PUESTAS A TIERRA

s. THE LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY, respondents

(G.R. No. L-8451; December 20, 1957)

FACTS: Mateo Rodis executed a Deed of Sale in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., with Mgr. Clovit Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual incumbent. When the deed of sale was presented to the Register of Deeds of Davao for registration, the latter required the corporation to submit an affidavit declaring that 60% of the members thereof were Filipino citizens.

Entertaining some doubts as to the registrability of the deed of sale, the Register of Deeds referred the matter to the Land Registration Commission which held that by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 1 and 5 of Art. XIII of the Philippine Constitution, the vendee was not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines in the absence of proof that at least 60% of the capital, property, or assets of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc. was actually owned or controlled by Filipino citizens.

ISSUE: WON the corporation sole may register the property transferred?

HELD: Yes. In solving the problem thus submitted to our consideration, We can say the following: A corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy. Conceived and introduced into the common law by sheer necessity, this legal creation which was referred to as "that unhappy freak of English law" was designed to facilitate the exercise of the functions of ownership carried on by the clerics for and on behalf of the church which was regarded as the property owner (See I Couvier's Law Dictionary, p. 682-683).

A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a time), in some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have had. In this sense, the king is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or dens, distinct from their several chapters (Reid vs. Barry, 93 Fla. 849, 112 So. 846).

That leaves no room for doubt that the bishops or archbishops, as the case may be, as corporation's sole are merely administrators of the church properties that come to their possession, in which they hold in trust for the church. It can also be said that while it is true that church properties could be administered by a natural persons, problems regarding succession to said properties can not be avoided to rise upon his death. Through this legal fiction, however, church properties acquired by the incumbent of a corporation sole pass, by operation of law, upon his death not his personal heirs but to his successor in office. It could be seen, therefore, that a corporation sole is created not only to administer the temporalities of the church or religious society where he belongs but also to hold and transmit the same to his successor in said office. If the ownership or title to the properties do not pass to the administrators, who are the owners of church properties?.

Bouscaren and Elis, S.J., authorities on cannon law, on their treatise comment:

In matters regarding property belonging to the Universal Church and to the Apostolic See, the Supreme Pontiff exercises his office of supreme administrator through the Roman Curia; in matters regarding other church property, through the administrators of the individual moral persons in the Church according to that norms, laid down in the Code of Cannon Law.

This does not mean, however, that the Roman Pontiff is the owner of all the church property; but merely that he is the supreme guardian (Bouscaren and Ellis, Cannon Law, A Text and Commentary, p. 764).

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THE CORPORATION CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (Batas Pambansa Bilang 68, as amended) based on the book of Atty Ruben C. Ladia We must therefore, declare that although a branch of the Universal Roman

Catholic Apostolic Church, every Roman Catholic Church in different countries, if it exercises its mission and is lawfully incorporated in accordance with the laws of the country where it is located, is considered an entity or person with all the rights and privileges granted to such artificial being under the laws of that country, separate and distinct from the personality of the Roman Pontiff or the Holy See, without prejudice to its religious relations with the latter which are governed by the Canon Law or their rules and regulations.

The Corporation Law also contains the following provisions:

SECTION 159. Any corporation sole may purchase and hold real estate and personal; property for its church, charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, and may receive bequests or gifts of such purposes. Such corporation may mortgage or sell real property held by it upon obtaining an order for that purpose from the Court of First Instance of the province in which the property is situated; but before making the order proof must be made to the satisfaction of the Court that notice of the application for leave to mortgage or sell has been given by publication or otherwise in such manner and for such time as said Court or the Judge thereof may have directed, and that it is to the interest of the corporation that leave to mortgage or sell must be made by petition, duly verified by the bishop, chief priest, or presiding elder acting as corporation sole, and may be opposed by any member of the religious denomination, society or church represented by the corporation sole: Provided, however, That in cases where the rules, regulations, and discipline of the religious denomination, society or church concerned represented by such corporation sole regulate the methods of acquiring, holding, selling and mortgaging real estate and personal property, such rules, regulations, and discipline shall control and the intervention of the Courts shall not be necessary.

It can, therefore, be noticed that the power of a corporation sole to purchase real property, like the power exercised in the case at bar, it is not restricted although the power to sell or mortgage sometimes is, depending upon the rules, regulations, and discipline of the church concerned represented by said corporation sole. If corporations sole can purchase and sell real estate for its church, charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, can they register said real properties? As provided by law, lands held in trust for specific purposes me be subject of registration (section 69, Act 496), and the capacity of a corporation sole, like petitioner herein, to register lands belonging to it is acknowledged, and title thereto may be issued in its name (Bishop of Nueva Segovia vs. Insular Government, 26 Phil. 300-1913). Indeed it is absurd that while the corporations sole that might be in need of acquiring lands for the erection of temples where the faithful can pray, or schools and cemeteries which they are expressly authorized by law to acquire in connection with the propagation of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith or in furtherance of their freedom of religion they could not register said properties in their name. As professor Javier J. Nepomuceno very well says "Man in his search for the immortal and imponderable, has, even before the dawn of recorded history, erected temples to the Unknown God, and there is no doubt that he will continue to do so for all time to come, as long as he continues 'imploring the aid of Divine Providence'" (Nepomuceno's Corporation Sole, VI Ateneo Law Journal, No. 1, p. 41, September, 1956). Under the circumstances of this case, We might safely state that even before the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and of the Republic of the Philippines every corporation sole then organized and registered had by express provision of law the necessary power and qualification to purchase in its name private lands located in the territory in which it exercised its functions or ministry and for which it was created, independently of the nationality of its incumbent unique and single member and head, the bishop of the dioceses. It can be also maintained without fear of being gainsaid that the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church in the Philippines has no nationality and that the framers of the Constitution, as will be hereunder explained, did not have in mind the religious corporations sole when they provided that 60 per centum of the capital thereof be owned by Filipino citizens.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. CA (supra, POWER TO ACQUIRE PROPERTY)

FACTS: Private respondent Iglesia Ni Cristo applied with the CFI of Cavite for registration of a parcel of land which it claimed to have acquired by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale from Aquelina de la Cruz, alleging that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, continuous, public, peaceful and adverse possession and occupation of the said land for more than 30 years, which was opposed by the Government as represented by the Director of Lands. The CFI and the CA ruled in favor of INC.

ISSUE: WON the registration of the land should be upheld?

HELD: As observed at the outset, had this case been resolved immediately after it was submitted for decision, the result may have been quite adverse to private respondent. For the rule then prevailing under the case of Manila Electric Company v. Castro-Bartolome et al., 114 SCRA 799, reiterated in Republic v. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875 as well as the other subsequent cases involving private respondent adverted to above', is that a juridical person, private respondent in particular, is disqualified under the 1973 Constitution from applying for registration in its name alienable public land, as such land ceases to be public land "only upon the issuance of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48[b]" of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.

These are precisely the cases cited by petitioner in support of its theory of disqualification.

Since then, however, this Court had occasion to re-examine the rulings in these cases vis-a-vis the earlier cases of Carino v. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935, Susi v. Razon, 48 Phil. 424 and Herico v. Dar, 95 SCRA 437, among others. Thus, in the recent case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 146 SCRA 509, We categorically stated that the majority ruling in Meralco is "no longer deemed to be binding precedent", and that

"[T]he correct rule, ... is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period [30 years under the Public Land Act, as amended] is converted to private property by mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure." We further reiterated therein the timehonored principle of non-impairment of vested rights.

The crucial factor to be determined therefore is the length of time private respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land in question prior to the institution of the instant registration proceedings.

The land under consideration was acquired by private respondent from Aquelina de la Cruz in 1947, who, in turn, acquired by same by purchase from the Ramos brothers and sisters, namely: Eusebia, Eulalia, Mercedes, Santos and Agapito, in 1936. Under section 48[b] of Commonwealth Act No.

141, as amended, "those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure" may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act.

Said paragraph [b] further provides that "these shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." Taking the year 1936 as the reckoning point, there being no showing as to when the Ramoses first took possession and occupation of the land in question, the 30-year period of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation required by law was completed in 1966.

The completion by private respondent of this statutory 30-year period has dual significance in the light of Section 48[b] of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended and prevailing jurisprudence: [1] at this point, the land in question ceased by operation of law to be part of the public domain; and [2]

private respondent could have its title thereto confirmed through the appropriate proceedings as under the Constitution then in force, private corporations or associations were not prohibited from acquiring public lands, but merely prohibited from acquiring, holding or leasing such type of land in excess of 1,024 hectares.

If in 1966, the land in question was converted ipso jure into private land, it remained so in 1974 when the registration proceedings were commenced.

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THE CORPORATION CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (Batas Pambansa Bilang 68, as amended) based on the book of Atty Ruben C. Ladia This being the case, the prohibition under the 1973 Constitution would have

no application. Otherwise construed, if in 1966, private respondent could have its title to the land confirmed, then it had acquired a vested right thereto, which the 1973 Constitution can neither impair nor defeat.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF LUCENA, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH LIII, LUCENA CITY, respondents

(G.R. No. 75042; November 29, 1988)

FACTS: The ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by Msgr.

Jose T. Sanchez, filed an application for confirmation of title to 4 parcels of land which were said to have been obtained either by purchase or donation dating as far back as 1928, which was granted by the CFI.

Against this decision, the Solicitor General filed a Motion for reconsideration on the following grounds:

1. Article XIV, Section 11 of the New Constitution(1973) disqualifies a private corporation from acquiring alienable lands for the public domain;

2. In the case at bar the application was filed after the effectivity on the New Constitution on January 17, 1973;

which was denied by the lower court for lack of merit.

Still insisting of the alleged unconstitutionality of the registration (a point which, incidentally, the appellant never raised in the lower court prior to its Motion for Reconsideration), the Republic elevated this appeal, and the IAC affirmed the lower court’s decision.

ISSUE: WON private respondent, corporation sole, is entitled to confirmation of its title to the 4 parcels of land?

HELD: The parties herein do not dispute that since the acquisition of the four (4) lots by the applicant, it has been in continuous possession and enjoyment thereof, and such possession, together with its predecessors-in-interest, covering a period of more than 52 years (at least from the date of survey in 1928) with respect to lots 1 and 2, about 62 years with respect to lot 3, all of plan PSU-65686; and more than 39 years with respect to the fourth parcel described in plan PSU-11 2592 (at least from the date of the survey in 1940) have been open, public, continuous, peaceful, adverse against the whole world, and in the concept of owner.

Petitioner argues that considering such constitutional prohibition, private respondent is disqualified to own and register its title to the lots in question.

Further, it argues that since the application for registration was filed only on February 2, 1979, long after the 1973 Constitution took effect on January 17, 1973, the application for registration and confirmation of title is ineffectual because at the time it was filed, private corporation had been declared ineligible to acquire alienable lands of the public domain pursuant to Art. XIV, Sec. 11 of the said constitution. (Rollo, p. 41)

The questioned posed before this Court has been settled in the case of DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509 [1986]) which reversed the ruling first enunciated in the 1982 case of Manila Electric Co. vs. CASTRO BARTOLOME, (114 SCRA 789 [1982]) imposing the constitutional ban on public land acquisition by private corporations which ruling was declared emphatically as res judicata on January 7, 1986 in Director of Lands vs. Hermanos y Hermanas de Sta. Cruz de Mayo, Inc., (141 SCRA 21 [1986]). In said case, (Director of Lands v. IAC, supra), this Court stated that a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings must be made. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative.

If, on the other hand, they were already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporation or association obviously does not apply. In affirming the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court in said case, this Court adopted the vigorous dissent of the

then Justice, later Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, tracing the line of cases beginning with CARINO, in 1909, thru SUSI, in 1925, down to HERICO, in 1980, which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes' private property. (DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. IAC, supra, p. 518).

It must be emphasized that the Court is not here saying that a corporation sole should be treated like an ordinary private corporation.

In Roman Catholic Apostolic Administration of Davao, Inc. vs. Land Registration Commission, et al. (L-8451, December 20,1957,102 Phil. 596).

We articulated:

In solving the problem thus submitted to our consideration, We can say the following: A corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy. Conceived and introduced into the common law by sheer necessity, this legal creation which was referred to as "that unhappy freak of English Law" was designed to facilitate the exercise of the functions of ownership carried on by the clerics for and on behalf of the church which was regarded as the property owner (See 1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 682-683).

A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a time), in some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages, particulary that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have had.

There is no doubt that a corporation sole by the nature of its Incorporation is vested with the right to purchase and hold real estate and personal property.

It need not therefore be treated as an ordinary private corporation because whether or not it be so treated as such, the Constitutional provision involved will, nevertheless, be not applicable.

In the light of the facts obtaining in this case and the ruling of this Court in Director of Lands vs. IAC, (supra, 513), the lands subject of this petition were already private property at the time the application for confirmation of title

In the light of the facts obtaining in this case and the ruling of this Court in Director of Lands vs. IAC, (supra, 513), the lands subject of this petition were already private property at the time the application for confirmation of title