Pruebasde hipótesis específicas

words, Moscow’s concerns about the Community’s economic and political successes, and the worries about disobedience by its allies, were to a large degree two sides of the same coin. All the same issues re-emerged in the mid- to late 1980s. There was another attempt to breathe new life into Comecon, partly to keep up with the prestige and power of the Community, and partly to prevent members from abandoning this alliance. A rejuvenated CMEA was often seen as the foundations for the Eastern section of the new European structure. As late as December 1989, Gorbachev suggested that the first step towards a European economic area should be a mechanism of consultation between the EC, the EFTA and the CMEA.i®6

By this time, however, counting on a strong Comecon was clearly against all odds. Although the EC went from strength to strength whilst the Eastern Bloc collapsed, it is remarkable that Soviet policy did not become defensive and antagonistic overall; this time the result of greater EC integration, in terms of Eastern Bloc cohesiveness, was to be the opposite of that in the 1950s and 1960s. By the summer of 1988 the CMEA had signed a Joint Declaration with the EC, and the USSR was soon to follow with a Trade and Cooperation Agreement in December 1989 (see Chapter Two). Despite the incalculable loss of the East European buffer zone. New Political Thinking still prevailed.

There was, of course, an increase in conservative opposition to the passivity of Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe, as there was towards the acceptance of the establishment of the Single Market. Nonetheless, Gorbachev’s government seemed to have come to the conclusion that trying to create a fuss over the Single Market would destroy much that had been achieved in improving the Soviet Union’s image in Europe, and would have been unlikely to have achieved much in any case. The chances of rapid positive results of the Kremlin’s European policy had to be over-emphasized and the risks played down in order to keep domestic criticism to a minimum, and to show enthusiasm to the

West. In 1990, the head of IMEMO’s West European Department pointed out that the imminent Single Market, the EC’s increasing involvement in foreign policy and the relative decline of the international importance of NATO all made closer relations with the Community extremely desirable. Baranovskii added that ‘there is more than enough basis to assume that the EC will increasingly become the heart, the nucleus of the regional (all-European) international system’. This optimism about Europe was still reflected in government policy also, as shown by the Delors-Gorbachev meeting in the summer of 1991, and the negotiations for a more binding agreement between the EC and Russia.

The status quo was changed unrecognizably by the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of the new Russian government as its successor; but despite the growing tendency for New Realism in foreign policy, the approach to the Community was left much the same. This is one of many indications that the ‘New Realism’ of this period was centrist in many aspects, and not as anti- Western as foreign policy was to become in 1994, nor as defensive and/or distrustful as hard-line Realism as generally understood in Western international relations theory. During his visit to the European Parliament in April 1991, El'tsin had declared his intention to ‘repair a historical injustice’ and to ‘return to the European Home’. Although the intensity with which ElTsin has pursued the European goal has varied, the basic direction has not.

Attitudes remained positive about the Community even as it was about to become still more integrated through the fulfillment of the Maastricht Treaty. An article'm International Affairs of March 1993 gave a very flattering perspective of the evolution of the EC up to Maastricht, and was positive about the changes expected once that Treaty was enacted, stating that the increased powers of the Parliament and greater number of issues decided through qualified majority voting represented ‘a shift towards intensifying the supranational character of the European C o m m u n i t i e s A l t h o u g h noting the risk of greater isolation of

Vladimir Georgievich Baranovskii, 1990, op. cit., p. 13.

108 Valerii Gorskii and Elena Chebotareva, ‘Maastricht and Russia’, International Affairs,

The Russian Vision of Europe

Russia, they emphasize the stabilizing effect of the Union not only on West European economies, but consequently on intra-regional trade, as well as the likely increase in major pan-European projects in the field of energy, transport, communications and human resources development, ‘which are of great interest to Russia’. The established Westemizer Andrei Zagorskii continued supporting greater efforts to establish closer economic and political ties with the Community, pointing out in the summer of 1993 that the EC is not only an economic alliance, but the beginning of a West European political union, which will soon include more neutral countries as well, adding that ‘the degree of Russia’s future involvement in European affairs will greatly depend on how relations between her and the EC will d e v e l o p T h i s kind of pro-European feeling was still expressed by the Foreign Minister as late as October 1993, when he stated that ‘Russia’s choice is an all-European choice in favour of fi-eedom, private ownership and the rule of law’.m It should be pointed out that despite being much less unambiguously pro-integration with the EC than ‘New Thinkers’, Russian New Realists have tended to recognize that EC integration is inevitable, and that there is still much benefit to Russia to be gained fi*om closer political and economic relations with the Twelve (in this. New Realism differed from hardline Realism as commonly perceived in the West, which would minimize dependence on multinational organizations such as the EC). What had changed, as shall be examined further on, was the level of hope and trust in Western Europe’s capacity, and even willingness, to help.

Throughout the post-Soviet period, domestic criticisms of Moscow’s pro- Westem policies were greater than ever, following the shift to Eurasianism and even nationalist-populism. The general shift away from the Russia-Western world honeymoon was reflected also in attitudes towards the EC. Amongst an increasing number of public figures, there has been ever-louder evidence of what Baranovskii has called ‘residual superpower complex’; they could not resign

109 Ibid.

110 Moskovskie novosti, no. 24,13 June 1993.

themselves to Russia having to accept the role of mere regional power, on a par with that of the EC, nor to attempts to limit its geostrategic power in order to appease Western fears. The complaints examined above concerning the betrayal of Russia’s security interests, cheaply selling off Russia’s natural wealth, and granting the West control over Russia’s affairs, have all been directed against Europe. It is noticeable, however, that these attacks are almost invariably either based on petty issues (such as the complaints about selling black earth, mentioned earlier), or are very general and superficial. The attacks on the Community, and Russia’s attempts to form a closer relationship with it, have normally been delivered by people with no real knowledge of Western Europe. There are two main areas of serious complaint which are exceptions — the dangers of Russian isolation, and the prolongation of EC trade restrictions on Russian exports; both are detailed below.

The modern-day Slavophiles naturally abhor the idea of designing any aspect of the new Russia according to EC blueprints; Russia should count on its strong moral character and rich history, rather than follow plans which would make of her a second-class nation and a colonial supplier of raw m a t e r i a l s . Yet it is not only the anti-Western camp which has warned against reliance upon the Community’s example as the best road to growth. One commentator, having analysed the problems of Maastricht and found them minimal, nonetheless discarded the idea of closely comparing the CIS to the EC, as the levels of economic development are so different; ‘here there is no market, the level of technology is low and political culture is l a c k i n g ’ .

On the whole, however, there has been much positive analysis of the Community as a firamework which could be useful to Russia. Valerii Gorskii and Elena Chebotareva, for example, wrote that although the EC is obviously very different fi*om the CIS, the positive as well as the negative experiences of the EC should be borrowed by Russia and her partners, not only for their own use, but

As an example, see Mikhail Lemeshev, op. cit., pp. 119-20. Dmitrii Pogorzhelskii, New Times, no. 52, 1991, p. 30.

The Russian Vision of Europe

also to assist relations with the Community. Elena Volkova wrote that Russia’s European policy is also of importance in resolving domestic problems, as an analysis of the situation in Europe could help clarify and correct some of the Russian Federation’s contemporary problems, or at least provide suggestions as to how to solve them. She refers in particular to the question of sovereignty, not only that of Russia over the other republics, but within Russia itself. Baranovskii confirms that in the first two months after the 1991 coup there was much debate about the nature of the political union which should succeed the USSR, and that the EC was a major influence in this debate — ‘the EC model now represented a kind of maximalist strategy for preserving the union’. In particular, the concept of ‘variable geometry’ was interesting in the post-cow/? period. Baranovskii added that the EC structure should be copied on a pan- European scale in many spheres, to reduce the threat of violence in the same way as it had been reduced in Western Europe. This idea of spreading the formula of the Community, whilst implying that the EC itself need not expand, is shared by Karaganov^^^ and other top-level specialists. These calls to use EC experience as a way out of domestic political problems in Russia remained academic, however, and were not explicitly used by the Russian government.

For all the positive comments about West European integration, calls to quickly become sufficiently compatible with the EC and to aspire to full membership have been very rare. It has been suggested that Russia bring its export standards up to those of the EC,i^^ or even that the new legal system should be comparable with those of the C o m mu n i t y , b u t only in the interest of

Valerii Gorskii and Elena Chebotareva, op. cit., p. 52.

Elena Volkova, ‘Vneshnaia politika Rossii: evropeiskii kontekst’, MEMO, no. 9, 1992(ii), p. 20.

Vladimir Baranovskii, 1994, op. cit., p. 75.

117 Sergei A. Karaganov, ‘Towards a New Security System in Europe’ in Gorbachev and Europe,