The global-local news flow, as fashioned through Weibo, produces a “global
membership,” a collective belonging in which national interests are no longer the primary concern. The formation of global membership is established through retrospection and reflection upon the past, and journalists are its leading voices.
This global membership requires more rational and sympathetic attitudes toward the “others” of China, as liberal-leaning journalists and other social groups take the lead here in the development of the idea of what a global membership on Weibo might look like. Though it is still an expression of nation-based identity, it also reflects a strategy to contest the popular version of nationalism that is filled with radical and narrow-minded patriotism. In short, it promotes an idealized China that can be respected in global society.
Scholars in the past decade have pointed out that the Chinese media, especially the market-oriented ones, have been actively participating in the formation of popular nationalism since the 1990s. This state-led nationalism permeated the popular discourse through journalism and popular culture, and it profited from stirring up nationalist sentiments, particularly anti-Americanism (Lee, 2003). The Internet also played a
significant part in the popular version of nationalism, with some scholars (e.g. Liu 2005) believing that the Internet offers a space for alternative versions of nationalism in the face of a clash of national interests (such as in the anti-Japan protests in China). However, others hold a cautious attitude toward cyberspace, holding that it promotes radical nationalism rather than liberal democracy, such as the case of cyberspace reaction to the 1998 Indonesian Chinese-exclusion riots (Hughes, 2006).
Popular nationalism involves a xenophobic view of the other and specifically expresses hostility toward the Western world, particularly the U.S. It easily mobilizes large numbers of people to organize collective actions against the Western powers, whenever China experiences moments of crisis or remembers “national humiliation.” In contrast, in the new approach developed on Weibo, shared human value is considered more
important than the national interest in events that involve a conflict of interest between China and others, or disasters in other nations. Liberal-leaning Weibo users advocate for sympathy to others, regardless of national interests. Riots and other forms of violent activities targeting a certain “other” are not favored on Weibo.
Two cases that occurred during the course of my study illustrate the meaning of global
membership—the 10th anniversary of September 11 and the anti-Japanese riots during a
territory dispute in 2012. Global membership suggests sympathy across national boundaries, in which national interests are no longer the priority in understanding moments of crisis in other nations and national conflicts. That is, people should not celebrate other people’s suffering simply because they are not one of “us” and the nation they belong to is portrayed in the official discourse as that of “our enemy.” In Weibo’s
discussion of the 10th anniversary of the September 11 attack, most of the posts recalled the Chinese people’s collective applause of the attack on hearing the news ten years earlier. Now, liberal-leaning groups of Weibo users consider this kind of activity not only inappropriate but also shameful, seeing it as the product of the long-time indoctrination of official education and propaganda efforts that had emphasized the “Western anti-Chinese forces”—imagined enemies created by the state. As two posts argued:
Ten years ago, I was a junior college student. My classmates, on hearing the news, were applauding in the classroom. At that time I was also a
brainwashed young man, but during that moment, I started to feel that the applause was disgusting. It was actually a very important moment in my life. At least I began to realize that I couldn’t let my child become such a cold- blooded applauding onlookers (@Yekf, September 11, 2011).
Ten years ago, September 11, 2011, I was in high school. That evening everybody was studying in the classroom, and my teacher came and told us what had happened in the United States. I remember clearly that the whole classroom was filled with the sound of applause, including mine. Now when I think of this, I would say, at that time we were terrible (@Nanfangzhoumo XP, September 11, 2011).
What these two posts by Chinese journalists reflect are the changing attitudes toward the catastrophe over the past ten years, particularly the feeling of shame for the celebratory activities in which they participated in the past. Posts like these two were quite common
on Weibo in discussions of the 10th anniversary of September 11, a sign that the anti- American mentality in the public has gradually faded. Instead, more and more people have started to consider the disaster as not only relevant for Americans but also “a disaster of the whole human race” (@Yangjl, @zhangyh, September 11, 2011).
These examples illustrate a gradual change in the sense of collective identification among some Chinese people. People are considering the national-based identification
problematic, advocating identity based on a shared value system.
For liberal-leaning intellectuals, journalists, media practitioners, and some business elites, the hatred toward “American imperialists” is an irrational expression, a narrow-minded nationalism that results from patriotic education and a Cold War mentality. Such hatred is considered an uncivilized behavior of a nation and its people, and although it is still visible in Chinese public discourse, Weibo offers a place to contest it and to call for further reflection. Here are two examples:
Ten years later, now there are still people celebrating the attack. Conspiracy theory, class struggle, and hatred education have had a bad influence on several generations in China. These are characteristic of a closed and authoritarian society (@Wangwei, September 13, 2011).
I hope more people could write about the moment they heard the news of 911, as a way to remember the innocent victims and the day that changed the world. Whether we have a universal compassion and empathy for all human beings, whether we can freely report and express our opinions about things like 911, matter a lot to our own future (@Wangran, September 13. 2011).
These tweets argue that the only way that China and the Chinese people can be respected in a global society is to reflect upon the past, eradicate narrow-minded nationalism and hatred toward others, and show empathy toward others. These posts contest anti- American sentiments and popular nationalism, emphasizing the “universal values” that China should embrace. These posts have become more prominent with the increasing transnational mobility of Chinese citizens and accessibility of global sources.
The idea of global membership and the underlying “universal values” from which it derives are also reflected in the advocacy for a rational attitude toward other nations. The call for the “rational” expression of patriotic messages has become very popular during the new waves of anti-Japanese protests in multiple cities in China, taken in reaction to the escalating territorial dispute between the two countries that began in mid-August, 2012. Protests soon escalated to riots, as people started to smash Japanese-brand cars, restaurants serving Japanese food and stores selling Japanese products, using violence against Japanese citizens in China. Liberal-minded Weibo users pointed out that the riots in China were based on a simplified, one-sided, narrow-minded understanding of Japan and the territorial dispute between the two countries.46 According to these users, the riot was reminiscent of the Boxer Rebellion,47 the Cultural Revolution, and the rise of Nazi Germany in the past, all of which had been powerful in mobilizing huge numbers of people and causing large-scale riots in society. Liberal-leaning users strongly opposed
46 The territorial dispute between China and Japan involves the Diaoyu Islands (called Senkaku Islands in
Japan).
47 The Boxer Rebellion (or Yihetuan Movement) occurred in China between 1899 and 1901 in northern
China. The participants were mainly peasants. It supported the Qing court and mainly targeted foreigners, especially the Christian missionaries, as they believed the Western invasion was the cause of their loss of livelihood.
violence and extremist expressions—the hotbed of totalitarianism. As two users suggested:
The long-time education imposed the idea of hatred between nations, a distorted picture of the global world, and the wrong value system. The whole nation is xenophobic, with no respect for the rule of law, freedom, and
constitutionalism. The tradition of Boxers has been strengthened in the Cultural Revolution. Now nationalism is dangerous to the nation... (@Zhuzhiyong, September 15, 2012).
People asked me, as the descendant of an anti-Japanese war hero, why I wasn’t angry (about the Japanese). Many people are so outrageous that they even want to get weapons to occupy the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. I said, no, please don’t be excited. I have only one enemy—people who oppose human rights. I don’t care what citizenship he/she holds. Hitler also mobilized people with nationalism, but look at what happened… (@Longcan, September 15, 2012).
The first post situates the anti-Japanese riots today in a tradition that has lasted for a century—the extreme violence and xenophobia toward the “other,” especially Western society. While the Boxers in the early 20th century opposed the Westerners, especially Christian missionaries, the riots today reject the idea of “universal values” by using violence against ordinary citizens and their properties. The second post juxtaposes popular nationalism in China with the rise of Nazi Germany. The posts shows that regardless of the different historical contexts, there are some shared values (e.g. human
rights) that need to be placed higher than the nation-state and national interests,
suggesting that patriotism is always manipulated by the state to create obedient subjects for the interests of dictators.
However, the advocacy of rational behavior toward other nations is rooted in a strong national concern, aimed at promoting China as a respectful nation in the world. Scholar @ZWdewenzhang posted about the negative effects of the riots on China’s image in the global society:
Those who participated in the riots (beating, smashing, and robbing) in the name of “anti-Japanese” and “patriotism” were “invading China” and “doing harm to the country.” In the era of advanced Internet technology, these violent activities can reach worldwide audiences in a few seconds, causing the resentment of China in the global world, which may actually put China in a disadvantaged position in the territorial dispute (@ZWdewenzhang, September 15, 2012).
Posts like that above implicitly or explicitly point out that the riots brought shame to the Chinese when viewed by global media and other nations. In this sense the liberal-leaning users have an idea of what a nation China should be like, and they also have a strong desire of their nation to be fully respected globally. They argue that the only way that China can truly be respected in the world is to abandon the irrational mentality and narrow-minded nationalism derived from the past and to
embrace “universal values” and take the “route to civilization.” To behave rationally is a way to achieve this goal. As liberal-leaning groups embrace global membership, trying to “enlighten” the larger public by pointing out the long-time indoctrinated resentment over Western imperialism, the “enlightenment” they envision is premised upon a recognition of “universal values,” seen as an essential part of Chinese national identity in this globally connected world.