It is in virtue of this that I now propose a new argument within the family of Plantinga’s EAAN. Again, let N&E stand for naturalism and evolution.
(1) Given N&E, all of our metaphysical beliefs are either the direct result of being produced to meet the Darwinian requirement, they are evolutionary by-products (spandrels) of beliefs that do, or they are beliefs that are disadvantageous for our survival.
(2) Given (1) it seems possible that under different circumstances, our evolutionary makeup could have been such that we would have held different metaphysical beliefs.
(3) (2) would include all metaphysical beliefs besides those metaphysical beliefs that would be required to be held in order to meet the Darwinian requirement. (4) Given (2) and (3), if one’s cognitive faculties could have produced different metaphysical beliefs, if upon reflection one lacked a reason for giving preference to certain metaphysical beliefs over others, one would lack a way of knowing which metaphysical beliefs were true.
(5) If one lacked a way of knowing which metaphysical beliefs were true, then one would have a defeater for those metaphysical beliefs.
(6) Naturalism is a metaphysical belief that one would lack a reason for giving preference to it over another belief.
(7) Therefore, given (4) and (5), one has a defeater for belief in naturalism.
It appears to me that (1) and (2) would be espoused by anyone who adheres to N&E; thus I suspect that these premises would not be controversial. However, the main thrust of the argument would be with regard to (4) and (6).57 If the above examples are sufficient to demonstrate its plausibility, at least in showing that (4) and (6) are more plausible than their negation, then I think the argument is a good one and can contribute to the literature that pertains to the evolutionary argument against naturalism. The advantage of this argument is that it permits the possibility of there being certain beliefs that have to be held in order for a person to survive and reproduce. However, as long as there are
57 Though I don’t foresee (5) being too controversial, for those who don’t share my intuition, see Michael
Huemer, ‘Moore’s Paradox and the Norm of Belief,’ in Themes from G.E. Moore: New Essays in
Epistemology and Ethics, eds. Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay (New York: Oxford Press, 2007), 142-
conflicting metaphysical beliefs which could all lead a subject to meet the Darwinian requirement, the argument can still get off the ground.
3.12 Conclusion
I first argued that naturalism lacks the resources to account for proper function. I did this by interacting with certain notorious naturalistic accounts of proper function as well as Plantinga’s critiques of them. I argued that since proper function is a necessary condition for warrant it would seem to follow that naturalism could not be warranted.
I then explained Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism. The core of this argument rested on the claim that, given natural selection, one’s cognitive faculties are not aimed at truth but at survival and reproduction. But because one can affirm all sorts of false propositions that despite being false, would still aid in survival and reproduction, one would have a defeater for the belief that one’s cognitive faculties were producing true beliefs. Finally, I developed my own version of the argument by focusing exclusively on metaphysical beliefs and, within that genre especially on naturalism and deism.
I have now explained and defended Plantinga’s arguments that naturalism cannot account for the proper function condition and the truth-aimed condition of his theory of warrant. The proponent of Plantinga’s religious epistemology now has a response to the person who argues that naturalism could be warranted in a similar way to Christian belief. In moving on to the next chapter, I will engage Rose Ann Christian’s original Pandora’s Box Objection. I will there reject the claim that Shankara’s Advaita Vedanta Hinduism can supply the resources to account for and thus utilize Plantinga’s epistemology.
Chapter 4: Pandora’s Box: Hinduism
4.0 Introduction
In Chapter one, I mentioned Rose Ann Christian’s suggestion that a follower of Shankara’s Advaita Vedanta tradition could adopt Plantinga’s religious epistemology.1 For Christian, this is problematic; having an epistemological system that would potentially allow a religious tradition that is vastly different from Christianity to also be warranted without the support of an argument seems to greatly weaken Plantinga’s religious epistemology. Again, Beilby makes the point that there might be possible objections to such a worldview, yet one might be able to handle these potential defeaters in a similar way as Plantinga does with Christianity.2 As mentioned, David Tien makes a similar argument that Neo-
Confucianism could be warranted in the same way that Plantinga’s Christianity could be warranted. Tien finds this troubling for it would show that the follower of Neo-
Confucianism is in the same epistemic boat as the Christian.3 And once more it is
important to reiterate that Plantinga seems to believe that various religious traditions could use his system:
But, you say, isn’t this just a bit of logical legerdemain; are there any systems of beliefs seriously analogous to Christian belief for which these claims cannot be made? For any such set of beliefs, couldn’t we find a model under which the beliefs in question have warrant, and such that given the truth of those beliefs, there are no philosophical objections to the truth of the model? Well, probably something like that is true for the other theistic religions: Judaism, Islam, some forms of Hinduism, and some forms of Buddhism, some forms of American Indian religion. Perhaps
1 Rose Ann Christian, ‘Plantinga, Epistemic Permissiveness, and Metaphysical Pluralism,’ Religious Studies
28, no. 4 (1992): 553-573.
2 James Beilby, Epistemology As Theology: An Evaluation of Alvin Plantinga's Religious Epistemology
(Hants, England: Ashgate, 2005), 131.
3 David W. Tien, ‘Warranted Neo-Confucian Belief: Religious Pluralism and the Affections in the
Epistemologies of Wang Yangming (1472-1529) and Alvin Plantinga,’ International Journal for
these religions are like Christianity in that they are subject to no de jure objections that are independent of de facto objections.4
Now, I am unsure what forms of Buddhism and Hinduism Plantinga has in mind. If by forms of Hinduism or Buddhism he has in mind those forms that espouse personal theism, I might be sympathetic to his comment. However, there are major historic
philosophical forms of Hinduism that wouldn’t fall into this category and I am unaware of any Buddhist tradition that would as well. It is with this stated that I would like to
challenge the claim that Plantinga has allowed a wide range of serious religious beliefs to be warranted in the same way that Christian belief could be warranted.
Since the earliest formulation of this objection can be found in Christian’s work, in the context of her claim that the Advaita Vedanta tradition could use Plantinga’s religious epistemology, I will first address her argument. However, in order to properly address it, I will need to articulate Advaita Vedanta’s core doctrinal beliefs as seen in its central thinker Shankara. This will lead us to see that Shankara endorsed a type of proper functionalism. Since Shankara endorsed something like proper functionalism, it would seem to provide even more reason to think that Plantinga’s epistemology would allow the core belief of Advaita Veldanta to be warranted in a similar way as the core belief of Christianity. This will further motivate a response to Christian’s original objection and provide more plausibility for it being able to account for the preconditions that are necessary to make Plantinga’s theory of warrant intelligible.
After exegeting the central beliefs of Advaita Vedanta Hinduism, I will argue that it lacks the resources to make intelligible both the proper function condition and the truth aimed condition. This will be due to Advaita Vedanta’s ontological commitment that all of reality consists of the impersonal Brahman. Having interacted with Christian’s claim about the Advaita Vedanta tradition, I will entertain the idea that Samkhya, its dualistic
counterpart, could do better in accounting for the relevant preconditions. I will approach this tradition in a similar way in that I will first exegete its central claims. In my analysis of the Samkhya tradition, I will argue that it also fails to account for the proper function condition and the truth aimed condition. This is because its tradition is nearly an exact parallel to naturalism. Having surveyed these Hindu traditions, I will move on to the next
chapter where I survey their religious cousin, Buddhism, in order to determine if it will do better in accounting for the preconditions that are necessary to make Plantinga’s theory of warrant intelligible.