R EQUERIMIENTOS

As has been already mentioned, the discourse on “Kresy” has experienced a considerable revival after the fall of communism. At the same time, however, its “outdated” character has become increasingly obvious, not only for the liberal side of Poland’s field of power, but also for the wider public scene. The traditional“Polishness” of the Kresy concept, its clear orientalist aspects and its identification with the conservative right had made its appeal restricted.

In particular, for the liberal camp, references to Kresy are difficult, although, as I have suggested earlier, the total abandonment of the concept, given its root-edness in Polish culture, is not conceivable even for this part of the intellectual scene. Thus, while left-liberals call for total rejection of the notion, mainstream liberals continue its use, albeit in highly self-reflexive and restricted ways.

Mainstream liberals try to find a balance between the embeddedness of the Kresy notion in Polish traditions and liberal values such as openness, multi-culturalism or self-reflexivity. Thus, given such restrictions on the use of the old Kresy concept, a need for new ideologies of Eastness emerged, in particular, in liberal sectors of the Polish field of power. A demand for new identity discourses became particularly clear at the regional level. In Poland, the regional reform of 1998, which introduced 17 new large regions (voivodships), involved an assumption that the new regions needed to be furnished with clear territorial identities. This emphasis on the cultural dimension of what was basically a political reform, could be seen as a local manifestation of a much wider global trend known as “new regionalism” (Larner and Walters, 2002). This trend was characterized by a push for transforming regions into self-accountable entities similar to corporations. The new identity discourses were especially sought-after by peripheral regions which badly needed ways to relate to some historical and cultural narratives linking them to the past. It was necessary, however, that these narratives be compatible with the values of future-oriented ideologies of progress and with those of European integration.

In such context, the Kresy discourse with its conservative connotation was clearly not the answer for the new regions of Eastern Poland.

One of key answers to the above mentioned demand was what I will call here the“borderlands discourse” or more precisely the “new borderlands discourse”

and which I will discuss in this chapter. This discourse is increasingly popular

in a wide variety of contexts, in particular, in“new” Polish regions (created by the regional reform of 1998), which are supposed to develop their regional iden-tity narratives and which are faced with the challenge to become economically marginalized since the beginning of the post-communist period. The border-lands discourse can be clearly seen as a new“ideology of Eastness”. However its “oriental” and “Orientalizing” traits are much more subtle than those of the old Kresy discourse. After all, the new borderlands discourse is a product of the liberal sector of thefield of power, and its ideological assumptions are largely characteristic for the political philosophy of the Euro-enthusiastic political camp. This does not mean that uses of the new borderlands discourse are restricted exclusively to the liberal sector of the field of power. Just as the Kresy discourse is in different subtle ways integrated into many liberal discourses, in the same way, elements of the new borderlands discourse may be found in different types of conservative, that is, Euro-skeptic discourses. In effect, one could be presently impressed with the number of publications on borderlands in Poland originating in the field of widely defined regional studies. Tens of books, numerous journals and hundreds of articles are published each year on borderlands, and the notion proves to be also popular in the entire region of Central and Eastern Europe.

What are the particular features of the new borderlands discourse that make it attractive for contemporary users´ The advantages of the new borderland dis-course can be well demonstrated when we compare the borderland notion to the related notion of a periphery. While the notion of a periphery, in particular, in systematic approaches such as Stein Rokkan’s analyses of peripheral regions (Rokkan, 1980), is based on assumption of dependence between centers and peripheries, the concept of a borderland usually ignores the question of external, or, even, any power relations and dependencies as well as the ques-tion of the relative status of a region in wider spatial hierarchies. Borderlands are usually imagined as spaces of crossing external influences seen as forces that increase the spectrum of possible choices for the inhabitants of a region, rather than forces that restrict any of the inhabitants’ freedoms. Typically, these external forces are imagined predominantly in cultural terms, and are supposed to enrich a given region culturally. This tendency may allow classifying the new discourse on borderlands as strongly influenced by cultural reduction-ism, characteristic for most of the intelligentsia-developed identity discourses in Central and Eastern Europe. In this way, the concept of a borderland may not only allow the marginalization of the problems related to the dependence of peripheral regions, but, moreover, transform them symbolically into an asset.

A marginal region becomes supposedly privileged as it may profit from the richness of cultural flows, which are allegedly less accessible to areas that do not enjoy borderland status. The assumption of richness of cross-cutting cul-tural influences in borderland regions may be seen as related to liberal ideals of multiculturalism, diversity, openness, or cosmopolitanism. At the same time, it allows the opportunity to ignore most of the questions regarding power relations. One can, thus, relate the periphery-borderland opposition to

the opposition between the paradigm of conflict-oriented and that of social integration-oriented sociological inquiry, introduced in thefirst chapterof the book. In fact, both the old Kresy discourses and those on the new borderland can be related to the integration paradigm, however, their effectiveness, as far as integration capabilities are concerned, is clearly unequal. The devaluation of the Kresy discourse may be to a large extent related to its deconstruction in the current political context, in particular, from the point of view of the liberal sector of thefield of power. From that viewpoint, the integrative power of the Kresy discourse is challenged, foremostly because of the controversial nature of its universalizing potential and because of its strong and explicit references to Polish culture and its traditional heritage. However, looking from the conservative view point, the Kresy discourse is a typical social integration discourse, aiming for creation of a common cultural frame and celebrating the cultural diversity and interaction between cultures. In a left-liberal view, the Kresy discourses are, however, as it has been discussed in the previous chapter, seen as a narrative of possession and domination, permeated with symbolic violence.

In contrast, the new borderland discourse may be seen as having a much higher ability of masking the power relations on which it is build or by which it is employed. The ethnic or national neutrality of the new borderland dis-course is recognized much more broadly than that of the Kresy disdis-course or that of the open national discourses. In its view, a borderland appears as

“nobody’s land”, as a space open for any actors willing to build a civic commu-nity that will be based on peaceful cooperation of cultures. The wider context, in particular, the geographic setting in which a given region is located, is imagined as a space that offers possibilities rather than a space that imposes constraints or coercion. At the same time, looking from the perspective of Rokkan’s approach, any periphery may be seen as a region, whose fate is largely determined by forces acting on it from superior central places or zones, located higher in the spatial hierarchies. These forces may not neces-sarily fully determine the destiny of peripheries. All subordinate actors, even in a pessimistic conflict-oriented paradigm, do have at least a limited margin of lib-erty, especially regarding the recognition of their subordinate position. Periph-eral regions may also profit from games between several centers competing for influences over them. A periphery that enjoys such liberty of balance between two or more centers is called, in Rokkan’s nomenclature, an “interface per-iphery”. More generally, Rokkan sees peripheral regions as dependent on processes of interaction between centers above them. Both tension and coop-eration between higher order centers may bring opportunities and threats for the development of peripheral regions located between these centers. Hier-archies of space, in which peripheries are located, are also produced by the interactions of higher order centers. A good example is what Atilla Melegh called the “East-West slope” (Melegh, 2006). Its logic defines the conditions of functioning of all spatial units in the Central-Eastern part of the continent (that is, zones one and two, using the conventions adopted in this book).

In any case, a conflict-oriented approach assumes that peripheries of all types have a considerably restricted scope of choices and that the development of their social structures is highly dependent on the external forces acting on them. As has been mentioned earlier, the classic choice facing peripheral actors is one between collaboration with the centers and resistance to their domination. In contrast, the new borderlands discourse marginalizes the role of such external factors in the analysis of any internal developments on a regional scale. Borderlands, particularly in their idealistic and optimistic visions, are presented as spaces of freedom and opportunity. They are often imagined as being in many respects even greater than those enjoyed by inha-bitants of central regions and metropolises. Borderland ideologists often emphatically argue that core areas are supposed to be dominated by their single mainstream cultures and ideologies. Peripheries, where several cultures meet and compete, supposedly offer a much wider choice of possible identities and lifestyles to their inhabitants who can freely choose their social roles. In such visions, peripheries become incarnations of the post-modern constructivist paradigm of self-constructed and self-reflexive identities. Not surprisingly, idealized images of peripheries are often used to prove the waning role of the nation states, and the advent of a post-national, cosmopolitan era.

The new borderland discourse usually includes the questionable assumption of transparency of borders and that of a universal trans-border interaction, both of which assumptions have been mentioned in the introductory chapter.

In general, the new borderland discourse may be seen as simultaneously idealistic and highly normative. One could see a discrepancy between nor-mative and descriptive elements in the new borderlands discourse. This often seems to make addressing inter-cultural tension and discussing hidden power-relations difficult when using this type of discourse. Often, discussion of borderland identity has clear elements of visions of an ideal society to be implemented in regions, which can claim a status of borderlands. Ideal border-lands are characterized by their“openness” and “tolerance”. Ideal inhabitants of borderlands are supposed to be adapted to “otherness”. Diversity, as for example Polish sociologist Grzegorz Babin´ski had suggested, may produce conditions, in which no culture or group dominates, and none aspires to dominate. This is a typical vision of a borderland as a community devoid of power relations, a community that consists of free and equal citizens or even resi-dents, given that“ideal” borderlands are supposed to be open to all newcomers.

What is also characteristic for such visions is that they usually assume perme-ability of borders, which, as has been mentioned at the beginning of this book, may be seen as a typical manifestation of contemporary discourses of space.

Crossing legally or illegally the borders of borderlands is supposedly not only easy, but also common, and desirable. A typical resident of a borderland is supposed to be constantly on the move and be surrounded by other people who are also on the move. This ubiquitous movement induces an unprecedented mobility of ideas, cultures and values, which eventually may transform a given region into an incubator of innovations. Let me quote sociologist Zbigniew

S´wia˛tkowski, who has been writing about the Polish–German borderland in such a characteristic way:

confrontation of different cultural experiences effects in multiplicity of viewpoints, greater openness to new ideas, diversity of interpretation. This is a phenomenon particularly conductive to emergence of innovations due to widening of meanings of problems and increasing of possible ways of their solving.

(S´wia˛tkowski, 2005: 301) According to Zbigniew Władysław Paszkowski, the classic traits of a borderland region include “susceptibility to change, mobility, adaptability to changing conditions and trends, innovativeness. These traits of the philosophy of the borderland transform a marginal region into region of expansion, innovation, region of cultural melting pot characterized by creative and developmental growth vector.” (Paszkowski, 2011: 87). The opposition between the supposed

“diversity of borderlands” and “uniformity of the center” characteristic for the new borderland discourse appears often as contradictory, since, in fact, usually the central, core areas, such as global metropolises, may boast a high diversity and a feeling of personal autonomy, produced by anonymous social relations. Nevertheless, borderlands, in the discourses under consideration, are usually presented as paradoxically very similar to core areas in diversity, openness and, among other positive features, tolerance. This can be inter-preted as an attempt of discoursive promotion, or reevaluation, of peripheral regions by means of imagining them as similar to metropolitan areas in terms of characteristics, considered of special importance in the context of post-modern or post-industrial“societies of the future”. One could note that such discourses could be also interpreted as a compensatory offer based on cultural reductionism and directed to peripheral areas by the elites of the core. The offer consists of an act of recognition of the special cultural status of given peripheries, which would be courteously declared as being on equal footing with the cultural status of central areas. This recognition of the supposedly special cultural potential of the peripheries, imagined as multicultural bor-derlands, assumes the potentiality of their development and offers them a symbolic valuation. The above recognition may be also seen as a politeness strategy directed towards weaker actors. At the same time, however, it silences the dependent location of peripheries, as well as their usually low status in economic and political hierarchies.

The recognition of cultural potentiality in many instances turns into a conditional offer for full recognition. In other words, we may see here the compensatory nature of borderland discourses. These discourses, on the one hand, celebrate such supposed assets as superior levels of openness and tol-erance, acceptance of otherness, cultural diversity, freedom of identity choice, multitude of perspectives, high potential of innovativeness, ability of crossing borders (especially symbolic) and several others. On the other hand, however,

the compensatory nature of borderland discourses confines all of them to the cultural sphere and silences more tangible aspects of the status of peripheral regions, such as their economic and political dependency. Moreover, one can question many of the assumptions of the idealized borderland discourses by inquiring into the actual levels of indicators pertaining to social and cultural development, and diversity in specific regions. Their higher values in regions, which may claim status of borderlands, may not always be confirmed by empirical data.

One could argue that the above confusion between empirical and normative elements of the borderland discourse makes it an efficient tool for legitimization of power relations or, even, of symbolic violence. On the one hand, the borderland discourse pretends to be a descriptive narrative, an account or generalization of trends, which are supposedly observed in many regions all over the world. On the other hand, it presents an idyllic vision of unlimited possibilities for the development of borderland regions, which can be seen as similar to visions of core areas in terms of potential for development. That optimistic vision is, however, conditional. This transforms the borderland discourse into a normative narrative of how the “truly modern” regions should look like. While the cultural potential of borderlands, supposedly comparable to those of central areas, is admitted, it is imagined as a“task”, set for the region. Sometimes, the message of borderland discourses, in parti-cular, if it comes from a core area and is directed to peripheries, seems to be that of a promise. A borderland region, if it mobilizes its resources, can become one day a new Silicon Valley. However, this would happen only if the borderland region achieves a similar degree of cultural and ethnic diversity as California’s famous high-tech belt. At the same time, it is suggested that fac-tors like cultural diversity, openness and tolerance were the crucial facfac-tors leading to the economic success of such regions as the Silicon Valley. At least, this is the message coming from the work of authors like Richard Florida.

Florida, in his The Rise of the Creative Class (Florida, 2004), argued that cultural diversity is the key to economic success. So, what is expected of most borderlands is primarily a mobilization of their cultural resources and the smart use of those resources. This can allow the borderlands to become new centers of growth, as well as to attract investments and human resources from all over the world. To achieve this task of turning their peripheral character into centrality, borderland regions have, of course, to develop a full awareness of the potential that their region possesses. This awareness development requires a mental transformation on the part of the inhabitants of borderland regions, which includes internalizing modern borderland values, becoming aware of their regions’ symbolic resources, and developing a vision of their regions as spaces full of possibilities rather than constraints.

A characteristic feature of the borderland discourses, therefore, is that they blend descriptive and normative elements in a single narrative. On the one hand, borderlands are identified as regions that are inherently multicultural, diverse, open, tolerant and creative. On the other hand, they are expected to

fully develop these traits and, especially, to be able to capitalize on them in ways that are comparable to those of multicultural metropolises. Such discourse of the borderlands’ “hidden potential” or of their not fully used poten-tials can be seen as a tool for legitimization of their subordinate status. It is, in fact, assumed that the“potential of diversity and innovativeness” is there, but that potential may not be fully employed in the economic development pro-cesses, as is the case with the majority of core areas. Thus, borderlands are expected to mobilize their inhabitants so that they could capitalize on the

fully develop these traits and, especially, to be able to capitalize on them in ways that are comparable to those of multicultural metropolises. Such discourse of the borderlands’ “hidden potential” or of their not fully used poten-tials can be seen as a tool for legitimization of their subordinate status. It is, in fact, assumed that the“potential of diversity and innovativeness” is there, but that potential may not be fully employed in the economic development pro-cesses, as is the case with the majority of core areas. Thus, borderlands are expected to mobilize their inhabitants so that they could capitalize on the