Realidad Problemática Local

The Warsaw rising started on 1 August 1944. The cable informing about the outbreak was received by Polish telegraphists at Branes Lodge in London the same day.9 _{However, because}

the message did not have the authorisation of the AK command, it was ignored.10 _{It was only on}

2 August, when the Commander of AK, Tadeusz Bór-Komorowki, confirmed that the rising had begun, that the Polish government released information to the public. The British and American governments claimed that it had taken them by total surprise; Stalin did not acknowledge that the uprising was taking place until 13 August.11 _{Yet, Moscow radio had already appealed on 29}

July to the citizens of Warsaw to assist the liberation of the capital and, a day later, the Soviet controlled station Kościuszko broadcast in Polish:

‘Soviet forces are advancing forcefully and approaching Praga (…) people of the Capital! To arms! May the whole population rise like a stone wall around the CNL (Committee of National Liberation) and the capital’s Underground Army!’ 12

London was aware of these broadcasts; dispatches from the eastern front were also confirming that the Red Army was preparing for the liberation of the Polish capital. The broadcasts of the Polish Service and Radio Polskie, however, were in sharp contrast with Soviet appeals; instead of ‘to arms’, they advised: ‘be patient, do not strike too soon’.13

Contrary to what was claimed, it was not a secret that the AK was planning an uprising and more importantly, as Macdonald in 1971 recollected, ‘everyone was expecting it’.14 _{The Polish}

Service editor explains:

‘In the BBC (…) we were waiting for it. (…) the Soviet communiqués told of the victorious advance of the Red Armies towards the Vistula. We knew also from the monitoring of broadcasts that Radio Moscow and Radio Kosciuszko were calling on the people of Warsaw to rise. (But)…some of us knew more’. I knew (…) of Operation Burza by the Home Army, (…) that in the general plan for the Warsaw rising the

8 _{Ciechanowski, The Warsaw Rising of 1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 67.} 9 _{Davies, N., Rising’ 44: The Battle for Warsaw (London: Macmillan, 2003), pp. 11-13.}

10 _{Siemaszko, Z., Dziewięć Spojrzeń na Powstanie Warszawskie w latach 1969-2014 ( London:}

Siemaszko, 2014), p. 13.

11 _{Davies, op. cit., p. 164.}

12 _{Ibid, p. 165. Praga refers to suburbs of Warsaw east of river Vistula.}

13 _{Briggs, A., The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom: The War of Words, Vol. 3 (Oxford:}

Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 619.

Government Delegation and the Home Army Commander had discretion when to begin the battle, within certain dates. Of course, the British Government and General Staff had also been informed, though they themselves had their difficulties– in liaison with the Kremlin and the Red Army.’15

This was further confirmed in the dispatches from the eastern front. The Times reported on 1 August that the Russian High Command had announced the previous night that Marshal Rocossovsky’s men were fighting within 10 miles from Warsaw. ‘It is clear’, The Times concluded ‘that a bridgehead has been established over the river above the city’.16 _{The Times}

dispatch was also included in the Polish Service press review.17

The BBC Home Service followed the same line. On 1 August it reported at 7:00 am that the Russians were 12 miles from the Polish capital and were getting ready for the liberation. The afternoon bulletin gave a further update, announcing another advance of 9 miles towards Warsaw. The broadcast of the Polish Service was more detailed: ‘the Red Army captured three Warsaw suburbs: Wolomin, Radzymin and Otwock and was 15 kilometres from the heart of the city’.18 _{According to this broadcast, the AK had cooperated with the Red Army and an air fight}

was taking place between Russians and Germans over Warsaw; both reports were untrue. First, no cooperation or communication had been established between Warsaw and the Russian command; all messages sent by the insurgents to the Soviet command were ignored; and, secondly, Stalin had given orders forbidding the Red air force to fly over the Polish capital.19

In addition, before news of the outbreak of the Warsaw rising had reached London, the director of the PWE Polish Region, Moray Maclaren, together with one of the BBC programme writer, Louis MacNeice, had prepared a programme celebrating the liberation of the Polish capital by the Red Army.20 _{This programme, written already on 31 July and recorded on 1 August, also}

highlighted the desire of the Polish nation for good relations with the USSR and acknowledged the Polish Underground’s achievements. Given that it touched on sensitive subjects, permission for broadcast was required from the Foreign Office.21 _{In general, the Foreign Office official,}

Frank Roberts, argued that it was a good idea to broadcast such programme but had reservations regarding ‘the playing up of the Polish Underground Army and the Polish Underground

State’.22 _{The BBC was willing to modify the script, but became concerned that the Polish}

15 _Ibid.

16 _{The Times, Digital Archive, p. 5. The Times reported first time on the outbreak on 3 August.} 17 _{BBC WAC, Polish Service Bulletins, 7:20am, 1 August 1944.}

18 _{Ibid, 9:20am.}

19 _{Ritchie, A., Warsaw Rising: The Fateful Uprising (London: Harper & Collins, 2014), p. 493.} 20 _{NA, FO 371/39427, Frank Roberts to Features Department, 2 August 1944; The programme was}

recorded on 1 August at 7:15pm; rehearsal at 10.30a.m.

21 _{BBC WAC, R34/516, Policy: Poland, 1939-44, Leslie Stokes to Foreign Office, 2 August 1944. and ibid.} 22 _{NA FO 371/ 39427; Roberts to Features Department, 2 August 1844.}

announcer would inform the Polish government about the changes. Nevertheless on 4 August the Foreign Office changed its mind; there was a veto on the broadcast of the programme by all BBC Services.23 _{However the European Service directives referred on 1 August to an item}

prepared by the European Service news desk called ‘The Fall of Warsaw’ and required all the BBC foreign Services to broadcast it and to play Polish and Russians anthems after the main news.24 _{It is likely that the programme in question had been prepared by Maclaren and}

MacNeice, but because only written bulletins survived the war, it is impossible to verify that this was indeed the case (see chapter 2).