British mandate. Arguably the Levant region, with the exception of Palestine, was never a primary strategic priority of Britain in its own right but only in so far as it affected other British interests in the area, for example, its relationship with Iraq or, more recently, Britain’s continued interest in the MEPP. This in itself resulted in a relationship between Britain and Syria which has been for the most part strained and at some points in the last century practically non-existent.

Memories of direct impact on Syrian history, of the British having broken their promises over “greater Syria” and the British role in the creation of the state of Israel have created an imperial legacy that has soured Anglo-Syrian relations from the start. The anti-imperialist mandate of Arab nationalism, championed by the Syrian regime and providing legitimacy for its rule, ensured that these strained relations continued.

On the occasions when the pursuit of the British interest has focussed on Syria it has tended to be as an adjunct to other more important imperatives, for example, to counter French or Soviet influence, to preserve access to Iraqi oil or the Suez Canal, to help progress the MEPP and facilitating an Israeli-

Palestinian settlement. The perception, not unfairly, being that consideration for the Syrian people in these affairs is at best an afterthought, and certainly less important than the policy priority itself. A lack of real interest in Syria and her people for their own sake, either economically or culturally in the same way as, for example, France cultivated in the years preceding it being awarded the Syria and Lebanon mandate, has led to a dysfunctional relationship. This in many ways has benefitted successive Syrian regimes evoking Arab nationalism as a means to legitimise their rule, more than it has furthered the interests of United Kingdom.

Elites; the construction of national interests and world view.

In Britain, foreign policy is traditionally seen to be an ‘elite’ arena of policy making in which relatively few people have any input and where there is less political argument in contrast to what is seen in domestic politics. Some of this stems from the nature of foreign policy where often information is limited, access to intelligence is restricted and decisions are made very much in secret. For example, Mrs Thatcher’s decision to allow US Air Force to use bases in Britain when carrying out bombings on Libya25 _{was a decision taken by and}

known of by Mrs Thatcher and only a few close advisers (at least until after the event). In Blair’s government it is alleged a number of foreign policy decisions were formed by a close-knit group of advisors and selected ministers on key issues outwith the more rigid Cabinet process, so much so his way of working was labelled by some observers as a “democracy”26 _{or “sofa style}27_”

government.

British foreign policy decisions are taken in light of what is seen, or at least asserted, by policy makers to be the national interest, leaving aside the extent to which these perceptions are shaped by the personal or political interests of the decision-makers. In Britain the structure of politics is such that it is the government of the day that defines British national interest, through their

25 _{R Ware, “Case Study II: the Libyan rain” in Carstairs & Ware (eds) Parliament and}

International Relations (Buckingham, 1991) p103

26 _{R Hefferman, “The Blair Style of Central Government” in Dunleavy, Hefferman, Cowley, Hay}

(Eds), Developments in British Politics, (Basingstoke, 2006) p26

privileged access to information and their perception of the international system, and their estimation of the power Britain can bring to bear through various alliances and membership of international institutions.

A fundamental factor in this is the perception that Britain should have a role in the world. Britain’s status as a great power has declined over the past century as its economic and military resources diminished, this saw Britain’s physical withdrawal from its empire with policy designed around managing this. Yet the idea still held by many elites of this world role has constrained Britain from a substantial withdrawal from world affairs.

The strength of this perception was still evident after almost three decades of decline when the recommendations of the Berrill Report which reviewed British overseas interests, published in 1978, were rejected by the government. This recommended a significant realignment of British interests; that a large amount of resources in pursuit of the Commonwealth idea was unnecessary; that

Britain, a European power on par with three other medium-sized countries in the EC, would increasingly pursue its interests through influencing the policies of that organisation; a refocus away from non-Communist developed countries where there was really no requirement for them meant there should be

reductions in diplomatic staff abroad; and a reduction in the deployment of defence staff overseas amongst other recommendations. The general thrust of

the review called for a great reduction in Britain's international presence and was unpopular both within and outwith Parliament, and was rejected by the Government which stated that British interests extended around the world and it had to defend and promote its interests overseas28_{. A constructivist analysis}

of this elite discourse, and its dissemination via the press, would go further in understanding what Britain takes to be its “national interest” than a mere examination of geopolitics.

This idea that Britain has something “unique and exceptional” to contribute29

holds sway in regard to its relations with the Middle East. In particular, the belief Britain has a shared history and understanding with the countries of the Middle East. This, the argument goes, gives the British government both a unique role in and a responsibility to the region, thus there is an expectation that Britain has a role to play in events in the Middle East. This is evident, for instance, with regard to the peace process. Despite, or because, of the British role in the creation of Israel there is the perception among certain elites of a continuing responsibility and of a unique understanding of the parties involved. At the same time there is the recognition that Britain does not have the

capacity, alone, to make progress on the peace process with the prevailing opinion being that the US needs to be kept involved. This concept was

28 _{J Coles, Making Foreign Policy, (London: 2000) p78}

29 _{L Freedman, “Britain in the world”, Freedman & Clarke (eds) Britain in the World (Cambridge,}

demonstrated in Britain's behind the scenes involvement in the 2000

negotiations with Peter Hain describing Britain’s “unique credibility” from being close to both the Palestinian and Israeli leadership at the time.30

It is important, also, to recognise the importance of the school of thought policy makers most relate to as this informs their policy decision. British elites have often been criticised as being from the Realist school, of taking a pragmatic realpolitik approach to foreign policy making. The Cold War period can be seen in this light, with the Western bloc locked in a balance of power battle against the Soviets. Yet Britain is one of an ever growing number of liberal democratic states and for many the end of the Cold War signalled a victory for liberal democracies.

Traditionally Labour elites are associated with the tenets of liberal internationalism, that is:

 States share common interests and values in mitigating worst effects on international anarchy by building international institutions to regulate state interaction

 All states obligation to forgo pursuit of narrow national interests and work toward common good

 Foreign policy should be based upon democratic principles and universal norms

 Collective security systems represent a more stable and constructive approach to international affairs than balance of power theories

 Anti-militarism

 Belief in solidarity between workers of the world31

The practicality and interpretation of these liberal assumptions have been a source of debate for the Labour party.32 _{In terms of foreign policy Blair’s}

government did, however, go further than just nodding in the direction of this world view particularly regarding the first four assumptions. Explicitly rejecting the idea of realpolitik as a way to guide foreign policy decision making, Foreign Secretary Cook quick to set out his vision “ethical dimension” to British foreign policy. This gave rise to the idea that New Labour would bring a new outlook to British foreign policy not simply based on security and pursuit of national interest.

There are risks of overestimating the effect this actually had on British foreign policy. The most prevalent criticism being that not much of Labour’s actual