ANÁLISIS DE VIABILIDAD
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For C. Wright Mills (1959: 6) the ‘power elite’ is a minority of individuals that occupy key positions in institutions that hold major national power.He writes:
Within American society, major national power now resides in the economic, the political, and the military domains. Other institutions seem off to the side of modern history, and, on occasion, duly subordinated to these).
It is that position at the apex of economic, military and political institutions that enables them to make decisions of major consequence and ensure that their interests prevail over all others (Mills 1959: 3-4, 6). Members of the power elite – chosen through co-optation and socialization – move within and between these three interlocked institutional structures. This interchangeability of power positions is based on bureaucratic requirements that resulted in the production of an almost uniform world view among them (Mills 1959: 8, 283, 287, 289). With this emphasis on institutional factors Mills highlights that the elite are not simply those who have the most, but those who are in positions that enable them to exercise power. Mills also considers and locates other conceptions of the elite – “the similarity of its personnel, and their personal and official relations with one another, upon their
38 This was brought to my attention by William Case (2003) who in his article Interlocking Elites in
Southeast Asia pointed out that many aspects of Mills’ power elite conform to Southeast Asia’s, including Indonesia’s, national elite.
social and psychological affinities” – within his definition of the power elite. Thus, “origin, career, and style of life of each of the types of circle whose members compose the power elite” do inform “the personal and social basis of the power elite’s unity” (Mills 1959: 278).
Mills, however, insisted that there were divisions and quarrels among the parts of the power elite. Within the power elite, he argued, "factions do exist; there are conflicts of policy; individual ambitions do clash" (Mills 1959: 283). Nevertheless, he believed that the "internal discipline" and the "community of interests" of these factions and individuals were more powerful than the divisions among them (Mills 1959: 283). Thus, Mills did not think of the power elite as a homogenous or coherent group. Rather, there are struggles of dominance among the instituted elite and their over time shifting interests (Mills 1959: 276, 277).
As pointed out by Case (2003) various aspects of Mills’ power elite thesis can also be applied to Indonesia’s elite. In particular, this applies to the interlocking of positions across institutions as well as Mills’ perception of the elite not as a cohesive group but divided by a diversity of interests. Indeed, numerous scholars have highlighted that the Indonesian elite has never been fully unified and that factions within the elite have always existed (Crouch 1979; Robison and Hadiz 2004: 26-7; Winters 2011; Barker 2008; Case 2009: 656; Slater 2006: 212). During the authoritarian New Order, elite fractions frequently plotted against one another, and, at times, also worked to undermine or confront Suharto’s power. However, Suharto was very skilful in managing the elite:
Suharto first nurtured factional rivalries between different elites, dividing military generals, top bureaucrats and business tycoons along functional, religious and ethnic lines. However, he then dispensed patronage and sanctions in ways that dampened leadership challenges and inter-elite struggles (Case 2000: 55)
Indonesia’s post-authoritarian elite is more heterogenous and dispersed than during the New Order. In particular, decentralisation and elections have enabled more diverse sections of the Indonesian elite to gain powerful positions (Barker 2008: 537). The elite – either fractions or individuals – is in contestation, but within boundaries since all of them fear nothing more than their removal from power. Based on overwhelmingly pragmatic reasons, the Indonesian elite constantly defines and re- defines relations within the elite and between the elite and non-elites. In order to defend their status and interests against each other the elite forms alliances “that range across ruling parties, bureaucracies, military forces, and business entities, they do so in order to counter similar alliances that are arrayed against them, often instigating bitter, even murderous factionalism” (Case 2003: 250).
Moving between the institutions or simultaneously occupying key positions in various institutions as pointed out by Mills is not uncommon for the Indonesian elite. In the case of Indonesia, which transformed from an authoritarian state to a democracy, the elite not only shifted positions between pre-existing institutions but also entered the newly established democratic institutions. In the course of democratisation, power was redistributed among different institutions. Amongst the institutions whose power increased in relation to the government are political parties, the parliament and the media. In contrast, the military’s power decreased.
This triggered some former military elites to move to other more powerful institutions. There are various examples of military men who entered politics. The most prominent examples are Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Wiranto and Prabowo Subianto, each of whom established their own political party.39
In addition to moving between institutions, some members of the Indonesian elite are simultaneously businesspeople and politicians. The rise of businesspeople occupying key positions in political parties is no coincidence given the large cost of election campaigns. Indeed, in 2009 politicians with business backgrounds made up 54 per cent of the DPR (Mieztner 2013: 95). A similar situation can be observed in political parties where key positions are held by businesspeople. For example, in 2005 Soetrisno Bachir, a batik entrepreneur from Central Java, was elected as new PAN chairman. In the same year, Pramono Anung, former CEO of Yudistira Group, a mining and energy enterprise, became PDI-P’s new secretary general. Arifin Panigoro, founder of the oil company Medco Energi Internasional, and former Lippo Bank executive Laksmana Sukardi are further examples of businesspeople turned politicians who became key figures in the PDI-P.
39 This move enabled these three individuals, after their retirement from the military, to have a say in
the parliament and also to run for presidency or vice-presidency. The Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat), Yudhoyono’s presidential vehicle, was established in September 2001 (Partai Demokrat, n.d.). Having only ranked fifth in the 2004 legislative elections (7.5 per cent of the vote), it came first in the 2009 legislative elections (26.8 per cent of the vote). Despite its varied success in these legislative elections, Yudhoyono was successful in both presidential elections (Lansford 2014: 643-44). After being Golkar’s presidential candidate and Megawati’s running mate in the 2004 elections, Wiranto established Hanura in 2006 as his own ‘presidential vehicle’ (Lansford 2014: 645) after his failed bid in 2004 to win both the Golkar chairmanship and internal support for his presidential candidature (The Jakarta Post, 25 March 2014). Prabowo founded Gerindra in 2008 (Lansford 2014: 645). In the 2009 parliamentary elections Gerindra and Hanura won 4.5 per cent and 3.8 per cent respectively (Sherlock 2009). Although Wiranto and Prabowo had been unsuccessful in the presidential elections, Hanura and Gerindra gained a place in parliament and established themselves as opposition parties (Lübke 2010: 85).
The position of Golkar Chair, for example, has been held since 2004 by indigenous business tycoons, namely Jusuf Kalla and Aburizal Bakrie (Sugiarto 2006). The 2009 Golkar chairmanship elections – within which the price for one vote was estimated at between Rp 500 million and Rp 1 billion (Kompas.com, 6 September 2009) – was contested between two politico-businessmen, Aburizal Bakrie and Surya Paloh, each of whom owned a media company and utilized those to their advantage.
Furthermore, Mills also anticipated the importance of the mass media in the political campaign for office when stating “the politician must rely on the mass media, and access to these media is expensive.” During the 2004 presidential campaingn the Yudhoyono-Kalla team, for example, had spent Rp 20.84 billion on adverstising in television and print media (Badoh and Djani 2006: 97). This amount increased to Rp 232.58 billion when Yudhoyono paired with Boediono for his re- election in 2009 (Badoh and Dahlan 2010: 150-1). Crucially, however, Mills (1959: 315) links the rise the power elite rise with the transformation of the public into a mass-like society and argues that the mass media, i.e. the elite’s increased power over the media, were among those factors that contributed to this development:
[T]he media, as now organized and operated, are even more than a major cause of the transformation of America into a mass society. They are also among the most important of those increased means of power now at the disposal of elites of wealth and power; moreover, some of the higher agents of these media are themselves either among the elites or very important among their servants. )
This statement not only states that the media are recognized and used by the elite as a means of power. It also implies a linkage between the media and the elite, and is thus questioning the media’s democratic functions. In the Indonesian context, clear
distinctions between the politico-business elite and media organizations are sometimes impossible. This is particularly the case if the media owner holds a political office or has been presidential candidate. The nature of Indonesia’s transition to democracy and the legacy of its socio-political history have produced special patterns of relationships between the media and the elite. In many cases the actors involved are the same organisations – and are even the same individuals – as under the New Order. In order to fully explicate this, the following section begins with an overview of the New Order media before elaborating on the various forms of media-elite linkages in post-authoritarian Indonesia.