The third form o f Young’s extended communication is narrative or storytelling, which is similar to testimony, or the telling o f one’s own story in one’s language, proposed by Sanders (1997: 372). For Young (1996: 131-2), the parties often have the feeling that their own needs and ideas are not understood in discussion over conflict, especially where classes or culture separates the parties. She argues that narrative fosters understanding across such situations o f differences in several ways: it can ‘reveal the particular experiences o f those in social locations, experiences that cannot be shared by those situated differently but that they must understand in order to do justice to the others’, ‘reveal a source o f values, culture and meaning’, and provide ‘a total social knowledge from the point o f view o f that social position.’ The Yami focus group discussions, especially those o f elder Yami fishermen and housewives, exhibit their experience and values by telling stories o f their life, illness, the variety o f impact o f the nuclear waste repository and the attempts to make listeners understand their situation.
However, Benhabib (1996: 83) rejects narrative as unsuitable for the public language o f institutions and legislatures in a democracy. She argues that narrative would create capriciousness and it might happen that some simply cannot understand the stories. The Taiwanese focus group discussion showed that they have heard a lot o f the Yami stories in daily life, but that some o f them still cannot understand why the Yami have those values and priorities. The Yami Taipower employee group pointed out that there are a lot o f retold stories and one needs to judge who to trust. The story about the healthy Yami Taipower employees is in conflict with the stories about illness and poor yields caused by the nuclear waste (see Chapter 4). What concerns me is some Yami might have got opposing experience but feel they need to follow the
same storyline just to show the acknowledgement o f fellow tribesmen. The story might be retold instrumentally for the particular purpose o f evoking sympathy and getting the nuclear waste removed.
Young recognizes the dangers o f manipulation and deceit in greeting, rhetoric, narrative and other forms o f communications. For example, narrative sometimes is manipulated to win irrational assent and stories could be ‘false, misleading and self- deceiving’. She argues that argumentative discourse can involve deceit and manipulation as well and it needs criticism to address false or invalid arguments. The remedy for false, manipulative talk is ‘more talk that exposes or corrects it’, and the listeners to greeting, rhetoric, narrative and other forms o f communications should critically evaluate them (2000: 77-9). Similarity, Dryzek (2000: 167) argues for discursive democracy that accommodates difference and allows a plurality o f discourses in deliberation beyond rational argument. He argues that deliberation should admit other forms o f communication proposed by difference democrats only if they do not involve coercion, and are capable o f connecting the particular to the general. Those forms o f communications proposed by Young should be excluded if they fail to meet these criteria.
Dryzek (2000: 167) recognizes the value o f rhetoric as an important mode o f communication in deliberating across difference and across the boundary between the state and the public sphere. But rhetoric can coerce its audience by manipulating their emotions and this is why some deliberative democrats like to purge it. Furthermore, storytelling can coerce the storyteller especially when group norms constrain the range o f acceptable stories. An individual story can fail to resonate with individuals who do not share that situation (pp. 68-9). The threat o f coercion can be found in the discussion among the Yami. The elderly Yami are respected in the tribe and those
who speak first in the focus groups or public meeting tend to be the elder ones. Those younger Yami storytellers might avoid making challenges to the expected storyline. For Dryzek (2000: 71, 168), argument can also be coercive as the result o f failure to connect the particular to the general or the suppression o f any challenge to the particular. However, rational argument is capable o f exposing these failings in itself and applied to the context in which storytelling proceed to prevent coercion o f the storyteller by the group. He claims that argument always plays the central role in deliberative democracy in terms o f communicative failures and collective action regarding a social problem, while other forms o f communication can be present but not necessary.
Miller (2002: 208) argues that it is too easy to add greeting, rhetoric and storytelling to the deliberation by treating them as additional forms o f dialogue. He argues that the accusations made by Young and Sanders is not valid. For Miller, Young and Sanders’ charge that deliberation privileges rational speech and formal reasoning at the expense o f emotional speech and the concrete concerns o f particular groups relies on a false dichotomy between reason and emotion. Political speech, to be convincing, requires both passionate expression and rational argument. Political argument often takes the form o f linking the situation o f a particular group with some general principles that has been applied in the past to other groups and now commands general assent (pp. 213-4). Furthermore, Miller (2002) recognizes that deliberation encourage participants to adopt moderate proposals rather than the extreme ones, to be willing to give up their initial claims for the sake o f reaching agreement. He claims that democratic deliberation allow each perspective to be considered equally in the course o f deliberation, but cannot ensure that any specific or single perspective will prevail in the final outcome (pp.213-6). I think Miller is right that rhetoric or
introducing unfamiliar perspectives into democratic debate can be a divisive force in situations o f conflict that ‘weaken each groups’ commitment to deal justly with the others.’ The public meeting on Orchid Island in fact manifests the problem o f one-way communication and the tension caused by rhetoric, which seems to have led to some Taiwanese migrants lose interest in participating in similar meetings. With Miller, I do not see that the forms o f discourse advocated by Young and Sanders are likely to serve the interests o f the Yami better than a process o f reasoned argument.
However, there is a possibility o f weakening the tribal solidarity o f the Yami tribe if rhetoric or storytelling is completely restricted in deliberative democratic settings. Certain kinds o f speech might have a function o f maintaining the group boundary. The particular ways o f dressing or expressive statements could make a strong sense o f who is in the group and who is outside the group (Bell, 1997: 193). For weak and marginal groups, particular way o f communication might create a sense o f agency or tribal identity. Will it end up fragmenting the community or tribe if we say no to storytelling or rhetoric and allow reasoned argument alone? Is reasoned argument good solely for the powerful groups? Although it is important to recognize various forms o f communication o f knowledge in a pluralist society, reasoned argument and intercultural dialogue could serve the interests o f the minorities as well. The point here is to positively encourage reasoned argument, dialogue and interaction both between the Yami and the Taiwanese groups and within the Yami tribe in order to increase mutual understanding rather than enact an absolute prohibition o f storytelling or rhetoric in any deliberating processes.
Miller argues that ‘democratic deliberation that serves the cause o f social justice is most likely to occur in a community whose members share a common identity that transcends their group-specific identities.’ He puts emphasis on the sense o f
commonality provided by a shared national identity that can support the trust and mutual respect necessary for deliberation. Mansbridge (1980) also suggests that a participatory democratic forum applies only in contexts where people already share many goals, interests, and premises, or life experience. However, Young (2000) objects against theorists o f deliberative democracy that assume the idea o f common good or commonness as a prior condition o f deliberation, or as a goal o f deliberation, because the appeal to shared understandings or the assumption o f commonality ‘may exclude or marginalize some people or groups’ (p. 41). I would argue that the idea o f common good or a sense o f commonality could enhance positive group interaction and commitment in the process o f discussion, and defuse the perceived social distance and tension between groups, rather than repress group differences (see Chapter 7). Young’s (1996, 2000) inclusive model o f communicative that is open to plural speaking styles and perspectives might not necessarily facilitate the dialogue across cultural difference and social position, or increase a feeling o f recognition and understanding. It would involve too much emotion and irrationality injected into the discussion. The value o f rational discourse and debate should not be neglected. I will further discuss the importance o f the reconstruction o f a broader community and a pragmatic approach to intercultural dialogue that could bring the Yami and Taiwanese groups together to deal with the nuclear waste problems in Chapter 7.