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QUINQUIES

In document Gobierno del Estado de Puebla (página 31-55)

Neither can we say that FUERTE's actions are indicative of abandonment. To constitute such a ground for dismissal, there must be (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention, as manifested by some overt acts, to sever the employer- employee relationship. We have accordingly held that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, as in this case, is inconsistent with a charge of abandonment.

R.P. Dinglasan Construction Inc v Atienza, 433 SCRA 263 (2004)

To constitute abandonment of work, two (2) requisites must concur: first, the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without justifiable reason; and second, there must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by overt acts. Abandonment as a just ground for dismissal requires deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. Mere absence or failure to report for work, after notice to return, is not enough to amount to abandonment.

Chavez v NLRC, 448 SCRA 478 (2005)

As a rule, the employer bears the burden to prove that the dismissal was for a valid and just cause. In this case, the respondents failed to prove any such cause for the petitioner’s dismissal. They insinuated that the petitioner abandoned his job. To constitute abandonment, these two factors must concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship. Obviously, the petitioner did not intend to sever his relationship with the respondent company for at the time that he allegedly abandoned his job, the petitioner just filed a complaint for regularization, which was forthwith amended to one for illegal dismissal. A charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, more so when it includes a prayer for reinstatement.

Floren Hotel v NLRC, 458 SCRA 128 (2005)

In our view, petitioners failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the charge of abandonment. Petitioners merely presented joint affidavits from hotel supervisors Agustin Aninag and Lourdes Cantago and other hotel employees showing that Calimlim, Rico, and Bautista simply went on absence without leave after they were confronted with certain irregularities, and that Abalos and Lopez likewise just left their employment, also without filing leaves of absence. Those joint affidavits, however, are insufficient as they do not show that the absence of Calimlim, Rico, Bautista, Abalos and Lopez were unjustified. More important, they do not show any overt act that proves that private respondents unequivocally intended to sever their working relationship with the petitioners. We have held that mere absence from work does not constitute abandonment.

GSP Manufacturing Corp v Cabanban, 495 SCRA 123 (2006)

Abandonment as a just ground for dismissal requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to perform his employment responsibilities. Mere absence or failure to work, even after notice to return, is not tantamount to abandonment. The records are bereft of proof that petitioners even furnished respondent such notice.

Furthermore, it is a settled doctrine that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with abandonment of employment. An employee

who takes steps to protest his dismissal cannot logically be said to have abandoned his work. The filing of such complaint is proof enough of his

desire to return to work, thus negating any suggestion of abandonment.

2. Absenteeism Cases

City Trading Inc v Balajadia, 498 SCRA 309 (2006)

Petitioners contend that respondent’s intention to abandon his work can be gleaned from his history of absenteeism, his request for a Certificate of Employment, and the belated filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal. We hold that absenteeism per se is not an overt act which would prove an unequivocal intent on the part of the employee to discontinue employment. In the case at bar, respondent was able to explain his alleged absenteeism. He did not report for work beginning January 7, 2001 because the chief mechanic and cousin of petitioner informed him that he may continue working but should not expect to be paid his salary. Later, the company secretary and sister of petitioner John Edles told him point-blank that his services have already been terminated. Petitioners neither controverted nor denied these incidents.

Inference Cases

Hacienda Dapdap v NLRC, 285 SCRA 9 (1998)

It has been said that abandonment of position cannot be lightly inferred, much less legally presumed from certain equivocal acts such as an interim employment.

Specific Acts Cases

Premiere Development Bank v NLRC (293 SCRA 49 (1998)

Abandoning one's job means the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment and the burden of proof is on the employer to show a clear and deliberate intent on the part of the employee to discontinue employment. The law, however, does not enumerate what specific overt acts can be considered as strong evidence of the intention to sever the employee-employer relationship. An employee who merely took steps to protest her indefinite suspension and to subsequently file an action for damages, cannot be said to have abandoned her work nor is it indicative of an intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. Her failure to report for work was due to her indefinite suspension. Petitioner's allegation of abandonment is further belied by the fact that private respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Abandonment of work is inconsistent with the filing of said complaint.

1. Loans

Borrowing Money

• Borrowing money is neither dishonest, nor immoral, nor illegal much less criminal.

• BUT, said act becomes a serious misconduct that may justly be asserted as a ground for dismissal WHEN REPREHENSIBLE BEHAVIOR SUCH AS THE USE OF A TRUST RELATIONSHIP AS A LEVERAGE FOR BORROWING MONEY is involved.

Cases

Medical Doctors Inc v NLRC, 136 SCRA 1 (1985)

As stressed by the labor arbiter in the aforequoted paragraphs, borrowing money is neither dishonest, nor immoral nor illegal, much less criminal. Private respondent paid the money she borrowed from the hospital patient. She was even recommended for permanent appointment from her probationary status, from clerk to secretary, by her immediate superior, Sis. Consolacion Briones.

It may be added that she must have been compelled to borrow P50.00 from her patient because of economic necessity, which circumstance should evoke sympathy from this Court, the very constitutional organ mandated by the fundamental law to implement the social justice guarantee for the protection of the lowly, efficient and honest employee, who is economically disadvantaged, like herein petitioner!

Pearl S. Buck Foundation Inc v NLRC, 182 SCRA 446 (1990)

However, said act becomes a serious misconduct that may justly be asserted as a ground for dismissal when reprehensible behavior such as the use of a trust relationship as a leverage for borrowing money is involved. A recipient of largesse may be so grateful that out of a sense of "utang na loob" she may lend money to an employee or relative of a benefactor believing that the loan would be paid anyway In this case, the fact that Aliarte has retracted her complaint is of no moment. She loaned money to the respondent, not once but twice and there can be no other assumption where the money came from except from the trust funds intended for the ward.

2. Courtesy Resignation Cases

In document Gobierno del Estado de Puebla (página 31-55)

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