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Ostrom (2005; 2008) suggests a general framework that helps to recognise the universal elements in the institutional analysis and the relations among these elements (see Figure 1). The first step in using this framework is to identify ‘action arenas’, which include an ‘action situation’ and the actors in that situation. This identification can help to analyse and explain the behaviour of the actors. She further addresses the importance of nested-levels of rules, which consist of physical and material conditions, attributes of community and rules-in-use. The attributes of physical and material worlds determine what actions are physically possible. This may also involve the availability of technology.

The attributes of community refer to values that are shared within a community. The nested-levels of rules deeply influence the action agenda, because ‘the rules of the game…structure the game itself’ and the rules are embedded in the physical, social and cultural environment (Ostrom 2008, 831). Rules-in-use refer to ‘shared understandings by participants about enforced perceptions concerning what actions (or outcomes) are

required, prohibited, or permitted’ (Ostrom 2005, 18, emphasis in original). The shared

understandings are learned on the ground and may not exist in any written document as rules-in-form do.

Figure 1

A general framework for institutional analysis (source: Ostrom 2008, 829)

As Timmermans (2001, 317) argues, ‘a finite set of rule types allows institutions to be compared.’ Ostrom (1986; 2005; 2008) divides the nested-levels of rules into seven types of interrelated rules. These are, scope rules, access rules, position rules, payoff rules, competence rules, information rules, and decision rules. Together they shape the patterns of interactions. As shown in Table 1, I summarise definitions of the seven types of rule. The classification of rules helps to link the nested-levels of rules to the action arenas in the analysis process, but the concept of rules-in-use rather than rule-in-form has to be pointed out at the same time..

Type of rule Definition

Scope rules Scope rules delimit the range of potential externalities created by the decision out- comes.

Access rules Access rules affect the number of participants and their attributes.

Position rules Position rules define the role an actor is supposed to play.

Payoff rules Payoff rules prescribe the distribution of benefits and costs for actors while actions and outcomes are made.

Competence rules Competence rules give participants jurisdictions and conditions for using resources within arenas.

Table 1

Actor-centred institutionalism (Source: Scharpf 1997, 44)

Type of rule Definition

Decision rules Decision rules influence the procedures for decision-making and the level of control for participants when they exercise the decision function at a particular node.

Information rules Information rules authorise channels of communication among participants in positions.

Table 1

Actor-centred institutionalism (Source: Scharpf 1997, 44)

Different from the general framework proposed by Ostrom, which focuses more on how the institutions structure action situations, Scharpf (1997) proposes an alternative approach to explore how actors with their orientations, capacities, actor constellations and modes of interaction influence policy-making to cope with particular political issues, presenting an actor-centred institutionalism (see Figure 2). He recognises policy is ‘intentional action by actors who are most interested in achieving specific outcomes.’

(36) The term actor is used to describe an individual or an aggregate of individuals. In other words, in this approach policy-making is considered as an outcome of interactions among intentional actors—‘Games real actors play’.

Figure 2

Actor-centred institutionalism (Source: Scharpf 1997, 44).

In order to link actor’s action orientations to institutionally determined or empirically observable indicators, Scharpf (1997) disaggregates the notion of actor orientation into three major components: unit of reference, cognitive orientations and preferences.

The most important unit of reference for empirical research is the role of positions that are associated with role-specific norms, expectations and identity. He argues that in most cases the normative expectations of a role are a more useful predictor of

role-related action than individual self-interest, because the willingness of individuals to assume such a role is assured through benefits of membership, position, and career opportunities that cannot be otherwise obtained. However, this does not mean that the role self-interest plays in affecting the preference of actors’ choice can be ignored.

Regarding cognitive orientations, Scharpf (1997, 62) ‘start[s] from the working hypothesis that actors’ perceptions of directly observable facts will be empirically correct and that their hypotheses about what they cannot observe as well as about causal linkages will be shaped by theories prevailing at the particular time and in the particular institutional setting.’ The specific combinations of knowledge, ignorance and theories tend to be shared among actors in institutionalised interactions. Collective learning plays an important role in the knowledge sharing process, which implies communication and public debate. Thus, the cognitive orientations of the specific actors can be obtained relatively easily for researchers from public documents, interviews, or participant observation.

Scharpf (1997) divides preferences into four simpler components—basic self-interest, normative role orientations, identity, and interaction orientations. ‘Basic self-interest’

describes the basic preference of actors for self-preservation, autonomy, and growth.

In terms of corporate actors, their self-interest can be identified with the conditions of organisational survival, autonomy and growth, so the specific requirements associated with the self-interest of collective actors and corporate actors are relatively transparent to researchers. ‘Normative role orientations’ are shared expectations among participants based on antecedent conditions of particular actions or the purposes to be achieved. However, actors have the possibility to emphasise selectively certain aspects of interest, rules and normative purposes according to the specific ‘identity’ they define for themselves. If only individual or corporate actors have a clearly defined identity, the uncertainty of their preference can be reduced for other actors as well as for researchers.

In short, both analytical frameworks, respectively proposed by Ostrom and Scharpf, try to create a linkage between structure and actors, although their main focuses are very different. The former focuses more on the analysis of action arenas and on how the nested-levels of rules shape action situations and influence collective actions. Alternatively, the latter focuses more on the analysis of the interaction among intentional actors, which are structured by particular institutional settings. Indeed, these two frameworks do not conflict, but complement each other. Figure 3 illustrates the linkage between these two frameworks. Access rules determine the constellations of actors in the action arenas. Scope rules, competence rules, decision rules and information rules together structure the capacities of involved actors. Position rules and payoff rules affect action orientations of involved actors regarding their role of positions and action preference.

Cognitive orientation is shaped by the theories prevailing at the particular time within a specific problem-field. In this research, the cognitive orientation especially relates to the

Figure 3

A combinative framework of action arenas.

In document LA FALANGE INQUIETA (página 182-200)