One of the primary characteristics of the Turkish modernization process, however, poses a serious obstacle to the various types of non-nation-based alternatives, that is, alternatives that go beyond the nation-state and nationalism. This characteristic can be described as an alienation of the intellectual currents and systems, (namely, Islamist, leftist, Kurdish and state) from the idea of accepting individual rights and liberties. In fact, liberalism is still a swearword among these political movements. As opposed to the Western modernization process, intellectual and political movements based on the individual, on his or her rights and liberties, have not taken root within the process of Turkish modernization. Where they have appeared, they have been all but wiped out. Modernization has developed in the context of ideological trends and currents of thought that have been based on collective identity, and the question of what this should be. Two basic political and intellectual movements, which emerged as a response to this question, had little room for the individual and his rights; for both of them it was necessary to create a collective ‘we’ and ‘the other.’ This phenomenon continues to a large extent today. This is a significant element in hindering the development of democratic alternatives.
During the nation-building process of the late 19th century, the borders of collective identity were formed in response to Western attempts to partition the Ottoman Empire. The main question was how to save a state that was undergoing collapse. The fundamental question in this regard was what were to be the main characteristics of the collective needed for the
survival of the state. To answer this vital question two main political movements emerged in the middle of the 19th century and are still current today. One movement formed along the lines of ‘progressive/reformers,’ the other, ‘reactionary/traditionalists.’ These are known popularly in Turkey today as the ‘barracks’ and the ‘mosque,’ respectively. But despite all of the serious differences between these two movements (and the debate was indeed experienced as a clash of civilizations on the question of whether Islamic or Western civilization would win), the sides do appear to have united on one point: recognition of some shared, homogenous elements which separated the ‘us’ from the ‘them.’ Individual rights and liberalism generally were rejected throughout this entire process by these opposing sides because they perceived these rights as damaging to the collective. The common characteristic of both movements was that they both developed only authoritarian alternatives, which aimed at internal homogenization.
We can observe how powerful similar tendencies have been during the second, current wave of nation building. The main problem of the collective sub-identities that have come about is that, in differentiating themselves from each other, their homogenous, collective characteristics are brought to the surface. The political options being advanced by such groups are incapable of going beyond political models in which their own sub-identities are central. Thus, in regard to the sub-identities which seek individual rights and liberties, we can say that they do not appear impor- tant. Just as this situation has raised the danger that society will be divided along the lines of the collective sub-identities, it also leaves the door open to new authoritarian alternatives, through the assertion that they can prevent such a division. When the situation is looked at from this point of view, we can assert that the main currents which have formed themselves into political alternatives have preferred highly authoritarian alternatives over libertarian ones, and that they resemble one another.
It is certainly true that civil alternatives do exist that focus on individual rights and liberties. For these civil alternatives to succeed, it is essential that belonging to an ethnic group or subgroup not be the basis of the political programs being developed. The ability for individuals to live together in a society must be based on a common shared identity, which cannot be based only on an ethnic or subgroup identity. There need to be civil–democratic norms which have at their center individuals and their rights and liberties, which give meaning to belonging together. (The multi-ethnic Swiss system, which is governed by a cantonal arrangement, is typical in this respect.)
The greatest problem here is that there does not exist, in either the social or political spheres, a powerful advocate of these values. My point here is that what was lacking in the Turkish modernization process is a bourgeois class as found in Western cases of modernization. The question of why the
Turkish modernization process has not brought forth a bourgeoisie has been and remains even today a separate topic for debate. The best-known fundamental reason is the continuation of the Ottoman ruling elite into the republican period. The military-bureaucratic elite has been the primary transmitter of modernization. Ottoman modernization was accompanied not by a broadening of the ruling class, but by its narrowing. In this process, wherein the state more or less modernized and centralized itself, the bourgeoisie that existed was largely expelled or wiped out because it had been largely non-Muslim in makeup. The absence of a bourgeoisie within the process of Turkish modernization is the reason that the present- day military–bureaucratic elite continues to wield its influence over the state.
The question of which alternative will come to dominate in Turkey during the modernization process does not appear simply dependent on preferences within the country itself. One must also take into consideration the important role that international relations will play. It might even be claimed that, with regard to the various sub-identities within Turkey, the country’s international connections and the importance given to Turkey by the great powers are what prevents the current conflicts between the sides from becoming too sharp. When viewed from this angle, Turkey’s rapid integration into the European Union must be seen as a critical factor in increasing the odds that a democratic alternative will be brought to realization. It would not be too great an exaggeration to describe the process of democratization currently under way in Turkey as being promoted from outside of the country. In this sense, there is indeed a close parallel between current events and the reforms of the mid-19th century.
Indeed, such great parallels appear between the events then and now that any discussion of history, in this sense at least, is a discussion of current events. Beyond purely academic interest, I find it most informative, for this reason, to look at a cross-section of the initial efforts toward the Turkifica- tion of Anatolia at the beginning of the 20th century. It is not well under- stood that the first great planned leap toward the homogenization of Anatolia on ethnic–national lines was a disaster not only for the people of the region at the time; it has also left deep scars that have influenced and even formed Turkey’s present national identity. What Turkey is currently undergoing is like a rerun of the events of the turn of the 20th century. Thus, if the previous process of ethnic homogenization is understood, it will help us to understand better both the current process and the dangers that this ethnification can pose today. I believe that historical consciousness possesses a special importance for the strengthening of non-nationalist alternatives.