PUBLICACIÓN DE UNA VEZ SERVICIOS Y SOLUCIONES CARDÚ

judges.

ANS. - The import of the rule on voluntary inhibition of judges is that the decision on whether or not to inhibit is left to the sound discretion and conscience of the trial judge based on his rational and logical as- sessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case brought before him. It makes clear to the occupants of the Bench that outside of pecuniary interest, relationship or previous participation in the matter that calls for adjudication, there might be other causes that could conceivably erode the trait of objectivity, thus calling for inhibition. This is to betray a sense of realism, for the factors that lead to preference or predelictions are many and varied.

In the final reckoning, there is really no hard and fast rule when it

comes to the inhibition of judges. Each case should be treated differently and decided based on its peculiar circumstances. The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge. It is a subjective test the result of which the reviewing tribunal will not disturb in the absence of any manifest finding of arbitrariness and whimsicality. The discretion given to trial judges is an acknowledgment of the fact that these judges are in a better position to determine the issue of inhibition as they are the ones who directly deal with parties-litigants in their courtrooms. (People vs. Gallermo, G.R. No. 123546, July 7, 1998, 95 SCAD 579).

Q - A complaint was filed against a judge for reprehensible conduct in engaging in the, ,publication of a gossip tabloid, The Mirror, as editor and legal adviser and as a gossip- mongering columnist of a local newspaper, Sun Star Clark. Complainant alleged that respondent used his newspaper column to ventilate his biases or personal anger at people or institutions. For instance, when respondent failed to receive payment from the Office of the Governor for advertisement in exchange for a congratulatory messages in the maiden issue of The Mirror, respondent placed a blank space purportedly for the governor's message, and expressed contempt with a few lines underneath a picture of the governor. Complainant believes that respondent judge should not engage in active, sensational, and free-for-all journalistic writing because such act degrades the judicial system and compromises his impartiality as an administrator of justice. He likewise persistently attacked the governor for his movie-making activities.

Can the judge be dismissed for his acts? Why?

ANS. - Yes. The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. The personal behavior of a judge not only upon the Bench but also in

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his everyday life should be above reproach and free from the appearance of impropriety.

There is a difference between freedom of expression and compromising the dignity of the Court through publications of emotional outburst and destructive criticisms. Respondent's writing of active and vicious editorials compromises his duties as judge in the impartial administration of justice, for his views printed on newspapers reflect on his office as well as on the public officers that he challenges. From the standpoint of conduct and demeanor expected of a judge, resort to intemperate language only detracts from the respect due a member of the judiciary and becomes self- destructive.

Moreover, in persistently attacking the moviemaking activities of the provincial governor and repeatedly threatening to file an action against a public officer, respondent encourages litigation and causes dissension against the public officer concerned. As a judge, respondent's role is to maintain equanimity and not instigate litigation. This is not to say that one cannot question the improper activities of government officials if there are any. However, it is not proper for a judge to write publications of carelessly-worded editorials in local newspapers. (Benalfre J. Galang vs. Judge Abelardo H. Santos, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1197, May 26, 1999).

Q - After the hearing of the petition for bail, the court issued an order denying the same on the ground that the evidence of guilt is strong. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied, the court ruling that it has already clearly spelled out the grounds relied upon in the denial of the motion. The accused asked for the inhibition of the judge contending that because of the actuations of the judge, he has already become biased, hence, he stands no chance at all in court presided by the judge. Is the motion proper? Why?

ANS. - No. The orders denying the petition for bail and the motion for reconsideration do not sufficiently prove bias and prejudice to disqualify the judge under Sec. 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. For such bias and prejudice, to be a ground for disqualification, must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source, and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. Opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, as long as they are based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, even if found later on as erroneous, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. (Victorio Aleria, Jr. vs. Hon. Alejandro Velez, Jr., G.R. No. 127400, November 16, 1998, 100 SCAD 720, citing Webb vs. People, 85

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SCAD 66, 276 SCRA 243).

Q - A judge ordered the release of the accused knowing that the cash deposit for his bail was not yet sufficient. Is he liable for his act? Why?

ANS. - Yes, because the error was gross and patent violation of law and the rules on bail. While it is true that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision (Guillermo vs. Reyes, 58 SCAD 130, 240 SCRA 154), yet if the error is gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in evident bad faith, he may still be liable. The reason for this is that he is expected to have a more than cursory acquaintance with the rules on bail. Failure to follow basic legal commands embodied in the law and the rules constitutes gross ignorance of the law (Del Rosario, Jr. vs. Bartolome, 81 SCAD 281, 270 SCRA 645; Aurillo vs. Francisco, 54 SCAD 352, 235 SCRA 283) from which no one may be excused, not even a judge. (Evelyn De Austria vs. Judge Orlando D. Beltran, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1406, September 1, 1999).

Q - Maya judge be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he rendered? Why?

ANS. - No. As a rule, a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. To unjustifiably hold otherwise, assuming that he has erred, would be short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. The error must be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in evident bad faith. It is only in this latter instance when the judge acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance, that administrative sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this Court. (Evelyn de Austria vs. Judge Orlando D. Beltran, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1406, September 1, 1999; Panganiban vs. Judge Pablo B. Francisco, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-98-1425, November 16, 1999).

Q - Give examples of defenses of a judge charged with ignorance of the law.

ANS. - Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. (Evelyn de Austria vS. Judge Orlando D. Beltran, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1406, September 1, 1999, citing Guillermo vs. Reyes, 58 SCAD 130, 240 SCRA 154).

Q - Are the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity subject of disciplinary action? Is the rule absolute? Explain.

ANS. -No. As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are generally not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.

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(Morada vs. Judge Tayao, 48 SCAD 131, 229 SCRA 723, citing Louis Vuitton S.A. vs. Judge Villanueva, 216 SCRA 121; Mendoza vS. Villaluz, 106 SCRA 664). As has been stated in the recent case of Santos vs. Judge Jose Orlino, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1418, September 25, 1998, 98 SCAD 752:

"The fundamental propositions governing responsibility for judicial error were more recently summarized in 'In Re: Joaquin T. Borromeo,' 59 SCAD 1 [1995J, 241 SCRA (1995). There the Court stressed inter alia that given the nature of the judicial function and the power vested in the SC and the lower courts established by law, administrative or criminal complaints are neither alternative nor cumulative to judicial remedies where such are available, and must wait on the result thereof Existing doctrine is that judges are not liable for what they do in the exercise of their judicial functions when acting within their legal powers and jurisdiction. (Alzua, et al. vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308, 326; Sec. 9, Act No. 190). Certain it is that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders. (Rodrigo vs. Quijano, 79 SCRA 10). To hold, otherwise, would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. (See Lopez vs. Corpuz, 78 SCRA 374; Pilipinas Bank vs. Tirona-Liwag, 190 SCRA 834). The error must be gross or pat- ent, deliberate and malicious or incurred with evident bad faith. (Quizon vs. Baltazar, Jr., 65 SCRA 293)."

If an alleged error of a judge cannot amount to gross misconduct and bereft of any persuasive showing of deliberate or malicious intent to cause prejudice to any party, the administrative complaint against him insofar as the charge for gross misconduct is concerned, must be dismissed for want of factual basis. (Jewel F. Canson vs. Hon. Francis F. Garchitorena, et al., SB-99-9-J, July 28, 1999).

Q - An applicant for a position was told by the judge that in exchange for his signature on her employment, she would become his girlfriend. Thereafter, he went on to kiss her against her will. After learning that her application had been approved, he called her to his chamber and said that she was already his girlfriend. He went on to embrace her, kiss her, and touch her right breast. Can the judge be punished? Why?

ANS. - Yes, because not only did he fail to live up to high moral standards of the judiciary, he even transgressed to ordinary norms of decency expected of every person. The conduct of a judge, whether official or private, must be beyond reproach and above suspicion. A member of the Bench must not only be a good judge; he or she must also be a good person. (Dawa vs. De Asa, 96 SCAD 373, 292 SCRA 703). This is necessary so as not to erode the faith and confidence of the public in the judiciary.

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(Naval vs. Panday, 84 SCAD 691, 275 SCRA 654). In the final analysis, such faith and confidence is anchored on the highest standard of integrity and moral uprightness that judges are ex- pected to possess. As ruled in Junio vs. Rivera, Jr., 44 SCAD 308, 225 SCRA 688:

"All judges on all levels of the judicial hierarchy, from this Court down to the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Courts, are bound to observe the above exacting standards. There is however, a special reason for requiring compliance with those standards from those who are front liners of the judicial department. As such, a judge is the most visible living representation of the country's legal and judicial system. He is the judicial officer who on a day-to-day basis deals with the disputes arising among simple, rural people who comprise the great bulk of our population. He is the judicial officer who comes into closest and most frequent contact with our people. The judiciary as a whole and its ability to dispense justice are inevitably measured in terms of the public and private acts of judges in the grass roots level. It is essential, therefore, if the judiciary is to engage and retain the respect and confidence of our nation, that this Court insist that municipal judges and all other judges live up to the high standards demanded by our case law and the Code of Judicial Conduct, and by our policy."

The judge's lustful conduct was aggravated by the fact that he was the superior of the complainant. Instead of acting in loco parentis toward his subordinate employee, he took advantage of his position and preyed on her. (Ana May M. Simbajon vs. Judge Rogelio M. Esteban, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1162, August 11,1999, citing Talens- Dabon vs. Arceo, 72 SCAD 527, 259 SCRA 354).

Q - Will the retirement of a judge preclude the finding of any administrative liability on his part? Why?

ANS. - No. The retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the finding of any administrative liability to which he shall still be answerable. In Gallo vs. Cordero, 61 SCAD 956, 245 SCRA 219, it was said that since the court had this jurisdiction at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint it was not lost by the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of his case. The Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous implications. If innocent, respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation. (Villa Macasasa, et at. vs. Judge Fausto H. Imbing, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1470, August 16, 1999).

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