Pseudoscalar transition form factors

In addition to, or perhaps as a result of, the uncertainties inherent in climate -relevant information, policy-making for climate adaptation is very much influenced by the way in which ‘climate adaptation’ is framed as a policy problem. In abstract terms, frames can be characterised as ‘organising principles that enable a particular interpretation of a phenomenon’ (de Boer et al., 2010: 502). They are decisive in knowledge production as part of research, policy development and policy implementation because they are of agenda-setting character. Frames allow certain questions to be asked while others get silenced (O'Brien et al., 2007).

In their formative paper ‘Framing Climate Change Adaptation in Policy and Practice’, Fünfgeld and McEvoy (2011), identify three levels at which framing takes place:

firstly, at a meta-level, in public discourses which reflect cultural values and belief systems; secondly, at a conceptual level, which is largely manifest in theories on adaptation processes and outcomes, most commonly in the scientific domain but which subsequently inform policy development and adaptation practice; and lastly, framing occurs at an operational level of adaptation practice, where any given framing is articulated in policy documents, consultancy reports, strategies or guidelines. At this latter level, the framing might appear in the written word as a question of ‘risk management’, or ‘disaster resilience’ or ‘climate vulnerability’, all of which influence the types of responses that will be considered. It stands to reason that the three levels of ‘framing’ are not mutually exclusive, and, moreover, frames that guide climate change adaptation can be explicit, i.e. openly discussed as part of a policy or program design, or they can be subconsciously represented without ever being reflected on or discussed (Fünfgeld and McEvoy 2011: 19). Due to the nature of framing as a social process discussed above, such implicit framing is common and manifests itself by:

x How adaptation is referred to (e.g. as ‘problem’, ‘challenge’, ‘opportunity’, or

‘process for increasing capacity’),

x Who is expected and permitted to make qualifying statements about adaptation (e.g. politicians, government staff, scientists, local residents),

x What questions are considered relevant and important (e.g. ‘what are the key climate change impacts?’; ‘how certain is climate change?’; ‘who and what is going to be affected by climate change?; or ‘who or what assets do we want to protect?’), and

x The range of answers considered appropriate (e.g. depending on underpinning values, professional traditions, and political risk involved).

(modified from de Boer et al., 2010 and cited in Fünfgeld and McEvoy 2011: 18) In other words, the way in which adaptation is framed is critically important to what information is considered relevant and necessary, the likely adaptation responses will be, who will be involved in making decisions around adaptation, and, crucially, who is responsible for financing adaptation processes or outcomes.

In Australia, the Productivity Commission’s draft report ‘Barriers to Effective Climate Change Adaptation’ (2012) framed climate adaptation very much as a problem of risk, much like any other risk:

Responding to change and managing risks are a normal part of daily life.

Adaptation to climate change can be thought of as a part of this ongoing process of risk management — identifying, evaluating and responding to changes in risks faced to minimise damage from harmful events and maximise gains from new opportunities. Generally speaking, households, businesses and other organisations are capable of managing the climate variability and the risks they face. This is because people have an incentive to assess the costs and benefits of taking action to mitigate the impacts of climate change on themselves (PC 2012: 5).

Once framed as such, the policy response is to rely on providing information and market signals to alert actors of the risks, on the assumption that private actors i.e.

the householder, the business owner, the investor etc. will react accordingly. Using this framing, and perhaps not surprisingly, the PC came to the conclusion that “most adaptation would occur without the need for government intervention” (PC 2012: 7).

However, as Fünfgeld and McEvoy contend (2011: 29), relying solely on private actors for achieving effective adaptation is difficult for a number of reasons, as outlined in Table 2, below.

Table 2. Barriers to market-based adaptation

Barrier Example

Uncertainty about climate change impacts affects the assessment of expected climate-related damages and the benefits of adaptation

Cost-benefit assessment results are inconclusive regarding financial and non-financial costs and benefits

Individual resource constraints in

understanding the nature of impacts on a system require collective action

High cost of developing climate change projections

Effective adaptation through market-based processes may be limited for non-traded public assets and goods

Supporting adaptation of biodiversity and jointly consumed ecosystem services

Resource constraints regarding

implementing adaptation actions, as much adaptation will draw on resources not held by the adapting actors themselves

Local adaptation action plans not being implemented due to resource constraints

Adaptation benefits may spill over to beneficiaries other than the actor making the change, which is as a systemic disincentive for private adaptation investment

Reducing agricultural water use from a pooled water resource increases water availability for other actors

Individual adaptation action may dislocate climate-related impacts onto other

stakeholders unable to take action

themselves and put them at increased risk

Protecting a coastal property from erosion by hard infrastructure may dislocate coastal erosion impact to neighbouring properties

Some climate change impacts require collective adaptive action in order to be effective but high costs and uncertainty prevent timely private action

A whole-of-catchment approach to reducing water runoff can have a significant effect on flood prevention whereas the effect of action by individual property owners may be limited Climate change impacts are distributed

unequally across space and social groups, leading to inequalities that markets and private action are unlikely to address sufficiently without regulatory intervention

Low income groups may suffer

disproportionately from an increase in food prices following extreme events (e.g. storms, hail, flooding)

Focus on one small part of a system can lead to maladaptation in other parts or systems

Increased use of pesticides to combat an increase in vector-borne diseases may lead to adverse environmental effects

Institutional barriers need to be removed before individual action can take place

Unclear governance arrangements over responsibilities for climate change adaptation prevent private action

Source: Fünfgeld and McEvoy (2011: 29).

Yet, once framed as essentially a problem of ‘risk management’, detailed exploration of where the market barriers in Table 2 might exist, and thus what role each level of government might play to overcome them, is necessarily shut down.

Interestingly, in the course of this project, it was clear that there are multiple framings of climate adaptation currently evident amongst Australia’s policy community and within official policy documents (see Case Studies 4, 5, 6, and 7). This may be expected, as adaptation as a policy problem and broader societal issue has only been recently prominent (relative to mitigation, Dovers and Hezri 2010), despite components of the issue (drought, flood, etc) being of longer standing concern. The most commonly used framings of adaptation are:

1. A hazards approach.

2. Risk management approach.

3. Vulnerability approach.

4. Resilience approach.

The consequences of these multiple framings are explored in Section 6 and in individual case studies. As is explained in Section 5, our project deemed the

‘resilience approach’ to be the only ‘frame’ that could hope to achieve robust, long term climate adaptation policies which respect the principles of ecological sustainable development. In taking this position, we are aware that this could be seen as a concession to a constructivist epistemology, whereas the dominant theory in practice in climate change reflects the epistemology of realism, which holds that there is no one frame or realm where universals exist and so action needs to be pragmatic, meaning it should be defined and pursued in context (Devitt 1984). We believe, however, that the realist approach taken in climate change reflects a greater emphasis on being seen to be taking multiple courses of action than on taking the most appropriate courses of action.

While a resilience frame is suited to the purpose here, we do not discount the usefulness of other framings for different purposes, where appropriate. A resilience approach has been argued to be complementary rather than oppositional to more deterministic, focused approaches (Fischer et al 2009): with resilience framing being most powerful for strategic and long term purposes, and approaches such as risk or optimisation suited to more focused and particular decision contexts within the broader strategic frame. As with the resilience approach adopted here, justification and specification of the framing is necessary given, for example, the multiple definitions of resilience that might be used (Botterill, in press) or many available risk assessment and management frameworks available.