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Los Racionales y la recta

In document 120893498-teoria-de-conjuntos.pdf (página 91-95)

Cap´ıtulo 2: Sistemas Num´ ericos

Teorema 2.43. La suma de n´ umeros racionales verifica las siguientes propiedades.

3. El racional 0 = [(0, 1)] es neutro con respecto a la suma, es decir, para todo

2.3.4 Los Racionales y la recta

The hierarchical nature of the godhead was a key component of ancient Jewish understandings of God, but scholars who have argued for a clear line of separation between the creator God and all other reality have also identified an important aspect of ancient Jewish conceptions of the divine. To demonstrate how foundational the notion of God, the creator, was for Jews living in antiquity, here I turn my attention away from an exclusive focus on Philo and draw instead upon a collection of extent Jewish sources that date to the first century CE. These include Philo, Josephus, 2 Baruch, 4 Ezra, the Book of the Parables, 2 Enoch, and the

Apocalypse of Abraham.168 Earlier texts illustrate a similar phenomenon (cf. Isa. 40:26, 28; 44:24; 45:12, 18; 48:13; 51:16; Neh. 9:6; Hos. 13:4 LXX; 2 Macc. 1:24; Sir. 43:33; Bel 5; Jub.12:3–5; Sib. Or. 3:20–3).169 Yet I conduct a close analysis of texts dating to the first century CE for two interrelated reasons. First, these Jewish sources date as close as possible to the time of the composition of the Gospel of John.170 Since this dissertation traces lines of continuity and discontinuity between the Gospel of John and other contemporaneous Jewish texts, the employment of these sources enables me to situate the Gospel of John within a particular chronological framework. Second, I employ a wide variety of different Jewish voices rather than

168 All of these Jewish texts likely date to the first or second century CE. For Philo,see Schenck, A Brief Guide to Philo, 9; Sterling, “Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series,” ix. For the placement of

Josephus’s lifetime between 37–100 CE, see Life of Josephus, 49. For a late first-century dating of the books of 2 Baruch and 4 Ezra, see Stone and Henze, 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch, 1–18. For a late first-century dating of the Apocalypse of Abraham, see R. Rubinkiewicz, “Apocalypse of Abraham. A New Translation and Introduction,” in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha. Vol. 1 Apocalyptic Literature and Testaments, ed. James H. Charlesworth (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1983), 681–88, esp. 683. For the dating of the Book

of the Parables between the late first century BCE and early first century CE, see Loren T. Stuckenbruck

and Gabriele Boccaccini, eds., Enoch and the Synoptics: Reminiscences, Allusions, Intertextuality (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2016), 5–6; Loren Stuckenbruck, “The Book of Enoch: Its Reception in Second Temple Jewish and in Christian Tradition,” Early Christianity 4.1 (2013): 7–40; George W.E. Nickelsburg & James C. VanderKam, 1 Enoch. A New Translation (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004), 6; On the possible dating of 2 Enoch to the turn of the first century CE, see R.H. Charles and W. R. Morfill, The Book of the Secrets of Enoch (Oxford: Clarendon, 1896); F.I. Anderson, “2 (Slavonic Apocalypse of) Enoch: A New Translation with Notes,” in James C. Charlesworth, ed., The Old

Testament Pseudepigrapha: Vol. 1—Apocalypses and Testaments (New York: Doubleday, 1983), 94–97.

Admittedly, the dating of 2 Enoch remains a bit of an enigma. See Grant Macaskill, The Slavonic Texts of

2 Enoch (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 3. Even a date as late as the tenth century CE has been proposed. See J.T.

Milik, The Books of Enoch: Aramaic Fragments of Qumran Cave 4 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), 110–12; 114–15.

169 For these citations, see Bauckham, Jesus and the God of Israel, 9 note 8. Bauckham also lists examples from the Sibylline Oracles and Joseph and Aseneth, such as Sib. Or. 8:375–76; Sib. Or. frg. 1:5–6; Sib. Or. frg. 3; Sib. Or. frg. 5, and Jos. Asen. 12:1–2, but the dating of these texts is uncertain, with scholars proposing a range from the second century BCE until, in some instances, the fifth century CE or beyond. With respect to the Sibylline Oracles, see James Charlesworth, The Old Testament

Pseudepigrapha. Vol. 1 Apocalyptic Literature and Testaments (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1983), 322, 416,

469. With respect to Joseph and Aseneth, see Tyson L. Putthoff, “Aseneth’s Gastronomical Vision: Mystical Theophagy and the New Creation in Joseph and Aseneth,” Journal for the Study of

Pseudepigrapha 24.2 (2014): 96–117, esp. 99.

170 The final form of the Gospel of John likely dates between 90–110 CE. See Brown, An Introduction to the Gospel of John, 199–215.

the perspective of a single author to illustrate how pervasive the concept of God as creator was. Many scholars today conflate their insistence that ancient Jews viewed God as creator with an equally firm resolve that ancient Jews were unequivocally monotheistic. However, byseparating these two concepts and focusing exclusively on the former, I demonstrate how the two are not inextricably linked. The description of God as the one uncreated entity from which all other reality flows is not incompatible with a hierarchical conception of the godhead.

Now, to a certain extent, the notion of God as creator was so ubiquitous within the ancient Jewish imagination that it would seem to need little comment. All extant Jewish authors from the first century CE use the term “creator” in reference to God and the descriptor appears more frequently than any other when they attempt to articulate who God is. Both Josephus and the author of 2 Baruch refer to God as our creator (War 3.369, 379; 5.377; 2 Bar 14.15, 44.4, 82.2).171 The author of 4 Ezra describes God as the one who has created the world (4 Ez 6.55).172 Josephus and the author of the Apocalypse of Abraham each respectively have the patriarchs refer to God as the creator of everything (Ant. 1.154–5, 271–2) and the one who created all things (Ap. Abr. 7:10). The author of Book of the Parables describes God as the sole creator of the universe (2 En 33.8).173 Even Philo of Alexandria, who is typically reticent to describe God

171 The author of 2 Baruch also refers to God as the “who created the earth” (2 Bar 21.4); the one “who created the world” (2 Bar 21.25); the one who “created all things” (2 Bar 49.1); the one “who created us” (2 Bar 79.2; cf. 54.10, 79.2); the one who reigns “over all creation which [his] right hand has created” (2 Bar 54.13); and the one who “will renew his creation” (32.7).

172 Elsewhere the text of 4 Ezra either explicitly or tacitly refers to God in similar ways, such as describing God as the “maker” of Israel (4 Ez 5.33); the one who has “created” (4 Ez 5.43, 8.7); the “creator” (4 Ez 5.44); the one present at the “beginning of creation” (4 Ez 6.38); the one who visits his “creation” (4 Ez 5.56); the one who will “deliver his creation” (4 Ez 13.26; cf. 7.75); and the one who “made all things” (4 Ez 16.63; cf. 7.70, 8.13, 8.44).

173 Elsewhere the author of 2 Enoch describes God as the one who “created from non-being into being, and from invisible into visible” (2 En 24.2; cf. 65.1); the one who “has created” every living soul (2 En 61.1); and the one who “created all things” (2 En 66.4).

in terms of what God is (rather than is not)174 consistently conceives of God as the creator (ποιητής) of the world. The appellation arises in every one of his treatises, occurring over two hundred and sixty times.

This remarkable consistency of language proves noteworthy because despite the chronological proximity of these Jewish works, they arise in response to different socio- historical concerns. The authors compose their work in different original languages. They pen their words in Palestine and the Diaspora. They respond to concerns prior to, and in the aftermath of, the destruction of the Second Jewish Temple. Despite these differences, they remain astonishingly consistent in their intellectual conceptualization of God as the one uncreated entity from which all other reality emerged. Employed far more often than any other appellation with respect to God, their frequency alone reveals how foundational was the notion of God as creator for the Jews living at this time.

The idea of God as creator of the world proliferates within the ancient Jewish imagination around the turn of the Common Era because of how pivotal the opening chapters of the book of Genesis had become. Since these creation narratives were some of the last parts of Genesis to be put into writing, interest in them emerges toward the end of the Second Temple Period.175 A case in point of this trend arises with respect to the pseudepigraphical Life of Adam and Eve.176 Composed in the first century CE, the work offers extended re-writings of the creation narratives. Considering the popularity of this rewriting and of the creation accounts from

174 Schenck, A Brief Guide to Philo, 56–57; Runia, “God and Man in Philo of Alexandria,” 55– 56; Cox, “Travelling the Royal Road,” 177–78.

175 See Lester Grabbe, “Adam and Eve Literature,” in Judaic Religion in the Second Temple Period. Belief and Practice from the Exile to Yavneh (London: Routledge, 2000), 95–97.

176 M.D. Johnson, “Life of Adam and Eve,” in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha. Vol. 2. James H. Charlesworth, ed. (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1983), 249–95; Gary Anderson, Michael Stone, Johannes Tromp, eds. Literature on Adam and Eve. Collected Essays (Leiden: Brill, 2000).

Genesis from which it emerged, both the language contained within the and their conceptualization of God as the creator of the universe infiltrated other contemporaneous Jewish works. Yet more than merely labeling God as creator, these authors drew directly from Genesis to ensure that their audiences knew that it was their God—the God of the Jews, the God of Israel—who created the world. Jewish authors from the first century CE, for instance, consistently emphasize details such as the order in which the first chapter of Genesis presents the unfolding of creation (2 En 24.2–30.8; 4 Ez 6.38–54; Ant. 1.26–34; cf. Gen 1:1–2:3).177 Or how the second chapter depicts God creating Adam from the dust of the ground (Ez 3.5–6; 4 Ez 7.62– 63; 2 Bar 48.44–46; Philo, Opif. 135; QG 1.4; Leg. 1.33–37; cf. Gen 2:7). Or how God begets parts of the creation into existence by God’s mere word (4 Ez 3.5; 6.38; 16.55–56; 2 Bar 14.17; 21.4; 2 En 25.2, 5, 26.1, 3; Philo, QG 1.4; cf. Gen 1). By referencing these specific details from their scriptures, these Jews established an inextricable link between their God and the creation of the world. Amid competing claims for authority, they retold stories of the world’s origins by identifying their God as its creator. The consequence of these hermeneutical maneuvers is that just as the opening chapters of Genesis often refer to God as creator of the world (Gen 1:1, 16, 21, 25, 26, 17, 31; 2:2, 3), so too the most frequent appellation employed by Jews in the first century to describe God is likewise that of creator.

Yet more than merely conceiving of God as creator, these first-century Jewish intellectuals sought to articulate a clear separation between the creator God and all other reality.

177 By way of example, the entirety of Josephus’s Ant. 1.26–34 is a close re-telling of Genesis 1 and 2 (cf. 2 En 24.2–29.8; 4 Ezra 5:56–6:6; 4 Ez 6:38–54; 2 Bar 14:13–19; 2 Bar 48:44–46). Though Josephus does not quote directly from the Septuagint’s version of Genesis (for example: he employs the verb κτίζω rather than ποιέω to describe God’s creative action), his words are so closely aligned to the biblical text that there can be no question that his writing is dependent upon it. He not only follows the precise order of events as they unfold in Genesis, but he also places the story of how God creates the world at the beginning of his Antiquities. This position indicates how central the image of God, as creator, was for his retelling of Jewish history (cf. Ant. 20.259).

Josephus, for instance, commences his Antiquities with an appeal not only to “regard God, and his construction of the world (τὴν τοῦ κόσµου κατασκευὴν),” but also to remember that humans are “the most excellent of the works [i.e. creatures] of God upon earth” (Ant. 1.21).178 The author of 2 Baruch presents God as the one who governs all the creatures that God’s right hand has created (2 Bar 54.13 and 2 Bar 48.9, respectively). The author of 2 Enoch underscores the omnipresent nature of God in order to chastise those tempted to worship created entities in lieu of the Lord of all creation (2 En 44.1; 65.1; 2 En 66.4–5; cf. 2 En 24.1–33.1, esp. 24.45; 49.1; 58.1–2; and 66.4–5). Yet Philo of Alexandria, despite his clear understanding of the hierarchical godhead, stresses the distinction between creator and all other reality more clearly than the others. He frequently describes God as the creator (ποιητής) and father (πατήρ) of all things (Opif. 7, 21; Mos. 2.48), for instance,179 including other gods (Spec. 1.20), and he openly condemns those who assume that the world exists without a creator (Opif. 1.7).180 Moreover, he regularly reminds his readers that the “world was created” by God and that humanity was the “last of all created things” which God had made (Philo, Opif. 171b and Opif. 83, respectively). These designations demonstrate the clear delineation that Philo and other contemporaneous Jewish authors draw between these two realms within their thought.

178 The Greek text can be found in Flavius Josephus, The Jewish Antiquities, Books 1–19 (trans. H. St. J. Thackeray et. al.; LCL; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930–1965). Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Josephus, including this one, are my own.

179 Although Philo describes God as creator upwards of one hundred times, these citations are instances where he describes God as both creator (ποιητής) and father (πατήρ) simultaneously. For examples of where he refers to God as the Father (πατήρ) who has created (ὁ γεννήσας), or more simply as God (ὁ θεὸς) who has created (ὁ γεννήσας), see Cher. 23; Deus. 47; Her. 205; Somn. 76; Spec. 3.189. For places where Philo describes God as uncreated (ὁ ἀγενητος), see Cher. 44; Sacr. 66; Gig. 42; Deus. 56; Plant. 31; Her. 14; Mut. 22, 45; Decal. 41; Praem. 87.

180 Elsewhere he even goes on to assert that those who doubt God’s existence—and thus by default assume that the world itself is uncreated—commit the greatest of all vices (cf. Spec. 1.32)for, as he claims, such nonsensical positions can only be affirmed by those who have darkened the truth with fabulous inventions (Philo, Opif. 170, cf. Philo Conf. 114; Leg. 1.49; Spec. 1.32).

A closer look at some of Philo’s philosophical sayings reveals that the distinction he makes between these two realms moves is more than mere semantics; rather, Philo draws an ontological distinction between his creator God and all other reality. On the one hand, Philo’s conceives of his supreme deity, the creator God (to whom he often refers as τὸ ὄν, or the Existent) as immutable, unchangeable, atemporal, eternal, and utterly sufficient unto himself (Mut. 27; Opif. 100). This creator God comprises the top of Philo’s divine hierarchy and is “divine in an ultimate, unshareable sense” (Leg. 2.1; Sacr. 91–92; Mut. 27; Virt. 65; Legat. 115).181 While other entities, such as the λόγος, σοφία, and the δύναµις, come close to this supreme deity, they cannot properly be considered synonymous with this sole uncreated one. Philo depicts them as participating in the divinity of Philo’s supreme creator God, often working alongside God the creator. Yet any one of these lesser divine entities “never become or threatens to become the primal God.”182 As an example: Philo presents the λόγος as neither uncreated nor created (Her. 206), but this language separates the λόγος from Philo’s highest divinity, who alone can be considered uncreated.183 This is because Philo’s creator God, true Being itself, is immutable and an entity unto himself.

By contrast, everything else that participates in this supreme deity’s divinity is mutable. This logic applies equally to entities such as λόγος, σοφία, and the δύναµις, who though separate from God are also subsumed under the broader rubric of God’s oneness, and to entities that have been created, such as the celestial beings, heroes and daimones, and even humans. Since the purpose of God’s powers is to enact change in the world in a manner that Philo’s supreme

181 Litwa, “Deification of Moses,” 5–8, esp. 6; idem, We are Being Transformed, 106–109. 182 Litwa, “Deification of Moses,” 5–8, esp. 8; idem, We are Being Transformed, 106–109. 183 James McGrath and Crispin Fletcher Louis have each, respectively, cited this example to suggest that among ancient Jews there was a clear bridging of the Creator-creature boundary. See McGrath, Only True God, 13; Fletcher-Louis, Jesus Monotheism, 298.

creator deity cannot, and since created entities are, by their very definition, constantly in motion, they are subject to change, unlike the supreme Creator God. The key distinction between Philo’s creator God and all other reality, then, is that while the former is immutable, all other reality is mutable. Accordingly, though Philo does frequently assert that God is one (Opif. 171; Decal. 65, 81; Leg. 1.51; Conf. 144), the primary way that he describes God is not in monotheistic terms. Rather, like his first-century Jewish contemporaries, he differentiates between the creator God and all other reality: while God is immutable, all other reality is mutable.

I have already established with my analysis of Philo that the ancient Jewish understanding of God as the sole creator from whom other reality flows is thus compatible with a hierarchical view of the godhead, but several other first-century texts also illustrate this argument. This is because first-century Jews envisioned the one God of Israel working alongside several different accomplices, even at times employing pre-existent materials to produce God’s creation. Despite 2 Enoch’s strong statements regarding God being the sole creator of the universe (2 En 33.3–8), for instance, 2 Enoch also depicts God employing pre-existent materials or even parts of God’s own self to accomplish God’s ends. Light emerges from the belly of Adoil, a mystical invisible being (2 En 25.1–5; cf. Gen 1:3–5). The firmament appears through Archas, another mystical invisible creature, who assists in the creation of lower things (2 En 26.3; cf. Gen 1.6–7). Moreover, personified wisdom functions as the principal agent by which humanity comes into existence (2 En 30.8). Consequently, rather than envisioning something akin to the construct of creatio ex-nihilo,184in which God creates the world from non-being into

184 2 Macc 7:28 provides unequivocal evidence for the concept of creatio ex nihilo in Jewish thought. Thus, contra Gerhard May, this concept did not originally emerge in the late second century CE. See Gerhard May, Creatio ex Nihilo: The Doctrine of ‘Creation Out of Nothing’ in Early Christian

Thought. trans. A. S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), esp. 2. For a scholar who refutes May’s

position, see also Paul Copan, “Is Creatio Ex Nihilo a Post-Biblical Invention? An Examination of Gerhard May’s Proposal.” Trinity Journal 17.1 (Spring 1996): 77–93.

being, the author portrays God creating from the invisible things into the visible (2 En 24.2; cf. 2 En 65.1).These accomplices do not challenge the uniqueness of the supreme creator God, nor do they distract from God’s oneness; rather these divine entities participate with Israel’s highest divinity to create the world.

Likewise, despite the author of 4 Ezra’s similar stress on the one God as sole creator of the universe, closer examination reveals that this notion is also more complicated than the word monotheism implies. On the one hand, the author envisions Israel’s supreme deity existing alone prior to the creation of all other things. Note, for instance, how the author has Uriel, the angelic interlocutor in the text, explain to Ezra, the text’s primary figure, the role that God played in the creation of the world.

[Uriel] said to me, “At the beginning of the circle of the earth, before the portals of the world were in place, and before the assembled winds blew, and before the rumblings of thunder sounded, and before the flashes of lighting shone, and before the foundations of Paradise were laid, and before the beautiful flowers were seen, and before the powers of movement were established, and before the innumerable hosts of angels were gathered together, and before the heights of the air were lifted up, and before the measures of the firmament were named, and before the footstool of Zion was established, and before the present years were reckoned, and before the imaginations of those who now sin were reckoned, who stored up treasures of faith were sealed—then I planned these things, and they were made through me and not through another, just as the end shall come through me and not through another. (4 Ez 6.1–6)185

With an eleven-fold repetition of the word “before,” the author stresses the pre-existent nature of God.186 Since God—and God alone—was present prior to all else, God must be seen as the world’s sole originator. On the other hand, the author re-writes the opening chapter of Genesis with a nod towards those who act as God’s accomplices (4 Ez 6:38–54). Twice the author hints

185 See also 4 Ez 3.5, where the author asserts that God formed the earth “without help.” Note that translation from 4 Ezra have been taken from B. M. Metzger, “The Fourth Book of Ezra” in The Old

Testament Pseudepigrapha, vol. 1 ed. James H. Charlesworth (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2011), 517–559. 186 Elsewhere in the text the author asserts that “before the world was made for them to dwell

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