A published letter stating that a woman employee had "illicit relationship with another who is the former's paramour" imputes adulterous relationship between the two.
A prosecution for libel based thereon cannot be made without the sworn complaint of the offended party.
Since the accused imputed the commission of adultery, a crime which cannot be prosecuted de officio, the Information filed by the Fiscal cannot confer jurisdiction upon the Court of origin.
The error may, however, be corrected without sustaining the motion to quash and dismiss the case.
Where the statement of the complaint was sworn to before the investigating fiscal; and the recitals in the sworn statement contain all those required of a complaint under the rules, a copy of the verified statement of the offended party may be filed in court
Thus, where the information was based on the criminal complaint filed with the fiscal's office which conducted the corresponding preliminary investigation and the records conformably with the procedure then in force was transmitted to the trial court, such circumstance does not deprive the court of its jurisdiction.
Imputing prostitution, does not indicate an adulterous act and can be prosecuted de officio.
Where, however, in addition to allegedly calling the complainant a whore, the private respondent is also charged in one information with having described the former as a "paramour of my husband," this is a clear imputation of adultery.
A paramour is "one who loves or is loved illicitly."
One taking the place without legal rights of a husband or wife.
A mistress, also called a lover, accordingly, that imputation is covered by Rule 110.
DEATH OF OFFENDED PARTY IN CASES OF LIBEL OR DEFAMATION
The death of offended party in a criminal case for libel or defamation does not extinguish criminal liability of accused.
SEC. 6.
Sufficiency of complaint or information
Time of the offense under the former rule was changed to DATE of the offense.
All Elements of Crime Must be Alleged
It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information.
What facts and circumstances are necessary to be stated must be determined by reference to the definitions and the essentials of the specific crimes.
The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the ofiense.
Matter of Evidence; Need Not be Averred
However, it is often difficult to say what is a matter of evidence, as distinguished from facts necessary to be stated in order to render the information sufficiently certain to identify the offense.
As a general rule, matters of evidence, as distinguished from facts essential to the description of the offense, need not be averred.
For instance, it is not necessary to show on the face of an information for forgery in what manner a person is to be defrauded, as that is a matter of evidence at the trial.
Reasonable Certainty is Sufficient
Moreover, reasonable certainty in the statement of the crime suffices.
All that is required is that the charge be set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed and will enable him intelligently to prepare his defense, and if found guilty to plead her conviction, in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
Effects of Fatally Defective Information
Conviction or acquittal under a fatally defective information for want of certain essential allegation is not necessarily void when no objection appears to have been raised at the trial and the fatal defect could have been supplied by competent proof.
It was, however, held in Ilo, et al. v. Court of Appeals, that a substantial defect in the information cannot be cured by evidence, for that would jeopardize their right to be informed of, the true nature of the offense they are charged.
The Supreme Court applied the case of People u. Austria, holding that an information which does not charge an offense at all cannot be validated by the presentation of evidence. Said the Supreme Court: "(t)he petitioner contends that under the allegation in the information that the accused without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control the firearms and ammunitions enumerated therein," the prosecution may prove that the accused carried the firearms and
ammunitions outside of his residence. The contention is without merit.
As the court had stated in People v. Austria, the presentation of evidence "cannot have the effect of validating a void information, or proving an offense which does not legally exist.
The information was not merely defective but it does not charge any offense at all.
Technically speaking, that information does not exist in contemplation of law."
In an information for rape (committed before R.A. No. 7659) without alleging the age or complainant, the accused was convicted of statutory rape there being no objection to evidence or minority.
The information was not void but merely defective which is curable by evidence admitted without objection.
The Substantial Compliance Rule
It has been held that a complaint is under the Rules one of the two charging instruments for the offense of which the accused was tried and convicted here.
While the criminal action was instituted by the complaint of the offended party, the information signed only by the fiscal ushered in the formal trial process.
But both are accusations in writing against the accused and serve the purpose of enabling him to take the necessary legal steps for his defense.
What is important is that the information states that the accused is being charged of an offense under R.A. No. 7610 based on the complaint of the offended party, to which the accused had adequately responded.
Under these conditions, the accused was fully apprised of the accusation against him.
The purpose and objective of the constitutional mandate are discharged and satisfied.
The accused may not be said to be taken by surprise by the failure of the information to state the age of the offended party, when he had received the initiatory complaint where he was told how old the offended party was.
Thus, even if the information did not allege that the victim was a mental retardate which is an essential element of the crime of statutory rape, or the element of force and intimidation or the age of the complainant or the information merely states that petitioner was being charged for the crime of "violation of R.A. No. 7610" without citing the specific sections alleged to have been violated the Court treated the informations as merely defective and that the deficiency was cured either because the complaint supplied the omission or by the failure of the accused to assail the insufficiency of the allegations in the Information and by competent evidence presented during trial, and the accused cannot successfully invoke the defense that his right to be informed is violated.
The Court did not consider the omissions sufficient to invalidate the information, holding that the character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, as they may be conclusions of
law, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.
The sufficiency of an information is not negated by an incomplete or defective designation of the crime in the caption or other parts of the information but by the narration of facts and circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprise the accused of the nature and cause of.the accusation against him.
The information may not refer to specific section/s of R.A. No. 7610 alleged to have been violated by the petitioner, but it is all to evident that the body of the information contains an averment of the'acts alleged to have been performed by petitioner which unmistakably refers to acts punishable under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610.
As to which section of R.A. No. 7610 is being violated by petitioner is inconsequential.
What is determinative of the offense is the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.
Sufficiency of Allegations of Conspiracy
In our jurisdiction, * * * conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a mode of committing a crime or it may be alleged as constitutive of the crime itself.
When conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself, the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging the offense is governed by Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of the
crime in either of the following manner:
(1) by the use of the word "conspire" or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc. or
(2) by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts
When Charged as a Mode of Committing the Crime
The requirements of the sufficiency of the information are different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as a mode of committing the crime as in the case of Plunder consisting of several predicate crimes.
There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense charged.
The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conpsiracy and make them responsible as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime.
The liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of the others.
The information must state that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among the accused.
Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words "conspired" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy," must
aptly appear in the information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy.
In fine, the agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of design among the accused must be conveyed such as either by the use of the term "conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy.
Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it.
In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.
An allegation of conspiracy, or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime.
Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others.
Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
In the absence of conspiracy, so averred and proved an accused can only be made liable for the acts committed by him
alone and this criminal responsibility is individual and not collective