Rasgos históricos de la violencia familiar en el Perú

Independent, Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 1.

?’The first victim, a border guard, was incorrectly described by his killers as an airline security guard. BBC, Early Evening News,

Saturday 9 April 1988. The second victim, a clerk, was alleged to have been a "Kuwaiti officer". The Guardian, Friday 15 April

1988, p. 1.

* ^ Associated Press, _{Monday 11 April 1988.}

* * The Independent, _{Monday 11 April 1988, p. I;} The Guardian, _Monday

11 April 1988, pp. 1 and 5.

*^The Ot>server, _{Sunday 10 April 1988, p. 21. At Larnaca, the}

hijackers issued demands for fuel as early as their first night at the airport. The Guardian, _{Saturday 9 April 1988, p. 1,}

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surrender. It is arguable that for a team which cited the only two possible conclusions of the incident acceptable to it as being martyrdom and victory, to have achieved neither represented resounding defeat, yet the hidden agenda of escape with life and limb may well have been an unstated, long term aim throughout. Irrespective of their actual intention, the fact that escape was achieved further enhances the professionalism of the team, the powers of which made realistic military opposition virtually impossible.

Organisationally, a command structure seemed to operate within the group, at least in terms of negotiating policy.** With explosives alleged to have been planted at Mashhad and with escape chutes removed at Larnaca,** they ensured that any military intervention would result in widespread fatality to hostages, captors and strike forces alike and so remained largely confident of their continuing safety. The competence and confidence of the hijackers were together another important factor in the longevity of the venture. Skills derived, most likely, from rigorous training were used with ruthlessness and efficiency when required and made it impossible for negotiators to win material concessions at times when lesser hijackers might have yielded to their efforts.*® Despite the high risks entailed in escalating the incident by murdering a hostage while on Cypriot territory, the gang did so, electing to follow up the first killing with another two days later. These activities on board were carried out very discreetly, to avoid causing panic among the remaining passengers. This emerged in interviews with subsequently released hostages, who knew nothing of the two murders.**

The gang remained sufficiently detached from the emotional implications of their violence to exercise relaxed but firm control over the remaining hostages and to continue bargaining with the Larnaca control tower in a rational and measured way. Similarly, the hijackers were equally able to exert sophisticated psychological techniques upon passengers and crew, maintaining order on board the cramped and unhygienic jet for over two weeks and, when desired, resorting to torture while presenting a public image of complete civility during most radio exchanges. The group consistently avoided hasty overreaction to potentially dangerous developments while on the ground, as with the landing of the Greek military aircraft and the infiltration on board of poisonous fumes, both noted above. The hijackers' high degree of confidence was also shown in their occasional appearances outside the passenger cabins, often in full

**rhe Sunday Times, _{Sunday 17 April 1988, p. A13.}

**fhe Guardian, _{Monday 11 April 1988, p. 5;} The Internationai Herald

Tribune, _{Monday 11 April 1988,} p. 5; ITN, Early Evening News,

Saturday 10 April 1988.

•®Dr, James Thompson of the Middlesex Hospital debriefed some hostages and was later able to conclude from his investigations that special psychological training had probably been given to the hijack group, which he referred to as "a special operations squad".

The International Herald Tribune, _{Friday 22 April 1988, p. 2.}

view of armed guards patrolling nearby, as well as in their readiness to cooperate with authorities in administrative matters such as the admission of hygiene crews and food consignments and the movement of their aircraft on at least two occasions.*?

Tactically, the hijackers used a wide array of measures to gain advantage over negotiators. The most effective of these were demand and mood variation in the conduct of negotiations together with a general deviousness, by which progress would seem to have been made towards settling the dispute, before priorities were changed, rendering previous discussions worthless. Yasser Arafat claimed that this approach was adopted in Cyprus, where the second murder came as a completely unexpected development within 24 hours of a deal almost having been struck and within minutes of what had seemed a constructive meeting with the PLO representatives.** This use of erratic demand and mood swings characterised the g a n g ’s approach to negotiations and passenger treatment.

On arrival at Mashhad its list of demands was first made known in unequivocal and disturbing terms but was followed only a few hours afterwards by the release of a sick hostage, with every indication being made that the hijackers were fair-minded and humanitarian combatants, eager to provide negotiators with goodwill gestures. Soon almost half of those on board had been freed by the hijackers who were prepared to take the extraordinary risk of limiting the list of passengers on the aircraft to those of Arab nationalities, in order to concentrate its campaign on Kuwait and to discourage external interference from western governments. This had the triple effect of simultaneously implying that the hijackers were prepared to give signs of compassion to hostages not directly implicated in their struggle; focusing very real threats on a more select, and so more vulnerable, collection of individuals; and stepping up the level of conflict with Kuwait.

The t e a m ’s use of deadlines early in each negotiating setting placed pressure on states to respond either by attempting to satisfy requests immediately or by actively attempting to moderate the demands imposed. As deadlines were progressively extended and forgotten only to be reimposed and extended once more, negotiators were encouraged to believe that threatened violence would not be perpetrated on board. The ground violence at Mashhad and the killings at Larnaca served to emphasise the unpredictability of the team and its commitment to its cause. Only in Algeria were deadlines rarely imposed and never executed, although memories of such brutality as the murders at Larnaca would have kept Algerian negotiators alert to the dangers posed by the rational yet unpredictable gang.

The operation carried out by the anonymous hijackers of Flight 422 was unusual in its length, its complexity and its ability to confound international efforts to end it. Not only did it illustrate the

*?The Guardian, _Thursday 7 _{April 1988, p. 1;} The Times, _{Thursday 7}

April 1988, p. 1; The Daily Telegraph, _{Thursday 7 April 1988, p.}

48; The Scotsman, _{Friday 15 April 1988, p. 1.} **ITN, Channel 4 News, _{Tuesday 12 April 1988.}

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problems of g o v e r nme nts ’ most senior officials to combat aviation terrorism at its most professional but, as shall be demonstrated, it rendered ICAO’s air crime conventions inoperable.

3.3,2. Kuw aitLM tborltjes

If the hijackers genuinely believed that the Kuwaiti government would publicly announce substantive concessions on the issue of the 17 convicted terrorists, they were naïvely mistaken on a crucial element of their siege strategy. The E m i r a t e ’s experience of intimidatory action for their release over the preceding four years had resulted in its leaders concluding that the dangers entailed in giving its terrorist enemies so major a propaganda victory should be avoided. Hence, throughout the 16 day hijacking it became clear that the Kuwaitis would not be seen overtly yielding to pressure on the principal aim of the incident.*’ This, combined with the government's policy of refusal to communicate directly with the g a n g ” presented a unified and systematic operational framework on which to encourage the development of favourable public opinion with its own domestic supporters and with its political allies in the west. Yet behind the austere appearance of determined opposition to blackmail, it is evident that Kuwait was directly involved in the dynamics of negotiation with the firm objective of securing the safe release of its citizens.

In tandem with its requests to Iran, Cyprus and Algeria to keep the 747 grounded and to avoid granting concessions to the group, the Kuwaiti government was probably using its ministerial presence at each airport to coordinate the peaceful solution which it sought and even at times openly advocated. Although officials of Iran and Algeria complained of Kuwaiti d e l e g a t i o n s ’ resolute refusals to make any offer relating to the 17 pri son ers ,’* the apparently powerless r e p r e se nta tiv es’ presence was vital to the success of negotiating efforts. The twin competences of supervising and assisting resident negotiators amounted to a difficult and complex damage limitation exercise in which two potentially mutually exclusive goals required to be satisfied. Simultaneously, it was

negotiators directed the hijackers away demands were credible and capable of being

the use of violence against hostages. Eventually Algerian involvement allowed both aims to be reached by presenting the terrorists with a compromise between the impossibility of a victory and the undesirability of a potentially bloody defeat. It is probable, however, that Algerian involvement in the case would have been promoted with the blessing of Kuwait which had been active in

necessary to from a belief granted, while ensure that that their discouraging

* ’From the outset, the Emirate maintained that the issue of the 17 prisoners was not to be negotiable. The Financial Times,

Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 1.

” The Observer, _{Sunday 10 April 1988, p. 21.}

’*The Times,

Thursday 7 1988, P. 1