Decisiones Sobre Precio:

Being in the heart o f the internal American political life, the Middle East, and with it the Israeli-Palestinian issue, is n ot an international concern but an internal issue. T he electoral calculations o f American politicians are always combined with a certain “ familiarity” with Israel. The allegiance to Israel is coupled in American political life and among the American population with a total ignorance o f the Palestinian grievance.15 American support for Israel has increased with time, but has also been counterbalanced by variable preoccupations related to the perceptions and stability o f the Arab world given the necessity to guarantee energy supplies and the protection o f the regimes standing against the USSR at the time o f the Cold W ar.16 This alliance between Israel and the United States has all appearance o f permanence and it is being displayed principally through the American financial aid to Israel, the numerous US vetoes to any Security Council resolutions condemning Israel’s actions towards the Palestinians and, at the time o f the Peace Process, the close coordination between the US and Israel on the positions to adopt even before submitting them to negotiations.17 These ties have become deeper with Israel having successfully persuaded the US that its fight in the Palestinian Occupied Territories was part o f the overall “War on Terror”. These ties have becom e deeper with Israel having successfully persuaded the US that its fight in the Palestinian Occupied Territories was part o f the overall “W ar on Terror”. This alliance has given m ore credit to “derogative interpretations” o f international rules like for instance the perceived legitimacy o f pre-emptive defensive action such as targeted assassinations. It has also contributed to the re-conceptualising o f counter-terrorism as a new species o f international armed conflict with, as one consequence, the substitution o f foggier rules than those o f hum an rights and international criminal law. N o t only that, but the presentation by Israel o f its actions in the O PT in the context o f the W ar in Terror has

15 G. Nonnem an, “Le role des Etats-Unis dans le conflit israelo-palestinien: un point de vue europeen” (2003) 62 Cahiers de Chaillot 36-49, p. 39

l(i Ibid., p. 40. 17 Ibid., p. 42.

led to an increased polarisation o f UN political bodies concerned with hum an rights around the Israeli-Palestinian issue,18

For the Palestinians and the Arab States, the US is therefore part o f the problem and o f the solution. It still represents the only credible peace-broker because o f its supposed leverage on Israel.19 This remains the case even after American invasion o f Iraq which has tremendously destabilised the region. The time when the EU was considered by some as a possible counterpower to American hegemonic position in the region after the end o f the Cold War is gone.20

The diplomatic pre-eminence o f the US in the region and its close ties with Israel is coupled with American and Israel fear o f greater EU involvement other than its usual financial assistance and its support to any American initiatives. After the First G ulf War, the US annihilated the E U ’s long-term idea o f holding an international conference under the aegis o f the UN in order to resolve the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They set up their own framework o f negotiations in which the European Community was confined to being an observer but was nonetheless invited to play a participatory role in the multilateral talks that emerged from Madrid21 and to assume a role o f depositary o f the progress made at the conclusion o f the Taba talks in 2001. The participation o f the EU in the Q uartet officially on an equal status with the US does not negate European dependency on American external politics.22

18 J. Fitzpatrick, “Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism and Human Rights”, (2003) 14 EJIL 241-264.

19 J. Peters, Europe and the Arab-Israeli Process: The Declaration o f Berlin and Beyond, In S. Behrendt and C. Hanelt (eds.), Bound to Cooperate — Europe and the Middle East, (Gutersloh 2000), pp. 151-170, p. 168. 20 See for instance F. Charillon, La strategic europeenne dans le processus de paix au M oyen Orient, In M.- F. Durand and A. de Vasconcelos (eds,), L a PESC, Ouvrir PEurope au Monde (Paris 1998), pp. 195-225. 21 P. Patokallio, European Union Policy on the Arab-Israeli Conflict: from Payer to Player, (Durham 2004), pp. 8-9 and J. Peters, note 5 above, p. 158.

For European decision-makers, this American supremacy is internalised.23 T he EU has never dared to get into a confrontation with the US and is ultra-sensitive to any pressure from it. O ne o f the blatant examples o f this was the decision by the EU to suspend aid to the Palestinian Authority following the victory o f Hamas at the elections o f the Palestinian Legislative Council in January 2006 -even though it organised and funded these elections. This has had, as a consequence, the direct loss o f influence o f Europe in the region and the immediate undermining o f a long-term institution building and a loss o f the earlier confidence which existed between the EU and the Palestinians. It has allowed some comm entators to state that the EU is following American interests in the region even though it is not in Europe’s own interests.24

1*3. T en se R elationships betw een the E U and Israel.

Israel’s allegiance to the US is counterbalanced by a widely acknowledged distrust for the EU .25 In many instances, Israel has interpreted E U ’s position and action as constantly biased in favour o f the Palestinians and the Arab States26 and will dismiss m ost o f its initiatives or the initiatives coming from its m em ber States out o f hand. This is the case despite the belief o f some Europeans that the position o f the EU is objective and impartial and as such constitutes an asset for E U ’s political involvement in the resolution